

SEEKERS AFTER SOUL

JOHN O. KNOTT

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
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SEEKERS AFTER SOUL

BY

JOHN O. KNOTT, Ph. D.



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TO
THE TWO IN MY HOME
TO WHOSE SELF-SACRIFICE AND THOUGHTFULNESS
ARE LARGELY DUE
MY UNINTERRUPTED HOURS FOR STUDY
THIS VOLUME IS DEDICATED
BY THE AUTHOR

A PERSONAL WORD

The author of this volume deems it but justice to himself and to the reading public as well, to say: There was no intention of making a book when the matter herein contained was first prepared. The chapter on "The Persistence of Ideas" is the essence of a Thesis presented a few years ago to the Faculty of Washington and Lee University for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy. This, with the chapters on Plato, Kant and Hegel have since been rewritten and cast into a more popular form: they are now published for the first time. In the meantime the chapters on Job and Browning had been published in a somewhat different form from that in which they now appear, in the "Methodist Review," Nashville, Tenn.

It was not easy to find a title which would adequately cover and describe the varied work of this little volume. Without any specific intention on the author's part, he found that, while stressing the salient doctrines of some of the men who had, in his estimation, influenced most the thought of the world, he had in every case selected a champion of Soul as against Matter. The men whose lives and labors are particularized in this book have been earnest seekers after that spiritual Something which lies back of mere matter, but which is manifested in and through matter. They have been among the great assertors

A PERSONAL WORD

of the Soul in philosophy and poetry. The term "Soul" is here used in the widest possible sense, including the rational, spiritual and immortal in man and in the universe.

The author has not concerned himself much about what is ordinarily termed "originality." What is said concerning Plato, Kant and Hegel has been drawn, largely, from the standard Histories of Philosophy and from the published Lives of these men. The brilliant sketch of the History of Philosophy forming Ludwig Noiré's Introduction to Max Müller's translation of Kant's "Critique of Pure Reason," has been freely used, as it seemed to leave nothing wanting as a clear and adequate résumé of the history and trend of thought from the earliest times to the days of Kant. To Prof. Simon N. Patten's "Development of English Thought" is due a debt for a working basis in seeking the origin and cause of the particular development of Ideas.

If the author may be allowed to express what he conceives to be the particular merit of his work, he would say it consists mainly in "point of view." This, in more of detail, in connection with the treatment of the chapters on Job and Browning, and in calling attention to the Persistence of Ideas in relation to the Soul of Things. The point of view from which the book as a whole is seen, is created by showing a great heart among the Hebrews and another among the Greeks, groping in the same age for light on the subject

A PERSONAL WORD

of Immortality, followed by chapters on the evolution and trend of thought bearing on this and kindred subjects, till the poet-philosopher, Browning, is reached, in our own day, whose confident assertions concerning God and the Soul serve as the best expression of the thought of our age as well as of the fruit of the world's thinking.

After what has just been said it is scarcely necessary to add that the end at which the author aims is to be *suggestive* rather than to speak dogmatically on the great subjects touched upon in this book. Henry Drummond was accustomed to say that the books which helped him most were the books with which he differed most. The books that stir us either to meet their implied teachings, or that create in us a desire to know more of which the books themselves give us but a glimpse, are apt to be ultimately of most help to us.

Acknowledgment is hereby made to Rev. Geo. B. Winton, D.D., of Ardmore, Okla., for reading the proofs of this volume, and for many suggestions, the most of which have been followed. Other friends have made the author their debtor, but their names, as in case of so many of the world's most helpful spirits, do not appear in the records.

Warrenton, Va.
April, 1911.

J. O. K.

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I

JOB: THE SOUL'S PATHFINDER

The Book of Job occupies a unique place in the world's literature. There is nothing else just like it in or out of the Bible. While the style is poetical, the form is not such as we can readily classify. It is drama, but unlike any other great drama we know. It is tragic, but has not the "fatal issue" of conventional tragedy. Though the book stands apart, it has had great influence upon both the style and thought of writers in different ages; Goethe is indebted to it for the *motif* of his "Faust."

The book as a whole makes perhaps the strongest appeal to the heart of any of the Old Testament writings. Carlyle said it was "all men's book." It has been the treasure-house from which lonely sufferers through the ages have drawn comfort and inspiration. What a pity such a piece of literature has not been cast into better form than we find in our Authorized Version! Perhaps the most readable and understandable of the many translations of Job, at least for the general reader, is Genung's "Epic of the Inner Life." Hengstenberg's "Lecture on Job" in his commentary on Ecclesiastes contains, in small compass, as sane an interpretation of the book as one will find anywhere.

What I propose in this chapter is not a learned

essay on the age of the book, the profundity of the themes discussed, or a criticism of how far the text has suffered corruption. Experts have already done much of all this, and will continue to handle such details of technical scholarship. What is herein attempted will concern a viewpoint from which to see the book as a whole as to its purpose and unity. While slight reference must be made to the age of the book and to the character of its author, the more simple and more practical as well as interesting questions are these: What inspired the production, and where should the emphasis fall?

We may safely assume that the Book of Job was written much later than our forefathers supposed. The subjects discussed, as well as the knowledge displayed; the philosophizing tendency seen throughout, and the nuggets of wisdom dropped here and there indicating the crystallization of thought; the problem especially discussed—the meaning of evil as experienced by the righteous; and the incidental allusions to immortality and such kindred themes—all tend to prove that this book was written by a representative of a people that had already a history and a literature. Poetry is indeed among the first forms of the literature of a people, but not such poetry as we find here. A nation may have its legends and epics, celebrating the doings of its heroes, but the story of Job does not belong to these. In Greek literature we have first epic, then lyric poetry, and finally

drama in its various forms, followed by philosophy; but in the Book of Job we have the epic, the drama, and philosophy, all represented, until it is difficult to say which predominates.

Who was Job? Probably the writer himself was the real Sufferer, while the traditional Job was a convenient personality for the writer to use to make known his experience as well as enforce the principles he would enunciate. Not that the writer of this book actually endured the peculiar tribulations the traditional Job experienced; but a man at some point in later Jewish history, in the midst of great national and personal afflictions, had his heart turned to the story of the Job of tradition and found in him a character suited to his purpose for such a book as he would write. That such a man as Job might have lived and been known far and wide as a person of unparalleled afflictions, is quite easy to believe. That his experience was proverbially alluded to by the Jews is practically demonstrated by Ezekiel's reference to him. But the name, signifying "Sufferer," gives more than a hint as to how we may regard this remarkable personality. In the case of "Malachi," we can regard the name as one borne by the prophet, or take it as meaning "My Messenger"—the more reasonable interpretation—and leave the name of the prophet unknown; so in the case of Job, the name and "Sufferer" may have meant one and the same to the Jews. Or if some such history had grown up about this character as was, in its:

way, associated with the mythical King Arthur, how natural to use the name and history to tell a story which the world has read with such response as it could give only to a story true to human experience and inspired of the Spirit in its revelations! Singular indeed that men should concern themselves more about a literal Jonah, and especially about the particulars of his life in the whale's belly, than about the principle the story was given to enforce! Is it of any great moment whether there was an historical "Samaritan" who relieved the wounded man on the Jericho road? We know the underlying truth has been often exemplified. So our belief or disbelief in the historicity of the man Job is not the great concern in our interpretation of the book, but how far we catch the import of the grave questions which the book discusses. Drop out mythical King Arthur, yet we have in the "Idyls of the King" one of the most powerful pronouncements on Sense and Soul that any language contains.

The mention of Tennyson's "Idyls of the King" leads to the suggestion that the Book of Job bears a relationship to "In Memoriam," which has been, so far as I know, overlooked. In making a comparison of the two productions, we gain a point of view from which I conceive the Book of Job can be seen in its development. Not that the English poet had in thought the Hebrew writer when he gave us his evolution of sorrow as well as its analysis; but because affliction as experienced

by different souls will take much the same form and in its development will follow in any age much the same course, we have this interesting parallel.

Tennyson's poem was born, as all know, of a crushing sorrow. Arthur Hallam's death was the occasion of its being written, but the moving cause was to ease the poet's heart:

For the unquiet heart and brain,
A use in measured language lies;

and so to wrap himself in words, "as in coarsest cloth against the cold," he sets about to write. Whether men who write "under inspiration" know at the time the full import of their attempts, and the use the world will make of them, is doubtful. It is no reflection upon the author of the Book of Job, or upon Paul the apostle, to say that the books written by both were afterwards used by the world in ways far and beyond what their authors dreamed. We can well understand how an ancient Hebrew writer, convinced that he has found the true secret of affliction, pours out his utterances in "measured language," using different characters to typify different phases of one and the same error, while the hero, Job, moving in a much higher realm, resists them, though he is unable to find the whole truth till God appears, when all is made plain. We can understand how the author's heart was eased in writing this book, and how with confidence he committed it to the world—feeling that it contained the truth, yet not realizing that

he had written something which many capable of judging declare is the noblest of all Old Testament books.

In the development of thought both in the Book of Job and in the "In Memoriam," we meet at the first conventional comforters. Tennyson says friends came to him to say "loss was common;" that "other friends remained"—and with such well-worn phrases showed how far they were from appreciating his grief, and how inadequate were their attempts to comfort him. Their words rather embittered than consoled, and certain parts of the English poet's work sounds much like Job's challenge of the Almighty as to why such suffering as his was ever permitted.

Both poems have a decided turning point, and it is where the consciousness comes to each man that human help is vain, and that the problem must be worked out by the sufferer alone, relying upon God to aid him. Even further than this we can push our parallel. We see in "In Memoriam" an intimation of a better mind when the poet says:

I hold it true, whate'er befall;
I feel it when I sorrow most;
'Tis better to have loved and lost
Than never to have loved at all.

With this intimation of coming light, we follow the development of thought till the writer becomes prophetic, suggesting Browning in his glad and bright outlook:

O, yet we trust that somehow good
Will be the final goal of ill,
To pangs of nature, sins of will,
Defects of doubt, and taints of blood;

That nothing walks with aimless feet;
That not one life shall be destroyed,
Or cast as rubbish to the void,
When God hath made the pile complete.

We feel sure that after this sentiment Tennyson will come into the full light; and he does. He finally comes to find his loved Arthur "on the rolling air" and "in the rising sun": he feels him "in each star and flower," as a power diffused, yet as a personality loved not less but more. Then as the light of morning breaks into the flood of day, God's great purpose is seen, and firm belief in immortality swallows up the poet's grief. The close of the poem is one glad song of faith and praise.

In the Book of Job, long ere we find the patriarch boldly asserting his faith that God will appear to vindicate him, we see intimations of "turn" in thought. We see the last cable cut that binds him to human aid. We see him at first drifting, till, strengthening himself to meet the cruel waves, he surmounts all successfully, and a prophecy of triumph makes us sure he will triumph, which he finally does. This will be given in more detail later. Suffice it now to say that while Arthur Hallam's death brought, by regular development, the pure but not over serious English poet to earnest thought and finally to firm faith in immortality,

so the afflictions of Job (call him the patriarch or the author of the book) brought him by the same hard but sure way to a faith in God and God's control of all things, till he could say with Paul in the after years: "All things must work together for good to them that love God."

With this parallel in mind, which by anticipation suggests the view point from which I would interpret the Book of Job, the story of Job is in order.

The scene opens with a simple but beautiful picture of domestic bliss. The rich Job, with every evidence of favor from fortune, is nevertheless pure and upright, and thus dear to God. Not only is Satan envious at this, but professes to have no belief in disinterested goodness. To all intelligent readers of the Bible it is clear that in dealing with the Satan of Job we are having to do with a personage seen through the medium of the popular belief of the day. As with the parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, the underlying truths are taught by means of coloring suited to the times.

If the question be asked, Why did God give heed to Satan and allow such sorrows to come upon Job? The reply might be made by asking, Why did God permit Israel's choicest souls to endure such afflictions as we find chronicled in the Epistle to the Hebrews? On a grassy lawn at Lexington, Mass., is a rude monument of stone that marks the place where Captain Parker, commanding a little band of Americans in 1776, determined to with-

stand the oncoming British. His words are engraved on the simple monument: "If they mean to have war, it might as well begin here." The conflict was irrepressible. So it would seem that sooner or later some one must meet and successfully put to silence Satan's contention, if for nothing else, for the sake of those who might be misled by it, that men are righteous from desire to retain or secure temporal good from God. To demonstrate Satan's miscalculations, and incidentally to show God's guidance when everything appears to be under Satan's control, the powerful forces of evil are permitted to be let loose upon Job.

The time selected for the onslaught of Satan is the happiest hour in the history of the family—namely, when the children of Job are celebrating the birthday of their oldest brother. There is no premonition of impending danger. We have seen at times a dark cloud from the west marching in the sky, ominous and ugly, and pausing on its way, due to contrary winds, suddenly drop near the earth and hang over a quiet settlement of happy homes in a mountain valley, while from the bosom of the sky came crash after crash, as lightnings were poured forth upon the earth, till it would seem God himself had forgotten to protect His children from nature's wrathful forces. So we find the disasters in the case of Job coming not singly,

But as though they watched and waited,
Scanning one another's motions;
When the first descends, the others
Follow, follow, gathering flock-wise,
Till the air is dark with anguish.

The prosperous and God-fearing Job arises in a few hours to find himself childless, bereft of property, and stunned beyond expression at the pitiless strokes of the God whom he has ever honored.

How long Satan waited to make the second attack is not told. But still professing to believe that if Job's body is tortured and his life despaired of, he will forsake his faith in God, the Adversary receives permission to let loose other afflictions. It is now well understood that the peculiar bodily malady of Job was a form of leprosy which was a most revolting thing, and was especially, in that day, taken as a sure sign of God's displeasure. He who saw that disease, must be convinced thereby that God convicted the man so cursed of unconfessed sin. Afflicted with this loathsome curse, in spite of his having hitherto kept his integrity, Job goes down into darkness with even his wife advising him boldly to assert that God had been unjust to him.

We come now to where the emphasis must fall in reading the Book of Job. What has been said so far is but the framework. The discourses that consume most of the book occupy much the same place here that the story of Æneas occupies in Virgil's great epic, where we see a condition created

with purpose to give the hero an opportunity to tell the story of the taking of Troy. So this Hebrew genius, with an instinct for a "sympathetic" situation, ingulfs a man in dire afflictions and then calls to the scene the wisdom and the theodicy of the day, and allows it to do its best to solve the problem as to the meaning of suffering like this. Well may we imagine the peculiar satisfaction the author of this great poem had in doing what Dante afterwards did when the Italian poet placed some Florentines in hell that he might show to mankind how superficial, if not positively culpable, was the spirit that assumed to judge men and morals in that day! Who can doubt that Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar were but convenient names to impersonate certain doctors of the law and prodigies of wisdom in the author's day—men from whom he had suffered much, but who, like incompetent physicians, aggravated rather than healed his wounds? What a stroke of art to place these men thus in the pillory to be ever afterwards gazed upon and laughed at for their pretensions as well as for their incompetence! Conventional comforters, they were! They professed to be able to solve the mystery of the ages, as to why God permits such suffering as we see man enduring. Job's afflictions gave the coveted opportunity, and they gladly availed themselves of it; and the deliverances of these men, which consume the greater part of the Book of Job, make an open show of their inability to cope with the situation.

Notwithstanding the length of the discourses of Job's friends, as well as the number of them, the principles involved are few, and small space only need be taken to get an idea of their import. One can hardly suppose these men, upon coming to visit Job, were altogether ignorant of the character of their friend's misfortunes. But the sight which met their eyes—the utter wretchedness, and worse, the manifest evidence of God's displeasure as shown in the character of Job's disease—deprived them of speech for the time. The “seven days” silence might have continued indefinitely had not Job broken it. When he did, however, the perplexity of his friends developed into amazement. His words sounded to them as blasphemous. He who in happier days calmly philosophized with them on the wisdom of God in ruling the world, and, it may be, sympathized to an extent with their notions of retribution, has now deserted the time-worn and age-tried paths and is at variance with the world's ripest wisdom. Genung has well said: “The first feeling of a soul plunged thus into undeserved misery we can readily divine—the sense of utter bewilderment.” Doubtless the very silence of the patriarch's friends had a significance he was quick enough to perceive. He knew their theories, and that they had their eyes and thoughts on the telltale disease which had revealed Job's real trouble. He saw they were not disposed to adjust their theories to changed conditions. Something in their unsympathetic looks occasioned an out-

burst from him that is one of the most agonizing cries ever wrung from mortal lips. His is the experience, he says, of one whose "way is hid"—whose sighs and groans are poured out in vain. He would blot out the day upon which he was born, and gladly be hid in the grave, even if it meant annihilation.

Eliphaz, probably the oldest and the wisest of the three friends, is first to speak. He says with more consideration what the others afterwards say in substance. We are impressed with the didactic style of the Temanite, and see through all he says that he conceives it to be his duty to "deal with" Job, in order to bring him to a better mind. The theory running through all that Job's friends say might be summed up thus: If affliction comes, it is a sure sign of man's sin. If man will acknowledge his sin, and bow submissively to God, evil fortune acts as a corrective—as chastisement—and the man will recover his former prosperous state. But if a man rebels, or fails to acknowledge that his affliction comes of his personal sin, he thereby proves he is far gone from righteousness. Eliphaz proceeds to reprove Job's unwillingness to admit and submit. Nothing could be more poignant than his concealed method of revealing his mind to Job:

Bethink thee now: who that was guiltless hath perished?

And where have the upright been cut off?

As I have seen — they that plow iniquity

And that sow wickedness, reap the same.

He will not say that Job has been guilty of sowing wickedness, or plowing iniquity, but the cruel "*As I have seen*" provides an ambush for the man who would shoot such a dart.

The same spirit of insinuation is seen in his further words concerning the course Job should pursue. The speaker does not in a straightforward manner tell Job to make his peace with God, but says:

But I, I, would seek unto God,
And unto the Mightiest would I commit my cause.

The sum of the entire utterance is: "Your peculiar afflictions demonstrate that God has found you out, for nothing like this happens to perfectly righteous men. If I were in your place I would confess my sin, make reparation, and then find that the very stones of the field, as well as the beasts thereof, will be at peace and in league with you: you shall go to your grave like a sheaf garnered in its season." Very good advice under some circumstances, and good for a "text" when conditions justify; but wide of the mark in Job's case.

Bildad follows, after Job's reply, in words less conciliatory, for Eliphaz's wisdom has not been effective. The second friend indeed hesitates not to say what the other no doubt felt—

If thy children have sinned against Him,
So hath he given them over into the hand of their
transgression;

which is to give utterance to about as cruel a sentiment as one can well conceive: "Your children are in league with you in iniquity, and God has first destroyed them to give you warning—your time is coming next." Alas, that from the pulpit we hear an occasional Bildad expressing himself thus, to the confusion of some poor sorrowing soul!

If Bildad is rude, Zophar is dogmatic. His speeches are but two in number and both brief. His contention is that Job's "babblings" should be put to silence, and his assertion of guiltlessness in God's sight develops something like frenzy in this reverend gentleman. He would have God appear, and thus shame Job's pretentiousness. Zophar spoke truly as did the other friends, save that their truth rooted in untruth kept them falsely true. The sequel shows that when God did appear, Job acted much as Zophar said he would, yet Zophar's confusion was much more than Job's. A nice distinction must be noted here. When Jesus said, "The words I speak unto you, they are spirit and they are life," he indicated that much concerning God's relation to man (and this includes doctrine) cannot be confined within the boundaries of forms to be repeated from generation to generation. On the other hand, to use a well-known and beautiful illustration, trust must ever

Leave its low-vaulted past,
That each new temple, nobler than the last,

Shut it from heaven by a dome more vast,
Till it at length is full,
Leaving its outgrown shell by life's unresting sea!
Holmes "*Chambered Nautilus*"

Job's friends belonged to that class of exasperating men who cannot see what the philosopher Hegel contended for, namely, "Truth is made up of contradictions." Had Paul been "consistent," he would not have been the man for the great work to which God called him. So when Zophar says,

O that God would speak,
And open his lips against thee,

he is at once giving the true solution to Job's troubles, and at the same time giving expression to what was false as well as heartlessly unappreciative of Job's attitude to God. We must believe that the author of the great drama we are discussing meant to give the "friends" credit for much sincerity. His particular aim was to show the inadequateness of the best the world had to give on a subject so vital to mankind. Incidentally he would show how cruel men become by being linked to mere traditional opinions concerning God's attitude to man. Friends may under such circumstances become positive tormentors. God may be caricatured by His very defenders. Well might a prophet, probably living in the very age that produced the Book of Job, cry out, "Is there no balm in Gilead; is there no physician there?"

Job's replies to his friends show how carefully

the book was planned. Not till all have spoken does the afflicted man see the utter barrenness of their theories, and not till then does he detect that, as physicians in their diagnosis, they have not understood his case. This revelation gives Job both comfort and courage. In the twelfth chapter we see the turning point, where the sufferer changes his attitude to his professed comforters and says:

Of a truth, ye are the people,
And wisdom will die with you!
I also have understanding, as well as you;
I am not inferior to you;
And who knoweth not things like these?

Later on he says:

Patchers-up of nothings are ye all.
Would that ye were silent altogether!

How plain the real situation now! Conventional wisdom, in phrases that are worn threadbare, is repeating itself over and over in application to a case where it does not apply! Verily, the Book of Job does not wholly belong to the list of "ancient" volumes!

Let us now turn to what is the very heart of the book, if the interpretation I suggest is the proper one. I have referred to a comparison between the "In Memoriam" and the Book of Job. Tennyson's liberty as well as incentive to think for himself came with his consciousness that friends could not help him. So we find Job in much the same situation. And as the intimation of a better mind and

a more hopeful view of all things came to Tennyson ere he prophetically announced his conviction that all would be well, so in Job we find two expressions related to each other as a streak of day might be related to full dawn. If we translate chapter xiv. 14 as in our Authorized Version, the suggestion made here as to its being a pivotal expression still abides; but if we translate as Genung (whose version I am using in all quotations), the connection appears clearly, while the translation itself is the most reasonable one I have seen suggested:

If a man die—*might* he live again,
(Then) All the days of my service would I wait,
Until my renewal came;
Thou wouldst call, and I would answer;
Thou wouldst yearn after the work of Thy
hands!
For *then* wouldst Thou number my steps.

This entire passage is put provisionally, and hints at what will follow in the development of Job's thought. Bearing in mind that at the time this book was written the doctrine of man's living again was not what it was even when the Book of Daniel was given to the world; and that, furthermore, the individual writer, on account of his afflictions, may have had to do as many men to-day must do—explore for himself ground that he had learned to believe in from what others had told him; in any case, hope that God will yet make plain what He had suffered to come upon this man,

is beginning to appear and takes the form of a provisional expression, which in its turn promises something more decided.

When the nineteenth chapter is reached, Job has touched the bottom of his despair and the author has half completed his book. The well-known "redeemer" passage marks both Job's Gethsemane and his Mount of Transfiguration. Is it fanciful to suggest that the author of the Book of Job would have us learn through the development of this remarkable character that men grow prophetic when the hours are darkest? When flesh and heart fail, and human aid has long since shown that its arms are too short to be of avail; when the world's best wisdom cannot discern our real state, much less guide our steps; when, if there be a God, He must, as He did in case of enslaved Israel, appear to champion the cause of the oppressed,—is it too much to say this Hebrew poet would here enforce the well-known formula by a vivid illustration that "man's extremity is God's opportunity"? Job's provisional and hesitating expression now gives place to a firm conviction that God *will* appear to vindicate him. We simply must believe that our 1611 translators have read *into* Job xix. 25 a meaning that while at this day it is literally true, as a statement of doctrine, and will ever be sacred to us in its present form, is not a faithful rendering of Job's words. Perhaps the text has been tampered with, as many proofs indicate. Our Authorized Version has inserted *Italics* to fill in the gaps, both

to give any meaning at all to the passage and to make it say what the translators wished it to say. Witness the rendering of LXX. if one would see how remote from what we take the words to mean this translation puts us: "I know that he is eternal who is about to deliver me, and to raise up upon the earth my skin that endures these afflictions; for these things have been accomplished to me of the Lord, which I am conscious of in myself, which mine eye hath seen, and not another, but all have been fulfilled to me in my bosom." One can almost safely say that only a biblical reader with a keen eye would recognize in this translation the hallowed words used in our Burial Service! And yet this very translation—from the version used most by the apostles of Christ—contains, though in awkward phraseology, what Job really meant to say. At least, we see here a key to an interpretation which puts us in position to see the Book of Job in its unity and development.

Surely the writer of the book knew where he would carry his hero and through what way. The final expression, "Now mine eye seeth Thee," which he makes Job say in ecstasy at the close of the book, was not an afterthought of the writer. A glimpse of the truth, as seen in chapter xiv., is followed by a firm conviction that God will come to the rescue; and that conviction is so decided, the sufferer would have his words inscribed by an iron pen on a rock. The prophecy of God's coming to vindicate eventuates in His actual manifesta-

tion. Shall we then translate the "redeemer" passage as referring to Job's belief in the resurrection, or perhaps his conviction that somewhere "out of his flesh" he would see God? *He saw God in his flesh.* Why not so translate it? Granted that in prophecy a man is speaking words whose meaning is more or less obscure, but as we here see the different steps in the development of Job's confidence, we can easily believe that all these steps had reference to the glorious consummation of the book—the sight of God and Job's consequent vindication. Samuel Wesley on his death-bed put his hand on his son Charles and spoke truly of a revival that would come to the Church in England. Intuitions to serious and spiritual people are of the nature of prophecy. The writer of this Hebrew drama knew this, and makes Job speak of coming events, whose shadows were even at the time being cast before.

With translation upon translation before me from different scholars, and after having studied with experts the original, I would not pretend to give another, but embodying several of them, give a suggestion as to the probable meaning of this famous passage that speaks of Job's coming deliverance. And while what follows is rather a paraphrase, it embodies ideas suggested particularly in the LXX., the translations of Genung and Davidson, and especially the renderings suggested in their notes on the text in question: "I know that my Advocate—Avenger—liveth, and that sooner

or later He will stand at my side; and though this disease has destroyed my very skin, yet in my flesh I shall see God, whom mine eyes shall behold—a stranger no more.”

The unity of the Book of Job, then, is seen in its plunging a man into such peculiar afflictions as become unfathomable to the theodicy of the writer's day. A man thus cut off from human aid and wisdom seeks a solution of the mystery as to why God permits such things. The doctrine of God's care for His children, and consequently an assurance that if God cares, God will not destroy, is developed till it asserts that He will appear to vindicate His faithful ones, here or hereafter—expressed purposely by the author in obscure phraseology. But God does actually appear in the story, which makes us incline to the belief that the author meant that we take Job's utterance as referring to such a manifestation of the Advocate while Job was *in the flesh*. Or, more to the point, that whatever his “Job” was made to say, the author of the book intended that his prophecy should be fulfilled actually and literally while Job was yet alive.

I have purposely omitted to speak of Elihu; yet, whatever is made of his place in the book, the unity of the same is not affected—at least as far as I have seen any characterization of the man and his place.

A very suggestive fact yet remains to be noticed, namely: the appearance of the Lord to Job does

not carry with it any explanation of Job's calamities. Does not the author of our book mean to tell us that God does not explain His purpose in His dealings with us? What He does we often know not *now*. Suffice it to say that God sees and knows all. And most beautifully and faithfully is the truth brought out in the humility and submission of Job ere God has healed his leprosy or restored to him anything he has lost. Here is the answer to Satan: *Give a good man the vision of God, and he is content to suffer and to wait.* Perhaps the gladdest day of Job's life up till then was when God appeared, and while the loathsome disease was still upon him, he yet could say: "I know that Thou canst do everything, and that no thought can be withholden from Thee."

II

PLATO: INTIMATIONS OF IMMORTALITY

Lake Geneva, to appearance, is the source of the Rhone river. Further observation, however, reveals that the Rhone enters the lake at its extreme east and flows like a tide to the opposite end. Other mountain torrents also, whose beginnings must be sought far back in the snow-clad peaks of western Switzerland, contribute their share towards making the lake a huge reservoir, which in turn receives these streams, unifies and purifies their turbid waters—then sends them forth in a river so clear and invigorating that the new Rhone gushing out at the west of Lake Geneva has little in common with the muddy torrent of the same name which entered the lake at the east.

This, in figure, illustrates to some degree the place and influence of Plato in philosophy. He seems at first to be the fountain-head of philosophy. We soon discover, however, not only the Socratic spirit which like a tide flows through all Platonic writings, but we see furthermore that Plato has become a receptacle as well as transformer of all the streams of philosophic thought before him—even those whose beginnings are to be traced to the far east. In him they meet, are purified, and finally go forth from him as a majestic river to enrich the world.

PLATO, THE MAN

Plato came of noble ancestors. On his father's side he had the blood of Codrus in his veins; on his mother's, that of Solon. Such a man might appropriately be the author of the *Republic* and the *Laws*, as well as be regarded one of the most kingly of men.

As far as dates and places can in his case be relied upon, his birth year was 427 B. C., at Athens. He died in his eighty-first year, having been an author for fifty years.

Plato was by inheritance an aristocrat and by taste and tendency an artist and poet. If he was austere, or as G. H. Lewes says, really melancholy, this came of a richly sensuous nature chastened by culture. His connection with Socrates began in his twentieth year, and for eight or ten years Plato was to Socrates what John the beloved disciple was to Jesus. Indeed there is a fascinating parallel just here, both in the temperaments of the two disciples and in their methods of giving to the world the thoughts of their respective teachers. If John was the eagle-eyed, no less was Plato. If one was a mystic, so was the other. But when we read the writings of the two men we are struck with the fact common to both, viz., that they cared much more for the spirit than for the letter of the teaching of their masters. The world will never know when Plato is quoting Socrates, and when he is putting Socrates' thought in Plato's own words; just as we do not know where to draw the line be-

tween the direct utterances of Jesus and the spirit of Jesus uttered forth in the words of John himself.

At the death of Socrates, whose tragic end would have sobered a far less sensitive man, Plato seems to have withdrawn to Magara, in order perhaps to escape persecution and possibly to continue his philosophic studies under Euclides. After a short stay there, he is supposed to have journeyed to Egypt and Cyrene. Upon returning to Athens he engaged in teaching and writing to some extent, and again set forth on one of his many journeys, this time to Lower Italy and Sicily.

Many who have written "lives" of Plato or commented at length on his works, have delighted to discover how each visit made its particular impression on the philosopher, and some have pretended to classify his works according to the schedule of his travels. All we can be sure of as to the influence of these various tours abroad is that Plato was certainly broadened by them, and that they did have a tendency to correct the philosopher in regard to some of his extreme positions. Aristotle is our authority for asserting that Plato from his youth had been acquainted with Cratylus and the opinions of Heraclitus; but that his contact with "Italic" philosophy (by which term Aristotle has reference to the Pythagorean and Eleatic schools) had considerably modified his views.

At the age of forty-five or thereabout Plato took up his permanent residence in his native

city, and consecrated the now famous public garden, the "Academia," to the study of philosophy. Authorities differ as to whether the Academy represented hard thinking, or whether the way of learning was made a flowery path. Ritter says the school was the meeting place of "the higher classes who had no other object than to enhance the enjoyment of their privileges and wealth." Others think the master's lectures demanded great power of abstraction and were really severe exercises in dialectics. It is agreed that he taught gratuitously and that even women in disguise attended his lectures. Not all will agree with Lewes in saying, "he had many admirers but scarcely any friends." We had rather take the view of Zeller who pictures him as "an ideal intellect, developed into moral beauty in harmonious equipoise of all its powers, and elevated in Olympian cheerfulness above change and decay."

PLATO'S WRITINGS

The Platonic writings have come down to us practically in their integrity. We may have more than Plato wrote, but it is not probable that anything of note which was his has been lost. His writings are all in the form of dialogues, some more dramatic than others. Jowett says that as the metaphysical interest increases the dramatic power diminishes. This would be natural.

It is possible that we have a hint in *Phaedrus* with which to reply to the question, Why did Plato

write in dialogue? He says there that writing is like painting; if you ask either a question they preserve silence; if you interrogate they have only their first answer to give. Plato had seen and felt the immense influence of Socrates and had been convinced of the superiority of conversation over reading, both because the mind is more or less passive in reading, and because the listener in conversation has a chance to have the truth put in other forms by requesting it. In addition to this, Socrates' method, which Plato strictly adheres to, was that of leading his disciples out of the labyrinths of confused mental states into the region of clear thinking by question and definition. Plato, no doubt, saw that the best substitute for this sort of conversation was the dialogue, where the writer could anticipate and answer the questions of the reader.

Many attempts have been made to classify Plato's writings, yet hardly any two agree upon a basis upon which to work. For ordinary purposes the reader of Plato receives more satisfaction from knowing that of the most famous dialogues, the *Republic* discusses the ideal State with reference especially to its realizing Justice; the *Symposium* discusses philosophic Love; the *Phaedrus* discusses true and false Rhetoric; the *Protagoras*, the Socratic view of Virtue; the *Timaeus*, the Origin of the world; the *Theaetetus*, the most metaphysical of all the dialogues, discusses Theories of Knowledge; *Phaedo*, the Immortality of the Soul.

If one would select famous or beautiful passages from Plato's works, or attempt to stress certain dialogues as representing the Platonic doctrine in its essence, quite a book would result. No one begins to read the *Apology* or *Phaedo* without completing them—they are short and exceptionally beautiful. Everybody who is at all familiar with Plato knows the famous seventh chapter of the *Republic*, containing as it does the figure of the Men in the Cave, and illustrating the author's peculiar doctrines better than perhaps any one image he uses. The *Phaedrus* contains the prayer of Socrates to the god Pan, as well as the myth of the Chariot of the Soul. *Theaetetus* gives us the oft-quoted image of the Mid-wife, to which Socrates likened himself, and also the figure of the Caged Birds. In *Timaeus* we have the myth of The Creation of Man; in *Critias*, that of The Island of Atlantis, and in the tenth book of the *Republic*, The Story of Er.

For his peculiar Doctrine of Ideas the reader must take Plato as a whole, for this doctrine permeates all he wrote, yet we might specify particularly *Phaedo*, the *Symposium*, certain books of the *Republic* and above all *Phaedrus*. Of all the dialogues perhaps the *Republic* is the most finished and the most famous.

PLATO AND PRE-SOCRATIC PHILOSOPHY

In speaking of the influence of pre-Socratic thought on Plato we take up the schools of phil-

osophy not in their chronological order, but in the order in which they affected Plato. It has been already intimated at the opening of this chapter, that Plato was a kind of reservoir for all the streams of thought before him. Now it may be asked: In what order did they flow into him?

We know that Cratylus was Plato's teacher before the latter came under the influence of Socrates; and Cratylus was to an extent, at least, a Heraclitan. Aristotle tells us that Plato was familiar with Heraclitus from his youth. We know he never fully freed himself from Heraclitan influence, as his dialogues testify. We have here therefore, it would seem, the first decided influence on our philosopher.

Heraclitus, an Ephesian and contemporary with Parmenides, belongs to that class of philosophers known as Physicists. He flourished about the close of the sixth century, B. C., and made a profound impression on Greek thought. He regarded the world of sense as a perpetual delusion; what we perceive is simply phenomena. Man has no certain knowledge, but God has; but as human intelligence is but a portion of the Universal Intelligence, it follows that it must ever be imperfect, yet humanity as a whole approximates the truth more nearly than does any individual man. Man is both right and wrong in his affirmations—for truth is known but in part. Hegel's doctrine, "Being and Not-being is the same" is Heraclitan. Perhaps the doctrine of Heraclitus is best known by the

phrase "perpetual flux." As the principle of all things was conceived to be Fire—in the sense of Warmth or Ether,—the visible things of creation were in a perpetual change from this to some other form of this underlying principle or element, and then again to their original form. We never cross the same river twice; nothing is abiding, but all things may be characterized as Becoming. The doctrine of Heraclitus stands in marked contrast with that of the Eleatics, best represented by Parmenides, who taught that our senses deceive us when they represent everything as changing. The Eleatics were apostles of Stability: Heraclitus and his school, of Change. Plato knew of both these schools, and was affected by both.

Passing for the moment the direct influence of Socrates, which followed close upon Plato's study under Cratylus, we note the philosophy of the Eleatics as perhaps next in order affecting Plato.

The founder of this school was Xenophanes, whose chief tenet was philosophical monotheism, but a monotheism which was pantheism. He was born about 620 B. C. He taught that God is the one immutable and immovable Being, but not personal; the One Existence has many modes, but these modes are merely manifestations of the one God. Carried out to its legitimate end, this doctrine, which contrasts sharply with that of Heraclitus, teaches that at least the central principle of the universe is stable. Parmenides, the illustrious disciple of Xenophanes, and a man much

revered by Plato, taught in contradistinction to Heraclitus, that change is a delusion; that as all things are but a manifestation of Being or God, and as Being is unchangeable, the senses deceive us when they lead us to believe in origin and decay. Parmenides, who is well known to readers of Plato because of the dialogue named for him and because of his criticisms of Plato's Doctrine of Ideas, opposed strongly the idea of Non-being. He made distinctions between thoughts derived from opinion or from things as they seem, and thought derived from reason—the latter as absolutely true, the former merely illusory. As Being and Thought (reasoned thought) are identical, Parmenides is in a sense the founder of Idealism. Certainly we see how he re-appears in Plato.

Concerning Zeno, pupil of Parmenides, and Gorgias, pupil of Zeno, nothing need be said, save that the first was the controversialist of the Eleatic school, and is introduced into the dialogue of Parmenides as a sharp dialectician; while, as Weber puts it, Gorgias' extravagance turned the Eleatic doctrine to the Heraclitean principle: *Being is nothing, Becoming is everything*.

One more influence is yet to be noted which perhaps even more than any save that of Socrates himself, affected Plato—that is the Pythagorean.

As this sketch is not a history of philosophy, I give only in briefest form the salient doctrines of those who are supposed to have been the intellec-

tual ancestors of Plato. Of the man Pythagoras little is known. Zeller puts his birth at 580 B. C., and it is well known that he dwelt in lower Italy and gave thus to his philosophy the name "Italic." How far he was acquainted with the mysteries and philosophical speculations of the East we can not tell. There can be little doubt that Pythagoras founded a sort of philosophic brotherhood, and that the Pythagoreans had their peculiar guilds long after the head of the organization died.

The attempt of the founder and his followers was to shape human life in an orderly and harmonious manner. Beginning in all probability with the thought of harmony in tones, they were led by this to the basis of Pythagorean philosophy, viz., that number is the essence of things. Their theory concerning odd and even numbers was carried so far that in ethics and in the domain of reason and intelligence, they did not hesitate to say: "Things are the copies of number."

Pythagoras taught the eastern doctrine of transmigration of souls, and consequently the soul's pre-existence. We know how large a place this has in Plato's theorizing. Pythagoras said the soul was a nomad, a unit, but self-moved. As far as it was moved it was imperfect, hence the strife to regain its state of perfection. The distinction of the three powers of the soul, Reason, Intelligence, Passion, may be traced to the Pythagorean analysis.

How far did Plato borrow from this Italian philosophy? The doctrine of the relation of the world of sense to ideas is substantially identical with the Pythagorean doctrine of the relation of phenomena to numbers. Plato says things "participate in ideas"; Pythagoras says, "things imitate numbers."

Prof. Ritchie calls attention to the fact that when we turn to the dialogues of Plato in which he seems to differ most radically from what we know from Xenophon and Aristotle that Socrates taught, these are decidedly Pythagorean in their cast. For example, *Meno* contains a more fully developed theory of knowledge than *Protagoras*, but it also contains the doctrine of "recollection"—the notion of pre-existence. In *Gorgias* we find justice explained in mathematical language; *Phaedo* and the *Republic* have the Pythagorean cosmology as the background of their visions of another life. Ritchie seems to think that the Pythagorean "way of life," to which Plato refers, suggested a model upon which the latter constructed his ideal state. In *Timaeus*, the work in which Plato elaborates his philosophy of nature, the whole discourse is put in the mouth of a Pythagorean.

Perhaps the spirit of the Pythagoreans affected Plato as much as any of the details of the system. The doctrine was dreamy; gave full sway to the imagination; taught immortality, and hinted at retribution; was idealistic in that mathematical

abstractions became the basis of things. If the ideal triangle or circle was the true one and not the triangle or circle of the carpenter, then why is not the ideal man, or tree, the true one, and not what we perceive by means of our senses?

When we come to speak of the influence of Socrates upon Plato, we enter upon ground that is not only debatable and debated, but also upon what is both tantalizing and tempting. The theologian sees in the debate as to how far the Socrates of Xenophon was the Socrates of Plato but another form of the controversy he has been familiar with, which grew out of the conception Paul seemed to have of Christianity as contrasted with the conception which the evangelists, and especially the synoptists, received from Jesus. I have said elsewhere in this chapter that Plato is like St. John, in catching the spirit of his Master; he is also like Paul in that he develops the thoughts of his Master to such proportions that many are disposed to say both interpreters have misconceived or even contradicted their respective originals. It has been already shown that Plato was affected and perhaps greatly influenced by other teachers than Socrates; but it seems quite unnecessary to assume that because Xenophon, a plain soldier, saw a much more simple man in Socrates than Plato makes him to be, that Xenophon's characterization is the correct one and that Plato has idealized Socrates beyond

all recognition. We take the ground here which we take in the bible controversy: there is really no conflict between the two pictures drawn of the two Teachers. If Mark makes Jesus very human, while John, and especially Paul, show us the divine almost exclusively, there is no conflict: Jesus was both. And Socrates was a man so capacious and rich as to have for Plato what Xenophon did not perceive.

Aside from that impalpable thing we call "spirit," which one man catches from another and which can never be measured or defined, and which in this instance must be given a very large place,—we are sure that Plato seized and held all his days to the *Method* of Socrates. And perhaps the best thing the great Athenian gave to the world was his Method. If Socrates seemed to attach little value to the natural sciences, the probable reason was that he was so interested in ethics as to practically lose himself in that study.

As a basis for his ethical reforms Socrates took the ground that no man is voluntarily bad; that wrong-doing is due to ignorance; that in consequence it is impossible to do right without knowledge—hence he tried to reform life by true knowledge.

The step is but a small one to identify Virtue and Knowledge if knowledge is sure to make one virtuous. But how is one to attain to knowledge? "Know thyself" is the motto, but how realize it? No man can affirm anything true about a subject

until he has a concept of it. He must know what it is in its unalterable nature. Knowledge must begin then in fixing concepts; but this led to comparison of mind with mind by a common inquiry, "in order to prove himself and the rest of world." Hence the dialectic of Socrates.

Plato practically endorses and appropriates all the Socratic method and belief. When we pass on to the peculiar ideas of an ideal State, or when we draw out fully the doctrine of Plato concerning the immortality of the soul—how far we are Platonizing or Pythagorizing Socrates we shall never know; but if we take the *Apology* and *Phaedo* as genuine (and there is little to be said against their being so) then we see in Socrates in germ what was more fully developed by his disciple and mouth-piece.

We may assert then that Plato is dogmatic when he is standing firm upon the Socratic *method*, from which he did not depart; that when he is teaching the highest morality he hesitates not, because he believes he has seen the truth personified in his great teacher. When Plato leaves the reader in doubt at the end of a dialogue, it is because he has learned from his master to give all sides of a subject; to love truth above rubies; to make no dogmatic pronouncement where there is room for difference of opinion. In all we see Socrates living in and through Plato, and carrying the Socratic *spirit* into a new generation.

PLATO'S THEORY OF KNOWLEDGE.

What has been said up to this point has been preparatory to a statement of the doctrines of Plato; yet those doctrines have already been by intimation anticipated.

Plato was to some extent a creature of his age; every man must be that. When we speak of the streams of influence which "made" him and attempt to point them out as they are identified with men and systems, we do not ignore minor influences which in their totality doubtless meant very much to our philosopher. For example the Sophists had not only much to do with whetting his mind to exceptional sharpness, but Socrates was a Sophist pretty much in the sense that Jesus was a Pharisee; and Plato held much in common with the Sophists, although he opposed them strenuously. To the age in which Plato lived and the absence of formal logic we must credit his not distinguishing between "contraries" and "contradictions," and his share in other confusions that in after days read like puerilities.

We may still hold to our original figure of the lake and say that Plato is the product of Heraclitus, the Eleatic Parmenides, the Pythagorean speculations, and his great teacher, Socrates. The last is the predominant influence, and characterizes the man as well as gives color to his whole philosophy.

Plato held with Heraclitus that all things are

in a state of flux, and that "becoming" characterizes the things of sense. But, said Plato, "flux" applies to things of sense only. Parmenides said, "only being is, non-being is not and cannot be thought." Being cannot begin or cease to be. Thought also is not distinct from being—that is, thought which is identified with the truth. *Perception* does not show things as they are, and opinion may be either true or false. The senses deceive when they seem to show us all things in process of flux. It is not difficult to see how Parmenides who had elements of the Pythagorean doctrines in his speculations, would and did greatly influence Plato. The suggestion of "permanence," and of the power of reason to discern truth—being; the identification of thought with being—these at least reappear in Plato though he modifies and selects at will.

From Socrates Plato imbibed the notion of an "inner sense" by which we know the truth; also the theory that knowledge consists in forming concepts or general notions. Here also we find what is perhaps the distinguishing characteristic of Plato—his method. The famous dialectics, which Plato practically identified with philosophy, came of the Socratic method.

From the Pythagoreans he gets a hint and perhaps more than a hint as to how geometry may give to the philosopher a key with which to unlock the treasure-house of the universe. Triangles, squares, circles are ideal and intelligible realities.

Yet they never find exact expression in the sensuous world. The figures in the books may imitate or in their measure participate in the perfect originals which exist only in the mind, but they are only imperfect copies. If this be true of geometrical figures, why not true of every concept we can form—of Man, the Beautiful, the Good? The hint then from mathematics carried to its conclusion, transfers conception from being a mere general notion made by the mind, into the region of reality, and then by one step further these concepts become the only realities.

From Pythagoras Plato had learned (so it is supposed) the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, and the kindred one of the transmigration of the same. With this as a clue, Plato bridges the gulf between the known and the unknown. Concepts have become to him realities—eternal realities; they constitute the abiding things as opposed to the flux discerned by the senses. The “inner sense” perceives these realities: but how? Simply enough; cognition is nothing but *recognition*. The soul (or “inner sense” we might say) when objects of a sensuous nature are presented to our minds by means of the senses, is provoked to recollection, and sees in the shadows thus presented that which it dimly remembers to have seen in another and higher life. To the extent a man is a philosopher, which means all we would mean by being “pure in heart,” can he see the eternal realities at the suggestion of the copies or shadows of earth.

Myth and substantial teaching meet here in Plato so that it is difficult to know how far the philosopher would have us go in interpreting him literally by his poetical utterances. Certainly Wordsworth has missed the meaning of Plato in his "Intimations of Immortality" and has thus no doubt made popular an error. Plato does not teach that "heaven lies about us in our infancy," if by that we mean the child knows more of reality than the youth or man. The Platonic teaching is that the soul when it is first confined to the body is irrational; but when the life of mere sensation gives place to the life of thought, then, under correct education, the soul becomes capable of true knowledge. The "soul's awakening" comes when men turn to philosophy and see behind the "many" of a class the "one" or the concept. Plato's theory of recollection might be illustrated by a vivid dream of many details being called to mind (after it had been quite forgotten) by some sound or sight, so that the man who had the dream sees indistinctly, slowly and even painfully at first, the mere outlines of what was, when seen in the dream, complete in all particulars. G. H. Lewes uses the illustration of one reading a lecture after having years before heard the lecture delivered, and as the man now reads he recalls here and there something of the tones of the speaker and feels something of the thrill he experienced when he sat under the speaker's masterful oratory. I am inclined to believe that, while some authorities

ignore the "recollection" theory of Plato and regard the interpretation usually given to the myths and poetical utterances on this subject from Plato as merely figurative language, the philosopher really accepted the theory of the pre-existence of the soul as the true solution to what was in later days known as the presence in the mind of "innate ideas."

The Doctrine of Ideas is the one by which Plato is best known, and furnishes a key to his theory of knowledge. The philosopher does not take especial care to be consistent in the development of his basic theory. We see evidence of growth and change as we read his dialogues. For this reason no two interpreters of Plato agree exactly on all points as to the Platonic teaching on Ideas. I am impressed with an interesting parallel here between the founder of the Academy and the founder of Methodism: the one in his theory of Ideas, and the other in his notions of Christian Perfection. Both men to some degree modified their first deliverances. In both instances we must search through an extensive literature to get at the exact meaning of the writers. In both instances we find apparent inconsistencies and even contradictions. Interpreters disagree as to what they did teach, and what is remarkable the disputants in each instance refer to the same deliverances from their respective teachers to substantiate the respective contentions of today.

What does Plato mean by the Idea? He be-

lieved that the essence of things was in their form; and by "form" he meant what approaches as near to the Platonic "idea" as we can well get. Some have suggested the term "type;" Lewes would use "noumenon," and Ritchie says the phrase "law of nature" very well illustrates what he meant.

Plato's meaning is best compassed perhaps by giving the process by which he arrived at his terminology. Wherever a universal conception of species or kind is found, there we find an Idea: hence Ideas are limited only by the number of general notions we can form. Even non-being is an Idea according to Plato.

The concepts or general notions of Socrates were so far objectified by Plato that *conceptions* become *perceptions*; he projects what we would call mere abstractions and they become images. He does what the manipulator of the stereopticon does who takes the picture in the machine and projects it upon the canvas, only we must remember that in case of the Idea it has no such existence as the negative has which the stereopticon enlarges; the illustration would be complete only if the manipulator could project upon the canvas in sight of spectators his general notion of Man—the typical and perfect Man, and do it *from out his own mind*. Plato was thus the founder of Realism as the word was used in Scholastic days.

One of the most puzzling things in Plato is what he meant by "Ideas participating in their copies," or better, how the copies on earth par-

ticipated in the Ideas. This relation of the real to the phenomenal evidently vexed his philosophic soul. The men in the Cave look at shadows of the real men; the chained observers never see the men. But how far does this figure which we can easily understand, explain how the shadows (earthly things) really participate in the eternal and divine Ideas? We understand how the ideal circle is never copied on earth and yet we can understand how we approximate it by use of instruments and by exercising great care. But we are dealing with "reality" as we say when we make lines; the copies of the heavenly things in Plato's theory are at bottom non-being. When we come to speak of his doctrine of Nature this will again meet us, but enough is said to see the difficulty in the way, viz. that of having any copies at all if they are nothing to begin with, and they come of nothing and amount to nothing. Perhaps this is too strong, but an Aristotle would thus dispose of them.

I have thought that the theory of "participation" might be illustrated popularly by the process by which what is called a "composite photograph" is made. Hundreds of negatives are selected and each in some way gives to the picture the photographer would make, *some* element: the result was supposed to be an ideal face, finer than any of earth and indeed approaching the face of Christ in purity. Supposing the theory of the discoverers of this process to have

been all they claimed for it; that all the human faces on earth could be combined and in a sense reproduced in the ideal face of the Son of Man—we should have an approach to the notion of Plato, in that each individual participated in the ideal face; and though the ideal face could not be reproduced by any one, yet some individual faces reflected it more perfectly than others. Many details of this illustration fail us, especially in that the multitude which made up the ideal face really exists separately, which Plato would not allow.

Another theory concerning the Ideas which puzzles the interpreters of Plato is the attempt on the philosopher's part to make a hierarchy out of the Ideas. The relation existing between the highest idea and the lower ones is similar to that existing between the things of sense and ideas. The Highest Idea, if we interpret Plato aright, is identified with the Absolute, the Good, or God Himself. Here we can only surmise whether Plato really believed in One, Personal God, and wrote other things in deference to the theological ideas of his day; or whether he ever really raised the question of the Highest Idea being one with a Personal God.

Certainly we can not take the myth of the "Chariot of the Soul" in *Phaedrus* to mean that Plato thought there was a definite place, a "heaven" for Ideas, where they had their abode. Ideas according to Plato dwelt not in space, nor could you say they had a dwelling outside of intelligence.

PLATO'S PHYSICS

Plato's Physics is largely Pythagorean and is made up, to a great extent, of conjecture. This department was not his forte. His great disciple Aristotle we shall find emphasized what the "divine Plato" did not feel much interest in.

To give in brief Plato's theory of Nature: He called the formless something out of which came what we call "matter," *non-being*, and identified it with what we should denominate "space." The world originated from the Creator after the model of an immovable and perfect archetypal world. The world-soul is the link between the formless matter or non-being and the Deity. The world is as perfect as stupid and untractable matter will admit; but matter is essentially evil. The stars are heavenly intelligences and the earth immovable as the center of the universe.

The soul may be considered under the head of Physics according to Plato. The soul consists of the soul proper, which is the divine principle or reason; and the appetitive principle which is perishable. Between the two as a "mediator" as in case of the world, we have the "passion" element of the soul, mediating between the divine in man and the earthly. As to the immortality of the soul, Plato insists upon this as true, but his arguments are among the weakest, so the best authorities think, of all he brings to bear upon great questions. Perhaps this is because we have

now no sympathy with the doctrine of the pre-existence of souls, and yet this as an argument meant much to Plato, as we can well see. The doctrines of Plato as to rewards and punishments are Pythagorean to such an extent that we are inclined to suppose he accepted the myths and peculiar theories of this school of speculators almost in their entirety.

PLATO'S POLITICS

Politics and ethics are closely allied in Plato. The State is but an individual on a large scale. Hence ethics for the individual will be one with ethics for the state. Using the same analysis for the state he did for the soul, we have the governing class likened to the reason in man, and this should consist of philosophers; the sensuous element in the soul is likened to the laborers and handicraftsmen; the passionate element in the soul, to the soldiers, who mediate between the governing and the laboring classes. Virtue in the first class is wisdom; in the second, is temperance; and in the third, courage. In Plato's earlier dialogues he merges everything in the state so as to practically ignore the home. He modifies this in his latest works. He also modified his views concerning a "monarchy" which he at first advanced; he afterwards suggested a mixed government.

His famous directions as to the education of children are so well known that I do not feel it necessary to give them. It is worthy of note

that Plato's disappointment in his different missions to Dionysius (the younger and older), influenced him largely in his notions concerning the State. His disgust and humiliation over the conditions at Athens, Walter Pater thinks led him to model his Ideal state after the simple and hardy Spartan one. It would seem that Plato was in earnest in his theories concerning the State as his most finished dialogue, the "Republic," is taken up with discussions which center about it; yet we must remember that Plato only uses the "larger individual" to illustrate and exemplify his notions of Justice. So after all we come back to the starting point that Plato was at bottom an ethical teacher. He would use everything to enforce what he considered the essential things of life—Justice, Temperance, Goodness, Beauty.

PLATO'S ETHICS

The Platonic Ethics results from Socrates' ethical principles combined with Plato's metaphysics and anthropology. Not to speak in the order of the development of his theory but rather after the logical order of the system as a whole, we see the Highest Idea of Plato identified with the Good. And as according to him the Highest Idea gives something of its nature to all ideas beneath it, and is of the nature of the Absolute, we see what Weber has happily said that Plato's ontology is "the monism of the good." The Scriptures say

God is Love; they say in substance He is Goodness. Plato by placing Goodness or the Good at the apex of his gradation of Ideas gives an ethical turn to his whole philosophy. Yes, more than a "turn." All things must partake somewhat of the ethical, and have an ethical end in view.

According to the view that "matter" is essentially evil and the soul belongs to the world above the senses, from which it has by some mischance come, the possession of the highest good or happiness must result from the subordination of things sensuous to the divine principle of the soul. This makes Plato's ethics approach very near to the christian. Our doctrine of the Incarnation and the revelation that the body may be the temple of the Holy Ghost, with other declarations of the Scriptures, have enabled us to rise above what would be natural for us to accept were we subject to Plato's conditions. We experience the same struggles he did, and have in view much the same end he had; only we are not vexed as he was with the notion that to escape from the world as soon as possible, either by one means or other, might be man's duty. We indeed do teach that there is such an experience as "death" (crucifixion with Christ) which might be likened to Plato's "philosophic death;" but He who brought life and immortality to light, taught that the world is good if used aright.

Plato says Virtue and Knowledge are identical or practically so. He says Virtue can be taught,

as it is a science. But Virtue in the Platonic sense is not what we ordinarily mean when we use the word. In his estimation Virtue is insight. He pendulates between the declaration that virtue is one and that there are many. Perhaps this can be reconciled by saying virtue is *essentially* one, but has many forms of development. His four-fold division of virtue is: wisdom, courage, temperance and justice. His theory that virtue is *one* is illustrated in this very division, for he says that while wisdom is virtue of the intellect, courage, virtue of the passionate element of the soul, and temperance, virtue of the sensuous nature—still justice is the principle which pervades and regulates the whole man. Thus Justice is the supreme, unifying virtue, which, something like the Highest Good, includes in itself all the others beneath it and thus really makes virtue one.

As to pleasure, Plato says true virtue carries with it its own reward; to do injustice is worse than to suffer it; to go unpunished worse than to be punished when guilty. Right for right's sake is Platonic. He would not despise pleasure as the cynics do; nor make it the end of existence as the hedonists do. He would take the middle ground and it would seem the true one, that there is something to be sought which identifies the soul with that which is above, viz., what will put us "in tune with the Infinite." Indeed Plato's justice might be defined as the harmony of all the parts of the soul—because in communion with the Highest Good.

In Ethics as in Politics, Physics, and every department of his philosophy, Plato intimates a trinity of doctrines. In his doctrine of *the soul* we have reason, passion, appetite. In *ontology*, being, becoming, non-being. In *Politics*, rulers, warriors, laborers. In *cosmogony* God, the soul of the world, and matter. In *Ethics*—wisdom, courage, temperance.

One of the most fruitful as well as fascinating studies in connection with Plato is that of "Platonism after Plato," including as it does, not only the teaching immediately succeeding the death of the founder of the Academy, but also the far-reaching influence of this wonderful man. Here we find those suggestions and anticipations in which he was so rich and which make us think of him as we do of a prophet. The well-known sentence of our American poet-philosopher, Emerson, is hardly an exaggeration: "Out of Plato come all things that are still written and debated among men of thought."

III

KANT: A PROTEST AGAINST MATERIALISM

“Between Socrates and Kant,” say Schopenhauer, “there are many points of resemblance. Both reject all dogmatism, both profess complete ignorance as to things metaphysical, and the speciality of both lies in their consciousness of this ignorance. Both maintain, on the contrary, that the practical question as to what men should do or leave undone may be ascertained with certainty, and this by themselves without further theoretical preparation. It was the fate of both to have immediate successors and declared disciples, who nevertheless departed from their principles in this very particular, and, cultivating metaphysics, introduced entirely dogmatic systems of their own; further, that notwithstanding the great divergence of their several systems, all professed themselves to be derived respectively from the doctrine of Socrates or of Kant.”

Some will say that philosophy has attained to nothing beyond Kant. In his “Historical Introduction” to Max Müller’s translation of Kant’s “Critique of Pure Reason,” Ludwig Noiré says: “It is not too much to say that Kant is the greatest philosophical genius that has ever dwelt upon earth, and the ‘Critique of Pure Reason’ the highest achievement of human reason.”

Whether we accept such an estimate of Kant, or a more moderate one, we but echo the general opinion of those who have a right to an opinion on such a subject, when we affirm that in Kant Modern Philosophy has found its many-sided man, whose thought has been utilized by idealists, empiricists, agnostics, atheists and theists; all claiming that Kant either by direct or implied teaching promulgated what their several schools affirm.

Heine says playfully, "The history of Kant's life is difficult to portray, for he had neither life nor history"—to which we might add that almost any great man's outward life is of small consequence. Kant gives us nothing with which to make a thrilling biography, unless "biography" is interpreted to mean the history of one's mental life; in that case, we know that Kant lived much, long and strenuously.

In the latter part of the eighteenth century, a visitor to the little town of Königsberg, on the northeastern frontier of Germany, might have seen, descending the steps of a plain house on a retired street of the town, a small, hollow-chested, serious-looking man, who wore a gray, close-fitting overcoat, and carried a cane. Such was the regularity with which this man took his afternoon walk (promptly at half-past three) that the townspeople could set their watches by his issuing from his study for his walk. This was Immanuel Kant—philosopher, bachelor, professor, and

withal the man who was to revolutionize the philosophic world.

He came of very plain parents; his father was a saddler, and his mother, Anna Regine Reuter, was remarkable for nothing more than her simple religious faith which was developed under Pietistic influences. The famous son of such parents was born 1724 and lived eighty years, practically without getting out of sight of the smoke of his native city. Like Whittier, he traveled little but made up for this by reading with relish what others had seen and described. In this way Kant kept pace with the ongoing of the world. When we remember that when he began his life work in earnest (1770) the struggle for Independence in America was on, and the French revolution was brewing, we appreciate how interesting were the times in which Kant's lot was cast.

Kant matriculated at Königsberg University in 1740, and his mind seemed from the first to turn towards the sciences. In 1746 he handed to the dean of the philosophical department a dissertation on "The True Evaluation of Dynamic Forces," evincing a thorough acquaintance with the issue between Descartes and Leibnitz regarding the measuring of force; this first attempt indicated, too, his disposition to reconcile differences between men of opposite schools of thought by showing how both were right in part. This spirit of reconciliation he retained all through life and it characterizes his writings. Kant's mother had died

in 1737, and his father, the year this first attempt of his son at authorship made its appearance. I mention these things to add that in Kant's diary we find written concerning the death of his father: "May God, who did not permit him to taste many joys in life, grant to him in return to be a partaker of everlasting happiness." This expression, in connection with the tender manner in which Kant spoke of his mother and her religion, should be sufficient reply to those who say that the great philosopher was selfish, and was wanting in appreciation of the worth of others. Poverty was Kant's companion from his youth: if in after life when he had a competence, he lived simply and at the end made his sisters, who lived in obscurity in Königsberg, his heirs, we can not say that competence or fame ever "turned his head" or deflected him from the path he had marked out in which to walk, viz. to consecrate himself to an investigation of the Truth.

In 1755 Kant began his work as private lecturer. He made application for vacant professorships at his Alma Mater for the next fifteen years, but was not rewarded until 1770. Had he consented to go from his loved Königsberg, he might have found both honor and appreciation, but contrary to the principle that a prophet is not without honor save in his own country, Kant confesses he had an instinct which prevented him from making any change, even when offered a place at Jena, saying, "If I am to draw a little

longer the threads which the Fates spin very thin for men, I must abide where I am." Knowing his bodily frailty and his dependence on habits which had grown strong, he remained a mere tutor longer than would otherwise have been necessary in order that he might eventually be professor where he felt his life work lay. But while he was waiting he was not idle. During this time—usually called the Pre-Critical period in Kant's life—he was busy investigating Nature and Mind. He published his "Natural History of the Heavens" as a result of his study and teaching of Physical Geography, which study, by the way, he was the first to introduce into the University Courses. His treatment of the origin and structure of the world is characteristic, in that it shows us the Kant of the future. The work was Newtonian in principle, but left out the direct interposition of God. He thought religion had no interest in setting limits to the mechanical explanation of natural phenomena. He thought that explanations of nature by suggestions of the purposes of God was the method of "an easy philosophy that tries to hide its vain uncertainty under pious airs." Here we see the man doing what he afterwards fully carried out in his Critical Philosophy—separating natural science and religious faith. How far Kant is responsible for this wide-spread notion reaching to us of today, I will not attempt to estimate. Surely he had his part in it.

Up to 1770 Kant had published, in addition to the Essays already mentioned, "The False Subtlety of Syllogistic Figures," "The Only Possible Basis of Proof of the Being of God," "The Introduction of a Negative Quantity into Philosophy," "The Evidence of the Principles of Natural Theology and Morals," and "Dreams of a Ghost-Seer." These essays indicate the trend of Kant's thought, especially his tendency to glide from Nature to Mind. His celebrated "Dissertation" which outlined his after work and marked the great "divide" in his life, was published the year he was made full professor, and was entitled "A Dissertation on the Form and Principles of the Sensible and Intelligible World."

The world saw, in 1781, the "Critique of Pure Reason," and it was followed in 1783 by a "Prolegomena to Every Future Metaphysic"—a most important work, and explanatory of his "Critique of Pure Reason." The "Critique of the Practical Reason" was issued in 1788, and "The Critique of the Judgment" in 1790. Although he wrote to the year of his death, 1804, the works by which Kant will be known for time to come are his famous "Critiques," especially that of the Pure Reason, and his "Prolegomena." The "Dissertation" of 1770 is valuable to those who wish to study the growth of a theory in a man's mind.

The last days of Kant were like those of Walter Scott, tantalizing in that he attempted to write but

could not—his powers having failed him. The gentle old man, whose kindliness of heart and devotion to study, should have spared him the bitter things which have been said of him, died 12th of February, 1804, with the words on his lips, in reply to some kindness offered, "It is good." He was buried in the Cathedral of his native place, and over his grave are his celebrated words, taken from the "Critique of the Practical Reason ;"

"The starry heavens above me,
The moral law within me."

KANT'S MENTAL HISTORY

If the poet who plucked a "flower from the crannied wall" could say of it

"If I could understand
What you are, root and all, and all in all
I should know what God and man is,"

we may say of Kant that could we know him "all and all"—his mental history especially, dating back as it does into days of philosophy's beginnings, we should know Philosophy. As the wave that touches the highest point on the beach is part of the illimitable ocean, which is back of the wave giving it force, so a great man is after all but part of that mysterious Unity which we call Humanity. And as each movement of the tide that carries individual waves high upon the beach, has back of it an influence which we have discovered to be due to the attraction of heavenly bodies ;

so there are peculiar "movements" in the world of Thought which have hitherto baffled our investigations, but which no doubt have their origin "in the heavenlies," where the Spirit broods over our moral and mental chaos and brings to pass in the fulness of time those mighty upheavals which in their totality represent the thing we call the development of our Race. To search for a man's place in this onward movement of the world—and especially the place of a man whose influence was such as Kant's—is to search for the really undiscoverable; but even an approximation here to the truth is not only of high value, but the search itself is rewarded by rich returns.

Let a brief survey of the remote past suffice to show the progress of thought to the time of Kant's immediate predecessors.

Coleridge said, "a man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelian:" but Kant's disposition to unite in himself opposing schools of thought made him both Platonist *and* Aristotelian. Without stopping to note the happy guesses and wonderful anticipations of Heraclitus, Democritus, Pythagoras, and Parmenides, the sum of ancient philosophy might be put in few words, thus: Socrates by his "Know thyself" turned the attention of man to Mind as the important field for investigation, if one would be a philosopher. Plato in obedience to this injunction created a theory of knowledge, and Aristotle completed it with the addition of Logic. The character of "matter"

became the burning question. What is the substantial, and how are reconciled deceptive appearances with knowledge? How make the connection between the knowing mind and inert matter? We have seen how Plato bridged the gulf by his theory of reminiscence, and how he disposed of matter by his theory of non-being. We find that Aristotle is "Kantian" in his love of Nature and in his disposition to investigate the same. But the vital point of connection between the system of Kant and Aristotle is to be found in their treatment of "form and matter." Even the celebrated illustration used by Kant of the "hand" is Aristotelian, for that great man of the ancients says: "But the soul may be compared to the hand, for the hand is the tool of tools, as the mind is the form of forms." When we remember that Aristotle held the theory that "form," or idea (which is the chief element in perception) lays hold of matter,— "potential stuff"—and makes the same "actual"—we see that he was saying what Kant in the after days put in more express terms. In his "Prolegomena," Kant resents the suggestion that his doctrines can be traced to what has been long ago said: "General principles are not easily learned from other men, who have had them obscurely in their minds. We must hit on them first by our reflection, then we find them elsewhere, where we could not possibly have found them at first, because the authors themselves did not know that such an idea lay at the basis of

their observations." These words from the Preamble of his "Prolegomena" indicate that Kant knew that his theories had been foreshadowed by others, but he took the ground which many have taken on such subjects, viz., that men in the past were wiser than they knew. This is probably true, but nevertheless, when Kant takes Aristotle's "Categories" bodily, and uses even in his explanation of his theory of "forms of mind" an illustration which Aristotle used, we are bound to think that he must have imbibed even more fully than he was aware of, much of Ancient philosophy. When we remember, too, that Kant was past fifty when he wrote his masterpiece, we can understand how what he had read had become so much a part of himself that he failed to consider his indebtedness to the labors of other men.

Medieval Philosophy might be summed up, as to its results, somewhat as follows: Its theory of Absolute Intelligence satisfied the cravings of reason for unity and spirituality. The Polytheism of the populace, the Atoms of Democritus, the Ideas of Plato, the Substances of Aristotle,—disappear, and God reigns alone. Metaphysics becomes possible as something transcending the Objective. The material and spiritual are separated. Concepts have taken the place of Plato's objective Ideas. But the Absolute Intelligence of the medievals threatened to absorb the individual. The investigations of scientists caused the objective world to reassert itself, and threatened

a relapse into mere materialism. The times were ripe for Descartes's "Cogito," which occasioned philosophy for sometime to oscillate between Mind and Matter. This brings us to the Modern Period in Philosophy, opening with Descartes.

But before Descartes is taken up, and we pass from him on to his successors which lead to Kant, certain influences should be noted, without taking account of which we can hardly appreciate Kant's position as a thinker and philosopher.

The Renaissance may be dated from 1450; the first Bible published by means of movable types was in 1456; America was discovered in 1492; Luther posted his celebrated Theses in 1517; Copernicus published his theory concerning the Solar System in 1543; Descartes was born 1596; Bruno suffered martyrdom in Rome in 1600; *Kant was born in 1724*; American Independence was declared in 1776; the French Revolution broke out in 1789. The dates given above that lead up to Kant and cover his life, are the ones of many that mark epochs, and that indicate the trend of thought. The Renaissance meant the most potent influence in the overthrow of Scholasticism. The Reformation which followed the awakening of independent thought, was aided by the discovery of printing, and the thrill that civilized man experienced at the discovery of what was practically a new world. The bold theory of Copernicus and the inspiration his discovery gave to science, as well as the perfect annihilation which Aristotle

seemed to suffer therefrom, stirred men to both doubt and investigation. That a scientist and philosopher should suffer as a martyr as late as 1600, where Savonarola had suffered a similar death just one hundred years before, must have produced a decided impression on thinking men. The 17th century was marked by political upheavals, which indicated how determined the masses of the people were to assert their rights. The rise of Cromwell in England and the revolution which resulted in the overthrow of the Stuarts in 1688, were followed hard by the age of Enlightenment—the 18th century—which, with its opposite religious tendency, Pietism, had much to do with making Kant what he was. He appreciated the struggle for independence which in America took the form it did, compelling respect, and admiration; and the abnormal spirit of the French which resulted in the French Revolution. In the meantime Kant was what every man must to some extent be,—a creature of his age. But the great movements I have just referred to can not be ignored if we would historically criticise the author of the “Critique of Pure Reason.” To what has been said, we should add that a reaction from Enlightenment(which meant the enthronement of Reason) had set in during Kant’s life, which reaction known as Romanticism, had Lessing, Rousseau, and later Goethe, as its most famous exponents. Kant acknowledges he was much influenced by this movement. In the name of *Heart*, it challenged *Reason* to be less imperious.

To return to Descartes, as the starting-point in Modern Philosophy and the exponent of pure Dualism, his contributions to philosophy might be summed up as follows: His greatest achievement was to start from the knowing subject without assumptions. He thus called attention to the correct view-point which afterwards greatly aided all who pursued philosophic studies. Descartes also moved in the direction of Kantianism by conceding real existence only to the *universal principles* of thought and matter, as advocated by Plato and Aristotle, while he denied the separate existence of objects derived from these, as well as the title of such objects to be called "things in themselves." Plato had made the "Idea" an entity, and Aristotle had made the "form" an entity, or its equivalent. Matter, according to Descartes, is but a modification of extended substance; and ideas are but modes of the thinking substance. Descartes credits the soul with what he called "innate ideas," which perhaps was an unfortunate way of expressing himself; but his suggestion had in it an element of truth. In Kant this truth will come out as a *priori* postulates of human knowledge. As a mathematician, Descartes taught that everything in the material world is accomplished in accordance with mechanical laws. The mind cannot add to or take from the quantity of matter or motion, but it can give *direction* to movement by making use of efficient causes. To this should be added the

discovery of the *relativity of motion*, i.e. no change takes place by itself, but only in relation to something else. This has its bearing on Kant who stresses the relativity of human knowledge.

Descartes left for future development by philosophy the following: The nature of "body" as he defined it can scarcely be distinguished from the space it occupies. Extension is its sole property. To deal with the external world mathematically we must have one quality, extension, and Descartes gave it *that*. But extended substance, without other qualities, becomes what? The assumption of specific differences in bodies as created by God, and the unexplained dualism, implied in the "extended substance" and the "thinking substance," left philosophy hard problems to solve, while many minds recognized the contradictions involved in all this. The use of the word "substance" occasioned no little trouble, and Kant will find fault with Descartes' implication when the latter says, "I think, therefore I am," remarking that Descartes mentally adds, "a *thinking substance*."

Descartes threw into the philosophic company the apple of discord, but singular to say, the apple seemed to break into two pieces, the Materialists took one half saying it was the original, and the Idealists took the other, claiming that it was the original. From this time on, "the river which went from Eden and parted and became into *two* heads," can be distinctly followed. It is not

necessary to follow into its details the revival of the doctrine of Democritus with modifications, which the English philosopher, Hobbs, affected, and which was almost the inevitable conclusion if there was but one substance and that Matter. Nor need we explain in detail the place of the reactionist, Berkley, who took the opposite extreme, and said that the one substance was Mind. We shall find later that Kant was very indignant at being called an idealist after the Berkley stamp, a point at which the difference between the Englishman and his cousin can be distinctly noted.

Materialism slept untroubled by the presuppositions of a sensitive and intelligent consciousness; and Idealism was little concerned about the club which Dr. Johnson proposed to use with which to convince it that an external world existed. The attempt to restore unity where had been made so great a division, was the work of the Jew, Spinoza. Some say his theory of the Universe is simply modified Buddhism. (It would be suggestive to follow out the thought how far a Semite would probably be *oriental* in his thought when dealing with the fundamentals of philosophy.) Spinoza's additions to philosophy, as interpreted from the Kantian stand-point, are as follows: He put an end to the unnatural separation between thought and extension. Every sensible process could be conceived according to Spinoza, as at the same time a material modification of the organs of sense and as a variety or *mode* of consciousness.

Tyndall is thinking of this distinction when he calls heat a "*mode of motion*." The notion of "substance" now must be shown to be a creation of reason, and must justify its existence at the court of Reason. Spinoza had a conception of absolute and perfect knowledge, as contradistinguished from the conditioned, and he thus led to Kant's recognition of the limits of reason, which he (Kant) credits to the aspirations of man in a higher realm. Spinoza says: "In order to distinguish between true and false ideas, we must learn to understand the *peculiarities of the intellect*." Here is an intimation of the critical spirit of Kant, especially with reference to the powers of the mind.

Says Noire in his Introduction to Kant's Philosophy: "The principal defect of Spinoza's system lies naturally in his idea of substance, and the way in which it is deduced; so that in the preliminary conception, existence is tacitly imputed to the subject, and then analytically deduced from it, like the conjurer's trick in which to the astonishment of the public, an article is discovered where the performer had secretly placed it beforehand. The leap from the mere idea, or what is thought, into the actual world, is the most violent and break-neck *salto mortale* to be met with in any system of Philosophy."

Descartes, the teacher of Spinoza, had taken refuge in the transcendental idea of the Deity to prove the reality of the material world and to

make a junction for his two substances. Spinoza went further and made the Deity immanent, identified God and the world, and thus identified Descartes' two substances. Spinoza's God-world, or One Substance, however, swallows up individuality, and his theory caused a reaction toward Individualism as in Leibnitz. Spinoza's recognition of causal dependence of spiritual phenomena inspired the attempt to inquire into human knowledge in its relation to sensible perception; as we shall see in Locke. His idea that the existence of individuals is but partial and apparent; his recognition of greater and less degrees of reality possessed by beings—will in Leibnitz meet its counter-thought of the higher liberty and the superiority of man.

Spinoza's idea of God is not an advance, as we interpret his teaching, but a retrogression. Aristotle called God the "Form of Forms;" Confucius simply spoke of the "Command of Heaven;" yet both speak of Him as personal—not, as it were, by design, but inadvertently, and they thus prove the promptings of intuition. The same is even true of Spinoza; his impersonal God is spoken of as a "thinking Being."

From Spinoza's Ethics we cull this anticipation of Kant: "The way in which we are affected by external things depends more upon the constitution of our body than on the nature of the external things."

I can not but feel that LOCKE must stand as one

of the most striking personages in the history of philosophy. What he wrote was popularly written, and clear. The reader always knows what he means. Locke read little, but shows a certain freshness and much originality in his teaching. His great work, "Essay on Human Understanding," was written when its author was fifty-eight. His mind matured slowly but in strength. No sketch of Kant is complete without an appreciation of Locke, for Locke led to Hume.

Among the many additions to the sum of philosophic knowledge for which we are indebted to Locke, we might name: His fine work on the nature of language. Dr. Horace Bushnell is but echoing Locke in his famous phrase that words "only suggest" to another what the speaker means. Men may use the same words, but mean very different things. The man who can make clear distinctions, and who is an adept in the use of words, will help to clear up much obscurity in philosophy as well as theology.

Locke may be called the representative Empiricist, of the serious sort. He was no scoffer, but like Kant, was relentless in his disposition to probe for the truth. He taught that while general ideas are the true objects of reason; they originate naturally, and are perfected by abstraction; and that thought and language are so intimately associated that Max Müller's theory is practically anticipated. Locke boldly averred that ideas were due to sensible impressions. The mind

was, as it were, an unwritten-upon tablet that was sensitive to impressions from without. "There is nothing in the understanding which did not come through the senses." This looks like materialism pure and simple. Yet it is characteristic of English philosophy, whether we note it in Hobbs, Locke, Hume, Spencer, Mill, or others less famous.

Locke said substance was inaccessible to human knowledge. He was the one modern philosopher to bring out clearly the difference between primary and secondary qualities of matter. This Kant will use, and declare *all* qualities secondary.

The gaps which Locke left to be filled are, among many, these: He shut up the individual within himself. A man could not go beyond his subjective standpoint. Locke was so concerned with his theory of getting his ideas *into the mind*, that he did not enter into the "dark room" of the mind to investigate what went on there. Kant will not only enter, but will spend most of his time there. Locke naturally called attention to the external world, for it was the source, according to him, of our mental riches. Kant will show that the mind not only adds something, but by far the greater part. The mind is no mere mirror held up to nature.

Locke's place in philosophy is thus expressed by Schopenhauer: "He was the first to proclaim the great doctrine that a philosopher who wishes to prove or derive anything from ideas must first investigate the origin of these ideas, as their con-

tent and everything thence deducible must be determined by their origin, as the source of all the knowledge attainable through them."

We have nearly reached Kant when we come to Leibnitz. The latter died in 1716, and the former was born in 1724. Locke's theory of knowledge naturally discarded the notion of "innate ideas," and Leibnitz saw the suggestion of Locke but refused to surrender the truth that the phrase "innate ideas" contained. Thus he said the mind was not like a piece of blank paper, but like a block of marble in which the veins prefigure the form of the statue. The mind has not *innate ideas* explicitly but possesses them potentially and virtually, only, however, by its power to produce them out of itself. He added wittily the phrase to Locke's celebrated *dictum* that there was nothing in the understanding which had not come through the senses, "but the understanding *itself*."

Leibnitz stands as the perfect contradiction to Spinoza. The latter had swallowed up individualism in God: the former pulverized the universe and gave to its monads an independent existence. Not only so, but each monad was a sort of a God. We are reminded of the "Ideas" of Plato and the hierarchy he suggested, and the "Forms" of Aristotle leading to the "Form of Forms." The monads of Leibnitz are not atoms, for atoms are qualitatively alike, whereas every monad differs

from every other. Atoms are extended and divisible, but monads are indivisible—metaphysical points. Atoms are not representatives, but monads are, for each monad reflects every other one. Every monad then is a miniature universe, and, mark it well, a *living force*. If the universe consists of independent existences which have “no eyes”—that work independent of each other,—how can there be any possible harmony in movement? “Not,” Leibnitz, says, “by occasional harmony by means of miraculous interposition,” but by a sort of standing miracle of “pre-established harmony.” This was especially illustrated in the way the soul, a monad, operated in unison with the body, and it was here that the illustration of the two clocks was used—both running in harmony, but each separate.

The place of Leibnitz as a forerunner of Kant does not especially appear in what has been said above. I have given the two elements in Leibnitz’s philosophy for which he is best known. But when we enter into the spirit of his work, we find that while Locke had, by his theory of ideas, stressed *perception*, though he had pointed out the contrast between that and *conception*, Leibnitz, true to the German instinct, not only places the active element in the foreground, as against the passive, or merely receptive, but looked upon *mere perception* of external things as indirect knowledge. Kant says that while Locke attributed everything to sensation, Leibnitz attributed everything to con-

ceptions of the understanding: the Kantian position was a reconciliation between the two, using elements of both. Conceptions, Kant said, were not the true matter of thought, with sensible intuitions a less perfect and confused though similar kind, nor are "things in themselves" to be comprehended by these conceptions, as Leibnitz suggests. To quote Kant: "Leibnitz *intellectualized* phenomena, and just as Locke *sensualized* all concepts of the understanding. Instead of representing the understanding and sensibility as two totally different sources of representations, which however can supply objectively valid judgments of things only in conjunction with each other, each of these great men (Locke and Leibnitz) recognized but one of them, which in their opinion applied immediately to things by themselves, while the other did nothing but to produce either disorder or order in the representations of the former."

The key-note to Kant is found then, with reference to all other preceding philosophies, in this: he, the sage of Königsberg, *eliminated substance* to which all others before him, after repeated attempts to be free from it, had returned for a foothold.

This brings us to Hume. Although his importance to the Kantian philosophy is vital, his position can be expressed in a few words, and so can his relation to Kant. Hume is a continuation of Locke. He is of course a member of that company

who laid hold of Descartes' half of the Apple of Discord and called it Materialism. Perhaps it might better be said that he considered both the *realistic* and the *idealistic* standpoints in philosophy as unassailable. He admitted the claims of both as in harmony with rational thought, and since they contradict each other, held that there is nothing left but Doubt.

Hume attacked the citadel of Reason—the idea of Causation. Schopenhauer says: “Before Hume no one had doubted that the principle of the sufficient reason, in other words, the law of causation, stood first and foremost in earth and heaven. For it was an eternal truth, subsisting independently, superior to gods or destiny: everything else, the understanding which apprehends the principle, as well as the world at large and whatsoever there may be which is the cause of the world, such as atoms, motion, a creator, or the like, exists only in conformity with and in virtue of this. Hume was the first to whom it occurred to ask whence this law of causality derived its authority, and to demand its credentials.”

Locke had gone so far as to deduce the causal relation from experience, in that he said that the resistance of bodies to our pressure originated the idea of cause. Leibnitz, making distinction between necessary and accidental truths, had reduced the former to identical propositions, while the latter he referred to in endless series. Still, the “sufficient reason,” or idea of cause, he maintained

strenuously. The opposition between contingent and necessary truths Hume thought irreconcilable, hence he inferred that causation and experience are incompatible, consequently our assumption of the existence of necessary truths is a delusion. He said, "it was impossible for the reason to construct *a priori* such a connection as involves necessity; for it is impossible to see how because one thing is, another thing *should necessarily* also be, or how the conception of such a connection should have been introduced *a priori*." He concluded that the reason was entirely deceived as to this idea, was in error in regarding it as its own offspring, seeing it was really a bastard child born of imagination and experience.

In reply to such an onslaught the Scottish philosophers raised the cry of heresy and appealed to "common sense." Kant is represented as having his righteous indignation stirred not so much at Hume's boldness as at the sort of reply his opponents made. He says they missed Hume's point by taking for granted the very thing he called in question, and demonstrating with much violence what he had never called in question. The matter at issue was not whether the conception of cause was just, serviceable, and indispensable to natural science, for this had not been disputed by Hume: but the vital issue was, whether the idea of cause could be conceived *a priori* by reason.

To answer this question Kant felt moved to write, and the result was "The Critique of Pure

Reason," in which book not only Hume, but other philosophers and philosophies are dealt with, and a reconciliation attempted between apparently diverse and even contradictory systems. By taking an entirely new standpoint, in which he delighted to compare himself with Copernicus, Kant produced a system which, whatever else may be said of it, has probably had more influence on philosophic thinking than any book of modern times. His work as a philosopher bears some resemblance to the work of Bishop Butler in the "Analogy." If the author did not make out his own case to the satisfaction of everybody he at least dealt a blow at materialists and empiricists generally. Both Butler and Kant can be said to have at least stopped the mouths of skeptics.

HOW KANT CAME TO HIS PROBLEM

The school represented by Leibnitz, whose doctrines were modified without being improved by the unoriginal Wolff, was the Dogmatic wing of Philosophy; and to it Kant belonged by association and training. Hume, of course, represented Skepticism, and Hume is the person who "aroused Kant from his dogmatic slumber." The writer of the "Critique of Pure Reason" elected to call his system of philosophy *Critical*, as distinguished from Dogmatism and Skepticism, and the word indicates what Kant had in mind. From his early manhood he had striven to reconcile opposing schools of thought, and it is not to be wondered

at that when the "Critique of Pure Reason" was published all schools laid claim to it and all schools denounced it.

This calls for an important observation. The "Critique of Pure Reason" is not only the book most read of the three Critiques, but read out of proportion to the others; not only so, judgment as to Kant's teaching, is based too often upon the first Critique. It is here that the author of the Critical Philosophy had cause for impatience—an impatience which he shows in his "Prolegomena"—at the misreading of his words because his books are not taken in their entirety. I have no doubt that he had that peculiarity of mind, such as one sees occasionally, of looking at one phase of a subject for the time, to the exclusion of every other, and of writing a book in the spirit in which he would deliver a lecture to an advanced class in philosophy. Certainly, when a man writes a special pamphlet to explain how he came to write a book, and tells in that pamphlet what he *meant*, and what he did *not* mean, we should take his explanations not as retractions: if he can consistently show how his apparent contradictions can be reconciled, we should allow him that privilege. Add to this fact that Kant was not happy in expressing himself as a writer, and we have perhaps the secret of the great diversity of interpretations of Kantian philosophy. Caird has well said that "Kant is easily misinterpreted if we stop at any

stage of his argument short of its final result." There are men, among them was Heine, who hesitate not to say that Kant found it necessary in deference to public opinion, and "old Lampe" particularly, to "make a God" after he had written like an atheist or agnostic. So, too, there are those who say that the Second Edition of the "Critique of Pure Reason" had in it an element of "back down" from fear, and does not represent Kant as he really believed. Max Müller takes somewhat such a view. It would seem that, when Kant's age is taken into consideration, his whole plan being perhaps mapped out ere he wrote; the revolutionary character of his philosophy and its subtlety; his philosophy appearing in three distinct Critiques, each apparently complete in itself, yet not so—misunderstanding would be inevitable.

We have seen that it was Hume who aroused Kant; that, in his estimation, Scottish philosophers had not answered the skeptic; and to this we may add that Kant agreed with Hume in much. To prove the limitation of *a priori* knowledge to experience, based upon an examination of the conditions of the knowledge which is so limited, is to yield to Locke and Hume their contentions, and this Kant did: to claim that knowledge has another origin *besides* experience, and that ideas thus acquired are *necessarily true*—is to contradict Hume and Locke and bring down on the head of Kant the wrath of empiricists generally, and G. H. Lewes in particular. And as by *a priori* synthesis

alone we can go beyond the region of experience, naturally the problem of the "Critique of Pure Reason" is this: "How are Synthetic Judgments *a priori* possible?" Of course Kant had in mind the attack Hume had made on Causation. If the idea of causation can be found to be dependent on experience then all *a priori* ideas must be given up.

Here we strike the matter of Kant's peculiar terminology. He must be read by taking words to mean what he says he means by them. "Experience" is knowledge of things given to us in sense; hence, prior in time to the impressions of sense, there is no such knowledge. But "experience" must be, according to Kant, distinguished from the knowledge of "certain general principles" which connect the individual facts of experience. These "general principles" cannot be derived from impressions of sense, for sense gives knowledge of *particulars*. If, however, we take the highest of these general principles and follow them to their limit we become entangled, as in the case of Casuality. Here we must either go back of experience and then into a series of causes, *ad infinitum*, or postulate a new conception—an uncaused Cause. Hence the antinomy,—the instance of reason at variance with itself. *Our hope in this perplexity is to find a higher law of reason, which will limit the law of causality to the sphere of sense-experience, and at the same time use this "limiting principle" to extend our knowledge into the region beyond the limit.* This in brief, as I take it, is the

real problem of the "Critique of Pure Reason," and of the Critiques which follow. The principles of Kantianism are really few; but in the application of those principles and in the mental twists and turns which Kant makes in the application of them, he becomes difficult to understand.

KANTIAN PSYCHOLOGY

As Kant's principle of classification is a psychological one, and the faculties of the soul may, according to his philosophy, be reduced to knowing, feeling, willing, we see here the bed-rock of the three Critiques—Pure Reason, Practical Reason, Judgment, (by the last Kant means the principle which regulates feelings of pleasure and pain.)

If Experience does not furnish the whole of knowledge, as we have above noted, then what of the sort it does furnish? It is *contingent* and *variable*. But the mind also furnishes an element—by means of those "general principles," just referred to—and the character of *this* knowledge is *universal* and *necessary*. Kant does not say with Descartes that we have "innate ideas", nor does he say with Locke that there is nothing in the understanding which did not come through the senses: he says that "experience"—the sense-world—furnishes a *part*, and a necessary part, of knowledge, and the *mind* furnishes a part, and just as necessary a part. Without the sense element perceptions would be empty; without the element furnished by the mind, conception would be blind.

When the subjective world is face to face with the objective, the two coöperate to produce knowledge. As to the subject (with which we are concerned), we call that *Sensibility*, which is affected by objects, and it is entirely passive. It is the mirror turned upon the world; but back of this sensibility is the *Understanding*, an active faculty, which receives the representations given by sensibility and whose function it is to judge. By this faculty *perceptions* are elevated to *conceptions*. Sensibility gives us sensations only, but not knowledge: many sensations are only many sensations, but if linked by some connecting faculty, they become *unified*, and by means of imagination, memory and consciousness, become conceptions—*knowledge*.

But the “raw material” gotten from the external world, and passed on back to the Understanding, has, ere this is done, undergone a transformation, or taken on it “form”. “Form” is a great word with Kant as it was with Aristotle. This “form” constitutes the *invariable* element in sensation, as against the variable which belongs to the mere “raw material.” The two *invariable* elements are Space and Time, for you can not divest external things of the form of Space, nor internal things of the form of Time. (Indeed, as we shall see later, Time is a “form” of both external and internal things.) We can imagine everything *in* space annihilated, but not space: so we can conceive Time going on, though everything in time is thought of as annihil-

ated. This is true of no other element in connection with sensation, and it is affirmed that these two "forms" *must* constitute the invariable elements in sensation—or as Kant prefers to say, the "forms of the sensibility." As these elements are not given by sensation, but are furnished by the sensibility, of course we are not indebted to experience for a knowledge of the same. They have no existence outside of our sensibility. As the "moulds of the mind" they not only give form to the diverse things of sensation, but have no objective existence. Once *get* this and once *believe* it, and Kantianism follows logically, for everything he says afterwards is in a way but an exposition or re-application of this thought of "forms" which the mind furnishes, whether the Sensibility or Understanding or Reason be under discussion.

Coming now to the Understanding, we see the same principle of "form" and "matter" but a more intricate application. We deal in the Understanding with an *active faculty*, and a complicated one. We have taken the case of the watch off, but now we come to deal with the wheels. Here the "forms" furnished to the materials which the sensibility has sent on, are based on the sorts of judgments that are possible. Taking the four possible judgments of quantity, quality, relation and modality and analyzing them much after the order of Aristotle, we have the twelve Categories, as the *pure forms* of Understanding, corresponding with the forms of Space and Time as referred to in connection with the sensibility.

In the exposition of the Categories of the Understanding Kant professes to have answered the vital element in the question, "How are synthetic judgments *a priori* possible?" The synthetic judgments of the Categories are all *a priori*, inasmuch as they are not dependent upon experience, but belong to the mind as its original endowment.

But there is yet another department of the mind—the crowning one—which Kant calls the faculty of Reason, as distinct from the Understanding—the *Vernunft* as against the *Verstand*. Reason reduces the variety of conceptions to their unity. It proceeds from generality to generality till the ultimate or Absolute is reached. Here we naturally think of Plato and Aristotle and see even in the word that Kant uses his indebtedness to Plato, for he calls the three pure forms of Reason, *Ideas*. Now these pure forms of Reason are independent of experience; they are above Sensibility, and above understanding—yet Reason receives as "raw material" the *conceptions* of the Understanding just as the Understanding receives perceptions from or through the Sensibility. Hence we have the "rock of offense" in Kantian psychology and philosophy—that Reason is powerless when employed on matters beyond the sphere of the Understanding. It can, according to Kant's theory, draw nothing but false conclusions when exercised out of its realm.

The three great unifying Ideas of the Reason are those which concern things subjective—the

Soul; things cosmological—the *World*; the ultimate and great unifying principle, binding everything in one—*God*.

It may seem vain to attempt to illustrate Kant's psychology, or at least his psychology so far as it bears directly upon this theory of knowledge, but a person not especially versed in philosophic studies might get from the following imperfect illustration, a fair idea of Kant's meaning: A man stands before a convex mirror, which reflects, but distorts the man's form; a photographer's camera stands at such an angle from the mirror as to catch the distorted reflection of the man, and in turn reverses it and greatly reduces it in size. The mirror is the *Sensibility* which receives the sensation from without and "impresses" on that which it receives a "form" due to the peculiarity of the mirror; the mirror in turn sends on this distorted image and the camera, as the Understanding, receives the same, impresses *its* "form" on it, and passes the twice changed image to a beholder who stands behind the camera, and receives through his eye, with corresponding changes and "forms," the picture of the man who somewhere without, yet not directly visible, stands before a mirror. I am assuming vision in the beholder to be the simple thing the populace takes it to be,—and in that case we get in a vague way Kant's notion of the "departments" of the mind, and realize how the "thing in itself,"—the man standing before the mirror, is not seen by the beholder; furthermore, the image

of it which *does* reach him has been "impressed" by "forms" and "forms," until he cannot say how far they have distorted the original. The thing seen as imprinted on the camera is only "phenomenon"—the man that remains unseen is "noumenon," concerning whom we can only infer certain things. Kant would say the "raw material" (the man) *exists*; but he would utterly reject the assumption that it would be logical to infer the image on the glass was a *counterpart* of the man standing before the mirror. I have used the illustration of the convex mirror to assist in getting at Kant's idea—but assuming the glass to be a *normal* one, the image reflected several times might still be true to the original. This I believe to be the *fact*—but this is not Kantian.

SOME INFERENCES FROM KANT'S PSYCHOLOGY

Strictly speaking Ontology as a science, according to Kant, is impossible. We cannot know "the thing in itself," but only such representations of it as Sensibility, Understanding and Reason force us, by their very nature to accept.

The existence of the external world is not directly known, yet necessarily postulated. What you cannot demonstrate you *may* postulate, upon the basis of certain universal and necessary ideas. Our knowledge of the objective world cannot be relied upon to be true as a subjective impression of an objective fact—a mirror held up before the world—yet that knowledge is true in that it is not

a delusion. An objective world exists, and, what is more important, the veracity of consciousness is established. When the veracity of consciousness is established we have certainty in morals.

The conciliating spirit of Kant is seen here in that he agrees with Hume in saying that our knowledge is relative, and that it begins with experience. He differs widely, and thinks he has answered Hume by saying that in consciousness we have elements which were not given by experience and which are *necessarily* true—or to quote the first words of the Critique of Pure Reason, “all our knowledge *begins* with experience—but it by no means follows that it all *arises out* of experience.” In consciousness we find ideas of God, the World, etc., and other ideas which can only belong to what we call soul—Virtue, Duty, Justice. We cannot demonstrate the existence of God. Reason is limited to things within the realm of experience; but the practical reason affirms what the pure reason cannot demonstrate. As in the case of the theoretical part of Kant’s work, he presupposed as existent the “thing in itself,” though such was not susceptible of being known—so in the practical part we find the *freedom of the will* as an abstract and indeterminate principle that must realize itself in something, and that something is—*action*.

The same principle which we saw further back in this chapter concerning sensibility, understanding and reason—in each case “imposing” their re-

spective "forms" on what they each receive from without or from each other, holds good in the region of the Practical Reason: in the realm of conscience man finds himself obliged to impose certain rules upon his actions. These laws have therefore the character of universality and necessity. Virtue, justice, etc., result not from experience, for the ideal we hold up as a type exceeds what our experience gives of virtue and justice. The "categorical imperative" comes not of experience.

THE ESSENTIALS OF KANTIANISM

I shall try now to sum up what might be called the essentials of the Kantian philosophy: In dealing with the problem of knowledge Kant was concerned with synthetic judgments *a priori*, for he considered that such only called for solution. Under the head of the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant plunges at once into a discussion of pure mathematics and shows at least to his satisfaction (not to the satisfaction of G. H. Lewes) that we have in this science *a priori synthetic judgments*. He even goes further and says we have them in Physics and Metaphysics. Now if the fundamentals of mathematics are intuitions *a priori*, may we not conclude that there may be also *a priori conceptions*, out of which, in connection with these pure intuitions a metaphysic could be formed? But as the intuitions of space and time are but subjective forms, there is something subjective mingled with all our perceptions, and we cannot know

things save as they appear. The Transcendental Aesthetic seeks to know only what is in the sensory *a priori*.

When we reach the Transcendental Analytic we face the problem of how to attain to the pure conceptions of the understanding. Aristotle's categories, Kant said, were tabulated empirically; we must derive them from a common *principle*, and that principle is, the logical *judgment*. Get the *modes* or *forms* of the judgment and we have the principle we seek. The twelve categories of Kant, he thinks, are conceptions *a priori*, and hence have *necessary* and *universal* validity; though by themselves they are *empty* forms which have *content only* through the intuitions which come through the *sensory*. Hence, as the categories are thus empty save as the sensory gives intuitions, the categories have validity only in their application to sensuous intuitions.

The question as to how sensible objects can be subsumed under pure conceptions of the understanding, and fundamental principles formed from them, calls forth the most intricate and perhaps least satisfactory thing in Kantianism,—viz., his doctrine of the *schematism* of the categories by the pure intuition, Time. He uses time in this capacity because he says it has both a *pure a priori* and a *sensible* element about it, and thus becomes the mediating "thing," or "thread for the beads of events." This *schema* is a product of the general or universal imagination. Quantity has for its uni-

versal *schema* the *series of time*; quality has the *content of time*; relation has the *order of time*; modality has the *whole of time*. Thus with a *a priori* conceptions and a *schema* through which we can apply these conceptions to objects, we are furnished with a basis for forming fundamental metaphysical principles. But Kant is never tired of telling us we have no right to use these conceptions and principles save as to things as *objects of possible experience*.

In the Transcendental Dialectic we have the work of "reason" as distinct from the understanding, and its peculiar work is: to "find the unconditioned for the conditioned knowledge of the understanding, and to unify it." The reason has no reference to objects but only to the *understanding* and its *judgments*, hence its activity is an immanent one. Exalt the highest unity of reason to an actual object of knowledge, and we apply the conceptions of the understanding to the unconditioned, and consequently are decoyed beyond the limits of reason. This is the "false use of the categories" as Kant thinks, and a prolific source of error.

Kant would overthrow all rational psychology as this has been previously apprehended. As we cannot know "the thing in itself" we cannot know it, even though that "thing" be our own *soul*. Kant thus reasons: to treat the Ego as *object* and be able to apply to it *categories*, it must be given empirically, in an intuition, for he has already shut us up to the belief that the categories are empty

save as they receive matter from the sensibility, and whether an "object" be something *without* or *within*, the sensibility has already impressed its "form" on the same ere it reaches the understanding, and we are forbidden to postulate objective reality of any such an intuition. I can separate my thinking *ideally* from my body, but this does not imply that I can exist *really* separate from my body. Psychology then furnishes us with no additional knowledge of self but is useful as *discipline*, to save us from "throwing ourselves into soulless materialism or into the delusion of groundless idealism."

The antinomies of reason growing out of an attempt to establish determinations respecting the world, are too well known to give them in any detail. Kant thought much of his work here. Others have not shared his estimate with him. Hegel has done his best work in refuting this section of Kant's Critique.

Under the head of the pure reason and the idea of God, Kant discusses the ontological, the cosmological, the theological or physico-theological arguments—and comes to the conclusion that the idea of a Supreme Being is nothing other than a regulative principle of the reason. We can act "as if" there were a God, but the Critique of Pure Reason goes no further. Kant has had in mind all the while to chastise reason, in that it has been presumptuous: the age of Enlightenment had made a god of "Reason." The Practical Reason will give to the intuitions of the soul what Romanticism was

calling for and faith may affirm what reason must remain an agnostic concerning.

The Practical Reason has to do with the determination of the *will*. It has nothing to do with the cognizableness of objects. Freedom is an *a priori* fact of inner experience. But free will works through its acts upon the sensory, and there must be a point of contact between the two. This is the basis for the Critique of the Practical Reason.

In the ANALYTIC Kant starts with freedom as the simple "form" of our actions. But experience or the empirical gives matter to the empty form—in the desire for pleasure and the dread of pain. The categorical imperative is the necessary law of freedom binding upon all men, and regulates men in regard to the variations which arise in their relations to pleasure and pain. The highest principle of morality is: so act that the maxims of thy will can at the same time be valid as the principle of a universal lawgiving.

The impulse impelling the will to act conformably to the highest moral law is the moral law itself apprehended and revered, and no mere impulse to happiness. Kant's morality was most severe: he said if we do that which is moral for the sake of law we have *legality* and not *morality*. Reverence for the moral law is the single feeling befitting man.

In the Dialectic of the Practical Reason Kant atones for what he has left undone in the Critique of Pure Reason. When we ask, What is the high-

est good? we find in reply that it is the highest happiness joined to the highest virtue. But the highest virtue cannot exist in this life, both because of the union of soul and body, and because of the brevity of life: hence we are bound to postulate the immortality of the soul—it must have time into which to develop in virtue. And the highest happiness can never be experienced save from the assumption of a God who knows our nature and the demands of the same. Hence we are bound to postulate a God. What the Pure Reason therefore could not prove the Practical Reason affirms.

The Critique of the Judgment discusses the aesthetic and theological sense, and is a kind of bridge between the two other Critiques. He calls this last Critique that of "Judgment," because in the narrower sense it establishes a relation between things which have nothing in common. "Beauty does not inhere in objects; it does not exist apart from the aesthetic sense; it is the product of this sense as time and space are products of the theoretical sense."

Here we find Kant with his principle with which we started out in these characterizations of his teaching subjectively binding us; and struggle as we will, aspire as we will, (and Kant allows us to do both) the *mind* prescribes law and the *mind* makes beautiful things beautiful. In an evil day Kant said in his first edition of "The Critique of Pure Reason" that the Ego and the "thing in itself" *might* be one and the same thing. This

hint to plunge Fichte and others into the extreme of making the universe one substance—God. Thus the pendulum swung to the opposite extreme. For Hume, whom Kant feels called upon to refute, assumed that the universe was one substance, and that substance was matter. Kant vainly protested that the extreme Idealism of Fichte had no right to claim Kantianism as its progenitor. Notwithstanding the severe denunciations of Kant against Fichte and his followers, the Idealism of the latter will continue to have its place in the History of Philosophy as a natural inference from Kant's psychology.

IV

HEGEL: THEISTIC EVOLUTION.

"A great man condemns the world to the task of explaining him," is an oft-quoted saying of Hegel's, and may well become the opening sentence of an attempt to give an exposition of Hegelianism in as simple a style and in as brief a compass as may be possible.

Plato was a poet-philosopher; Aristotle was scientific; Kant was a born metaphysician; Hegel was a theologian as well as philosopher. From one standpoint all that Hegel said might be included under a comprehensive dissertation on the text: "He that loseth his life shall find it." His philosophy reminds us of St. Paul's mystic utterances concerning the Godhead in Christ, when He who was equal with the Father "emptied Himself," but only to return, as it were enriched, and take His place at the right hand of the majesty on high. Before Hegel is condemned for his paradoxes and contradictions, it were well to ask if Paul has not been guilty of similar offenses. Can a man deal with the truth in its entirety, see unity in variety, overreach the merely passing, including the problem of evil—and not seem to contradict himself? Hegel is one of the philosophers who undertook to present a philosophy to the world that would include everything in it, and in the universe. Aristotle took up separate sciences, or indeed made

them; he wrote on all subjects, and thus produced a sort of encyclopedia. Hegel assumed to have discovered a Method,—a key to knowledge, which when applied, would, if not unlock all mysteries, at least place everything in heaven and earth upon what might be called a rational basis.

George Frederick Hegel was born at Stuttgart, the capital of Würtemberg, on 27th of August, 1770. This was the year in which Kant published his famous "Dissertation" and was made full professor at Königsberg. Hegel was born eleven years after Schiller and five years before Schelling. The Swabians of Germany, to whom Hegel belonged, have been called the "Scots of the Fatherland." Their peculiarities are shrewdness and simplicity, religious enthusiasm and speculative free-thinking.

As a boy Hegel was characterized as "thoroughly teachable," but not remarkable for brilliancy—save to take prizes because of his patient application to study. He was early designed for the Church by his parents, and was sent to the seminary of Tübingen to prepare himself for the ministry. Before this, however, he had been much influenced by his reading of Greek poetry, and his experience at Tübingen was colored in much by this decided influence. Greek art came to be regarded by Hegel as the vision of a realized harmony of existence, and occasioned the young student many a rude shock, as he saw life and even Christianity in Europe.

Kant was the rising star in philosophy when

Hegel was a Tübingen student ; but it is said that none of the professors at the institution understood Kant sufficiently to teach him sympathetically. Hegel was therefore forced to think his own way through philosophy, and left the seminary with the singular recommendation from one of his professors, that "Hegel was a fine student, well versed in literature generally, but deficient in philosophy."

In considering the making of Hegel, which follows here in order,—for the next six years may be said to have decided his course and line of thought—it is well to note what might be called his remote and proximate intellectual antecedents. It is a maxim of Hegel's that nothing is to be considered by itself—apart from that to which it is related. Surely a man cannot be so considered, and especially a man living when Hegel did, and the inheritor of all that was his.

Hegel is Platonic in temper, so far as that temper gives itself to theory as against scientific investigation. He is like Plato an idealist, but certainly not like him, a dualist. In reading Hegel one at once thinks of Platonic "ideas," for we are told that "nothing exists but *for* thought and as a manifestation of thought; that spirit is the *reason* of nature, and mind the *key* to matter."

In the formulating of his theory of ideas Plato appears again to be Hegel's forerunner. In the dialogues "Parmenides" and the "Sophist" we have almost Hegelian language in the subjects discussed, viz., Being, Not-being, Motion, Becoming. If

Hegel sympathized with the Heraclitan element in Plato, he was none the less Platonic for that.

With the consistent contradiction that we see throughout Hegel he was not less Aristotelian than Platonic. When we recall that Aristotle conceived reality as matter *becoming* real by acquiring "form" from mind, we have made a juncture between Hegel and Aristotle which is vital. It has been well said: "Add Aristotle's conception of movement to Plato's conception of ideas as constituting reality and you have something very much like Hegel's Logic."

The Greeks left a dualism unreconciled, and Descartes, in the opening of the period of Modern Philosophy, emphasized it as the most notable feature in his scheme. Mind is the purely active substance and matter the purely passive—this is the Cartesian platform. Out of this naturally, as by reaction, sprang the teaching of Spinoza, whose mind was intoxicated with the idea of unity. We have according to Spinoza one substance, but it is broken into two forms as we know it, *thought* and *extension*. Hegel's terse way of defining his position as against the monism of Spinoza is: "Not *substance* but *subject*." Hegel believes in unity as strongly as Spinoza does; still while differences do but suppose a unity as of substance, that unity, as a subject, breaks up into differences which constitute the main outlines of reality.

When we consider the proximate antecedents of Hegel we approach what must be treated with more

care and at greater length, for much that seems mysterious in our philosopher will disappear when he is shown in his environment—his agreements and disagreements with those who immediately preceded him or were his early co-laborers.

During the six years that might be said to have enabled Hegel to “find himself” he was a tutor first at Berne, Switzerland, and then at Frankfort, Germany. The influence of Greek poetry has been already alluded to as being the greatest single influence upon Hegel in his university days. Bearing in mind that he was educated for the Church and had not in his six “wander years” ceased to regard himself as a theologian rather than a philosopher, it is not to be wondered at that Hegel directed his attention at the first rather to the more concrete and practical matters connected with philosophy—such as the history of it and its bearing on ethics—than to abstract metaphysics.

Two leading principles were from the first in Hegel’s mind, viz., the idea of freedom, or self-determination; the other, the idea of man’s life as an organic unity, with its two phases, natural and spiritual, which cannot be separated from each other without losing all their meaning and value. The first idea came of the Reformation, with its emancipating influence, and might be said to be part and parcel of the 18th century Enlightenment. Its exponents, in part or in transformed state, were Rousseau, Kant and Fichte. In Rousseau and Kant we find an attempt to develop this

abstract principle of freedom into a social system without altering its abstract or negative character. Rousseau held to the doctrine of individualism, with universal reason as merely a common element in natures otherwise unlike, rather than a *principle binding together* differences and thus making organic unity. With Kant the "consciousness of self" was the thing common to all men and which makes community between them possible; and self-determination he considered the basis of all morality. But between Kant's abstract or general ideas and the desires and capacities which determine the particular relations of men to each other and to the world, there was no connection. His morality, as Hegel saw it, was soulless.

With Schelling and Fichte, Hegel was in more agreement. It is well known that the first was Hegel's fellow-worker in philosophy for a time. To the latter he acknowledges his indebtedness for the hint concerning the celebrated "method" that was to Hegel the key to a solution of his philosophical difficulty.

Keeping our minds upon the end Hegel had in view, viz., the reconciliation of the two principles above referred to, and remembering that his early study of Greek poetry and art had revealed to him what seemed to be a reconciliation of heart and reason, of the universal and the particular, and that at this period of Hegel's life he regarded Christianity as a failure, and said it was a "system which can make men good only if they are good

already"—we understand how he broke with his friend Schelling and with Fichte. The first of these would grant to a favored few, prophets and poets, to rise to the point of seeing reconciliation; while the latter said that moral turpitude hindered man's rising to true intellectual perception. Hegel espouses the cause of man and mind and says: "I hold it one of the best signs of the times that humanity has been presented to its own eyes as worthy of reverence. It is a proof that the nimbus is vanishing from the heads of the oppressors and gods of the earth. Philosophers are now proving the dignity of man, and the people will soon learn to feel it, and not merely to ask humbly for those rights of theirs which have been trampled in the dust, but to resume and to appropriate them for themselves." Further: "He who has so much to say of the incomprehensible stupidity of mankind, who elaborately demonstrates that it is the greatest folly for a people to have such prejudices, who has always on his tongue the watchwords of 'enlightenment,' 'knowledge of mankind,' 'progress and perfectibility of the species'—is but a vain babbler of the *Aufklärung*, and a vender of universal medicines—one who feeds himself with empty words, and ignores the holy and tender web of human affections."

Dissatisfied with the *Enlightenment*, dissatisfied with the philosophers of the day, dissatisfied with the Church as he saw it and understood it, Hegel was, if we give him credit for sincerity, forging

his way to what would be a philosophy and a religion which should do justice to the whole man, heart and head, and appeal to the people by its very reasonableness. Singular indeed that the man who is regarded as the most obscure of all modern philosophers, and who is supposed to be obscure for obscurity's sake, should have had in mind such aims as his words lead us to infer he cherished. Has he been misunderstood, or was all this seeming interest in humanity *only in seeming?*

During the last years of Hegel's residence at Frankfort, his terminology changed and with it his antagonism to Christianity seemed to vanish. Hitherto Hegel had used the words "life" and "love" to express the highest kind of social unity. He now substitutes the word "spirit." From this word he never afterwards departs. "Spirit" was to Hegel what "love" was to Browning—the highest of all principles—the unification of the irreconcilable. To Hegel the term "spirit" seemed to convey "the idea of antagonism overcome, contradiction reconciled, unity reached through struggle and conflict of elements, which, in the first aspect of them, are opposed to each other." Furthermore, and very important to know, this unity cannot be *immediate*, nor is it a *natural* process—it is not ready-made from the first, nor a something which does not at first resist our minds. It must begin with a distinct consciousness of independence to be renounced, and of opposition to be overcome. Here is the germ thought that was hinted at in the

beginning of this chapter—the idea of losing one's life to find it, or as has been expressed in few words, "dying to live."

Recurring now for a moment to Kant, we can see the point of departure between him and Hegel. Kant left philosophy struggling with dualism. His world of "thing-in-itself" was the unknown element as well as the mysterious unknown—it was not the "self" and was really no part of it—though the conscious self did impress certain "forms" upon this mysterious "thing." Furthermore, Kant hinted at a dualism again when he said that "man's conduct was *phenomenally determined* but *nomenally free*."

In addition to this expressed or implied dualism, Kant was agnostic, save that he brought in "faith" or what might be called "intuition," which affirmed what reason could not grapple with. To Hegel this seemed equivalent to saying on Kant's part: "There is a unity but I cannot find it—hence I affirm what I cannot discover." Indeed Hegel for a time took refuge in what Schelling never departed from,—that "philosophy must end in religion, because philosophy is thought, and thought always involves finitude and opposition—e. g., the opposition of the subject and object, of the mind that thinks to matter that does not think." His is the doctrine of religious "intuition" or the feeling of a unity which cannot be rationally discovered nor expressed.

Hegel's final position was that it is not enough to

say there are organisms in the world, but the whole world must be conceived as an organism. All history and nature must be seen to have the "unity of a poem." In such a theory optimism must be reached not by exclusion of evil, but by overcoming it. "All things must work together for good"—not only "to those who love God," but for man and the world—which is Browning's platform exactly.

We are now in position to treat of Hegel's system in something of detail. An outline of it might be given thus:

His aim was to unfold the doctrine of the Absolute. In doing so his method is that of "progressive definitions." But his progress is that of a spiral railway.

Reality is a system. By this is meant that reality is conceived as a unity. This must not be confounded with Pantheism of the ordinary type. This system regards unity as an objective fact and differences as mere illusion. To Hegel existence is necessarily revealed not simply as a unity but as a unity of distinguished and related parts—a *system*. His favorite illustration (and he was happy in using illustrations) to indicate the unity of the world, was the magnet which when broken into two parts did not give the one the south and the other the north pole—but each was both north and south. One thinks of Paul's paragraph on the "body" in his letter to the Corinthians as he reads Hegel's plea for the universe, as a system, with its

parts, each, however seemingly small or unimportant, necessary to the whole, yet nothing if separated from the body. In his treatment of this world of reality, Hegel begins with the world of thought—his *Logic*: next he takes up the world of reality in what we call Nature, seemingly estranged from thought—his *Philosophy of Nature*: finally the world of reality consciously penetrated by thought—which is his *Philosophy of Spirit*—the culmination of his Philosophy as a whole.

Reality is a graded system. Here we meet something like the hierarchy in Plato's Ideas. Every part of the Hegelian system is important, but not every part is equally so. The lower gives place to the higher. The life-blood of the slain passes into the conquerors. We have "lower" categories and "higher." The whole is a scheme in which evolution is the distinguishing factor. It is just here that Hegel is to some and perhaps to most people contradictory, or at least unsatisfactory. He is apt to say of a *thing* or a *state* or a *process*—"true in part," "false in part." From one standpoint that which is part of a graded system may seem to be "cause," "effect," "end,"—yet from another simply a link in a chain or "nothing" if entirely abstracted from its relations.

Reality is a system or union of opposites. This is the heart of Hegelianism. Truth is the synthesis of all possible half truths. It is reached when we have been tossed from aspect to aspect until we are thrown into the heart of things. Kant had said

that where Time and Space were the ruling "forms" of perception we should expect to encounter contradictions. Sometimes Hegel shows how one phase of a truth passes into its contradictory; again he shows how the thing as it stands is *self*-contradictory. First thoughts cannot be more than a rough one-sided sketch of the reality of things. The aspects of truth come to us in definite sequence; but finality is impossible unless in absolute philosophy, or perhaps in the totality of the process of the universe. Here again we think of Browning, as one who while a believer in evolution said the truth was to be reached not by judging the oak by the acorn, but the acorn by the oak. Get the whole process, see the entire development, and then judge the part the seed played, or what the earth, air, water must have given. Hegel will not give a categorical reply to many questions which it would seem should merit it: he is apt to say "either" or "both, if you please," and this is exasperating to men of the George H. Lewes type. And yet, was not this something of the attitude of Christ to many questions? The more men think, the more they are forced to see that behind much which the world regards as contradiction lies a unity. Hegel thought he saw a unity that annihilated all contradiction. It is easy to see in the light of this attitude how Hegel would begin with Logic—not the conventional logic of the schools, but one made by Hegel himself, which disregarded the established laws of "contradiction," "identity" and the like.

Reality is a work of thought. This is the crowning process, or last in the series. As I have said, Hegel did not regard the unity he was striving for as something which came to the mind *immediately* or *naturally*. He had no notion that a man's "first thoughts were his best thoughts." It was on the other hand by severe discipline, and by, in a sense, self-abnegation, that a man came to see the world as it really is. One must have such power of abstraction as to consider himself apart from himself—to place himself in with the world of men and of "things," and leave himself there, while at the same time he stands apart from all and observes the world's onward movement. Kant had said the world of our knowledge is a creation of thought. Hegel goes further and states that reality is that which thought *ap-prehends*, conceives or produces.

Thus far we have seen that Hegel was a child of his time in a sense, as was inevitable. We have seen that he was a German idealist, with elements that connected him with the great Greek philosophers. We see him dissatisfied with philosophy and religion, as he saw them in his early days. We see him proposing to apply a "method" which he assumed would give unity to what had hitherto been contradictory, and in so doing he came to the problem by regarding reality as a *system*, and as a *graded* system, with a union of *opposites*, and the whole the work of *thought*—but thought as movement and process.

His work as a whole, said to be the most comprehensive ever undertaken by man, as well as the most ambitious, begins naturally with his *Logic*, and proceeds to his philosophy of *Spirit*.

Hegel's Logic: Hegel's logic is both logic and metaphysics. As has been said already he begins with logic because he unmakes the conventional work on that subject which the world inherited from Aristotle. The great pupil of Plato laid down the "Law of Contradiction" as the highest law of thought as opposed to the Heraclitan principle of universal flux, and maintained that things are definitely *what they are*, in their isolation, and must be kept in their definiteness, no matter how they may be, in some instances, related. "*A*" must not be "*not-A*." No surprise then that the world rubbed its eyes and wondered if it heard what was really said when Hegel contradicted the law of contradiction. And yet, if we sympathetically look into his meaning, there is at least an element of truth in even the famous saying that "being and non-being are the same."

What Hegel contends for is that things in this world are not *absolutely* differentiated. Kant had said that thought made the world as we see it. Hegel says that *absolute difference* is something which cannot exist within the intelligible world. We can embrace in our thought the widest antagonism consistent with the *unity of thought itself*, but antagonism *inconsistent with the unity of thought* is itself unthinkable.

Starting with the position that the world is an organism, and that unity is at the bottom of all differences, Hegel thinks there are no seeming antagonisms which cannot be reconciled. If some one says, "every *finite* thing is *itself* and *no other*," Hegel replies, "this is true *within limits*," and then goes on to show that because a thing is finite it is by its very nature *related to something else* which *limits* it, and thus it contains in itself the principle of its own destruction. Its very existence is therefore contradictory, for it cannot be said to BE any more than it may be said NOT to be. This then is the basis for saying that every definite *thought or thing* includes its negative. Definiteness, finitude, determination have their affirmative or positive meanings, but also involve their own negation. The whole truth about a thing cannot be expressed once for all in a proposition. Neither assertion nor denial contains the complete truth. To say then that "being and not-being are the same" is to say that beneath differences and contradictions there is a unity, and in the case of "being," Hegel says the word implies both the most fundamental and at the same time the poorest of all conceptions—just because it is the most general and universal, so the idea that contains least—in fact, isolated, it contains *nothing*, or *is nothing*.

Being has no differentiations; it is above set differences; all qualities are thought out of it.

In dealing with the categories, Hegel begins with Being, as the most fundamental, and as the

one which contains all the others, in the sense that the others are but *transformations* of this fundamental idea. Yet, be it understood here, that, while Hegel says there is an order to be observed, which must be followed in considering the categories,—the mind must “abandon itself to its spontaneous self-activity,”—still, like the evolutionist in science, the lower types serve to be as stepping-stones to the higher, and when the idea of self-consciousness is reached, we have that which contains all the categories and the all-inclusive truth.

If it is asked, how does BEING which is, in a sense, *nothing*, become *anything* or *everything*, the clue or solution is found in the idea of *becoming* and in the very *contradiction* which in turn becomes a principle of force. As has been said, Being isolated, or separated from all relations, remains barren, fruitless, powerless. But Being as the fundamental category, from which everything is evolved, and in which everything is implied, by means of the very contradiction which puzzles us is resolved into the notion of “*becoming*”—similar to the notion of Aristotle concerning the non-existence of matter made actual by means of “form.” If the solution of one difficulty simply creates another, Hegel solves the second as he did the first—reconciling contradictions by unity—all the while assuming nature to be “the self-development of thought and thought as nature becoming conscious of itself.”

If in all this one asks, "Where is consistency?" Hegel replies that it does *not exist*. Syllogistic logic is the logic of *argument* and its *merit* is to secure *self-consistency*. This is the logic of the prize-ring. Hegel will not for a moment say that self-consistency is the main concern of logic. There is no such fixity in healthy unpolemical human thought. If logical premises were *infallibly true*, then self-consistency would be a sufficient rule. But logical premises are not given exhaustively, consequently self-consistency has no meaning for "thought as thought." Abstract (in the sense of one-sided) thought is vicious, if it be anything more than a *passing stage* towards a fully conscious grasp of the many-sided coherence of reality. The true movement, then, is *not from discord to self-consistency*, but from *VAGUENESS* to *DEFINITENESS*. This last phrase perhaps as fully expresses what Hegel means by his "method" or process as any words that could be used. He illustrates this principle by reference to *perception*. No perception is entirely new. Each is a fresh instance of what our past intellectual life consisted in. We have ever before us a vague, half-formed picture of what the world is. Each new experience is but a new touch to the picture.

We see Hegel's trend, even if we can not agree with him. We are also disposed to say of him what he says continually of what men have considered established truths: "True, in a sense." One must wonder though what becomes of his own reason-

ing when self-consistency is so summarily dealt with. But this characterization is concerned with presenting Hegel's views so as to make them intelligible rather than with a criticism of those views.

The *first* division of logic according to Hegel has to do with the categories in which relativity is not EXPRESSED—such as Being, Quality, Quantity. While these *involve*, they do not immediately express or even suggest any relation of the object to which they are applied to any other object.

The *second* main division will have to do with such categories as Essence and Existence, Force and Expression, Substance and Accident, Cause and Effect. These drive us to go beyond the object with which we are dealing, and to connect it with other objects.

The *last* main division will have to do with the categories such as those of final cause and organic unity, by which the object is characterized as related to intellect, or having in it the self-determined nature of which the intelligence is the highest type.

The general argument of the logic is: Reality, which at first is presented to us as the Being of things which are regarded as standing by themselves, determined in quality and quantity, having no *necessary relations* to each other—comes in the process of thought to be known as an endless aggregate of essentially related and transitory existences, each of which exists only as it determines

and is determined by the others, according to universal laws—and finally is discovered to lie in a world of objects, each and all of which exist only in so far as they exist *for intelligence*, and in so far as intelligence is *revealed* or *realized in them*.

This movement of thought is demonstrated by showing how the categories of Being when fully understood and reasoned out lead to the categories of Relations, and these in turn to the categories of Ideal Unity, which corresponds with philosophy.

Hegel's Philosophy of Nature: Nature is to Hegel the extreme of possible opposition to spirit, but that in turn through which spirit fully realizes itself. In dealing with Hegel as with Kant, when we have seen his "method" we have the key to his treatment of all that follows. When the Kantian doctrine of Space and Time has been fully appreciated and understood, Kant is comparatively easy: so if we appreciate the way Hegel looks upon "unity and difference," "contradiction and identity"—if we see the place "development" plays in his system, and what he means by it, we can at least follow him, whether he is reasoning about things mental or physical.

Nature, independent of intelligence, is a process fixed in the form of an external hierarchy of existences, which in their relation exhibit successive stages of development by which the object returns to the subject. In the inorganic world the ideal principle is present as an *inner* or *hidden* nature of things, a law of relation between parts external

to each other, yet this principle manifests itself only as these parts in their changes continually betray the secret of their essential relativity to each other. In the living being, however, this inner nature does not merely *underlie* the fixed difference of external parts, but is *revealed* in them as a principle of organization. The *ideality* of nature is to Hegel that in which the external visibly contradicts and refutes its own externality. This idealization is *imperfect*, as it is not *conscious of itself*; it is not present to the living being, but only to *us*. Nature rises to self-consciousness only in man, who in turn is not only conscious of it but of himself in distinction *from* and in relation *to* it. Man in his development must overcome this antagonism between himself and the world, and so realize his unity and the unity of all things and beings with the absolute Spirit, "in whom we live and move and have our being," and in whom Nature has its being.

How can the Absolute transform itself into a material manifold in Space and Time? Some one has said that it is as hard for Hegel to think of God without nature as to think of nature without God. He says we must think that the finite is not AN utterance of the infinite but THE utterance. What "Being" was as a category in logic, Space becomes in Hegel's treatment of nature. It is the *something* and the *nothing*. It is "reality" and it is "unreality." So with Time. We are asked to see in *movement* what we saw hitherto in contradic-

tion—a force. The movement from thought to material being is a double one, viz., from thought to empty space and time, and then from the idea of these back to matter.

All is the Idea struggling to manifest itself in objectivity. In the lower forms of nature dumb intelligence is striving to utter itself; at last in the higher forms it *speaks*. Every modification that the Idea undergoes in the sphere of pure Thought it endeavors to express in the sphere of Nature. Thus we have evolution; the secret of the seeming contradiction; and the final realization of the world in Reason. Nature is divine in principle but not divine as it *exists*. The Pantheists say God is one with nature and nature one with God. Hegel would say that nature is God's exteriority—the *passing of the Idea* through its imperfection to consciousness or to self-consciousness.

In the process up to self-consciousness, nature passes through three principle stages:

Mechanics: Here matter is found in its most universal form. Yet here we see a tendency to life or motion, and we call it "gravity." Gravity is the desire of matter to come to itself, and thus in this shows its first trace of subjectivity. This "trace of subjectivity" rules in the solar system. Hegel would say that the world of matter reveals thought or idea so far as a world *could* do it.

Physics: Here matter particularizes itself in a body, in an individuality. Mere matter possesses no individuality. In astronomy it is not the bodies,

so Hegel says, which interest us, but their geometrical relations. In astronomy, however, matter has found its center; in Physics matter has found a *quality*. To the province of Physics belongs inorganic nature with its forms and reciprocal relations.

Organics: Inorganic nature destroys itself in the chemical process. While the living body is ever on the verge of passing over to the chemical process, yet the living body resists that tendency. Nature in Physics arises to individuality, nature in organics rises to subjectivity. This is done as follows:

1. The general image of life in the *mineral kingdom*. But this kingdom is the result of a process already past. The geological earth is a giant corpse. The present life that produces itself eternally new breaks forth as the first moving of subjectivity in

2. The organism of *plants*. Each part of the plant is the whole individual, each twig the whole tree. Goethe's discovery concerning the relation of the leaf to the tree was in line with the thought of Hegel.

3. The *animal kingdom* reaches still higher, as Idea is seeking expression and manifestation. In its very highest form we find the Ego in man—self-conscious. This is *the self-emancipation from nature*.

Just as in the Logic we began with Being and worked our way up to self-consciousness, so here

we come to the same. The philosophy then of Hegel is a "method"—one which assumes to lead to a particular end, no matter where you begin. The world is an organism, a man a microcosm. Take any road, *you reach the Ego*.

HEGEL'S PHILOSOPHY OF MIND

We now come to the last of the three main divisions of Hegel's philosophy. He had in mind thesis, antithesis, and synthesis. He began with Thought; then went to Thought estranged; then to Thought returned to itself. Logic represented Thought; Nature, Thought estranged from itself; Mind, Thought returned to itself. Simple enough, as a system, in its main outlines, but complicated in its details and unfoldings.

Hegel would say that Mind is the truth of Nature. Here Being is removed from its estrangement and becomes identical with itself. The formal essence of Mind therefore is freedom—the power to abstract itself from everything else; its *material* essence is its capacity to manifest itself as mind—as rationality.

But just as Nature had its lower forms and through the lower proceeded to the higher, so mind has its stages of development. In its process to higher mind, it advances from that which is of the "earth earthy," to individuality, then from mere individuality to a point where it merges itself with all else, yet at the same time has divested itself of nature. This is the awaking of the Ego, which accomplishes two ends, *first*, it CREATES the

objective world; and *second*, it awakens to conscious subjectivity only *in* the objective world, and in distinction from it. Consciousness becomes self-consciousness by passing through the stages of sensuous consciousness, perception, and understanding, and convincing itself in this its formative history, that it has only to do *with itself*, while it *believed* it had to do with *something objective*.

Rising into the realm of the universal consciousness by coming in contact with other self-consciousnesses, we have mind divested of naturalism and mere subjectivity.

Mind is first theoretical, then practical. It is theoretical in that it has to do with the rational as something given; it is practical in the will. The practical is the "truth of the theoretical," to use Hegelian phraseology. By this Hegel means that the theoretical mind passes on to the practical, through the stages of intuition, representation and thought. The Will, on the other hand, frees itself into *free will* through impulse, desire, and inclination. Life is a warfare, therefore, and resistance is not only the law of living and development, but its very essence.

With free will come *rights*. The conflict between rights and rights and will and will results in a compact, or common will. In this we see the state in embryo. Under this head Hegel gives us his theory of government. Crime is individual will coming into conflict with the higher or common will, and the punishment of a criminal is not so much

warning or vengeance, but the man's higher will,—his own *better will* which belongs to him by virtue of his being a citizen, coming back on him and destroying him. In ideal government the individual will can not come in conflict with the higher or common will.

Removing the opposition between the universal and particular will, you have the basis of *Morality*. In morality self-determination is carried forward till duty and virtue emerge. Here we have Hegel's Ethics as before we had his ideas of government.

The ethical mind is seen at first in the family; this passes on to civil society and then to the state. The philosophy of History, so famously written up by Hegel, is but the following out of his theory of *peoples developing as individuals*, and is part of the Hegelian scheme.

In treating the Absolute Mind Hegel takes up Aesthetics and says the Absolute is present to the sensuous intuition as the Beautiful or as Art. The Beautiful is the appearance of the idea actualized in the form of a limited phenomenon.

Here we have evolution again. The beginning of Art is seen in Architecture. This belongs to the symbolic form of Art. Its material is stone, fashioned according to the laws of gravity.

In Sculpture man advances from the inorganic to the organic. Stone is given bodily form. The stone in sculpture disappears, as it is cut to represent body, the building of the soul. Hence the ideal character of sculpture.

In Painting we make progress over sculpture and represent the life of the soul—the look, the disposition, the heart. It is more ideal in that it has not the dimensions of sculpture, but appeals to the imagination and deals with illusions.

Music leaves off all relations. Its material is sound. It works exclusively on sensation. Music is the most subjective of the arts.

Poetry is the speaking art. In it all other arts return again. In dramatic poetry we see the union of all poetry, so in it we see the consummation of all art.

Poetry forms the transition from art to religion. All religions seek union of the divine and human. This was attempted in crude form in the natural religions, and attained to something higher in the religions of spirit; but attained its height in the Christian religion. The doctrine of the Trinity with its mystery and unfoldings, was Hegel's delight. Here we close as we began. The outgoing of God in Christ and the "return" in the form of the Trinity as now manifested to man, might well represent Hegel's Method and Philosophy.

PERSISTENCE OF IDEAS: THE SPIRIT IN THE TREND OF THOUGHT

"The history and development of human ideas is the most important, if not the only task, of future philosophy," says Ludwig Noiré. An inquiry into the persistence of ideas, the phase of the subject I would treat, necessarily begins with some investigation as to the origin of ideas.

Ideas result from the human mind seeking to know and to interpret its environment. Through our senses we receive sensuous impressions; by some mysterious power which has never been understood and probably never will be, sensations are transmuted into, or are the occasion of, what we call ideas. In attempting to find an explanation or even a plausible hypothesis, that will satisfy the reason of man as to the transmutation of a sense impression into an idea, we have theories as far apart as that of Kant, whose view has already been given, and the other extreme that makes the mind little more than a mirror reflecting the objects of the world about us. Modern philosophy, however, is inclined to stress the element in knowledge which the mind contributes, even going so far as to assert that mere matter, in its real nature, is to us wholly unknown. In our contact with the material world we know only sense impressions which perhaps have no similarity to "things in

themselves." Still, whatever theory of knowledge we may accept, the statement made above as to the origin of ideas, is not materially affected.

Our sense impressions, then, occasioned by our environment, give us one element in knowledge; reactions, in consequence of these impressions—i. e., the self struggling to interpret objective things as well as to adjust itself to the world about it—constitute another element. Of these two, it is evident that the reactions of the self in consequence of the stimuli from without, is the more important element both in the formation of ideas and of character. It is not what a man sees, hears or feels that makes him what he is; but the reactions which the phenomena excite in him. Music, in the most perfect expression of it known to man, may fall upon different ears, and, so far as we know, produce on different persons the same sensuous impressions; yet the reactions, due to inherited peculiarities or to culture of taste, may so differ as to be delight in the soul of one man and disgust in that of another. Scenes and spoken words may make the same sense impressions on the human organism. But the different reactions will enable a Galileo to see the pendulum in the swinging lamp at Pisa; Newton to see the law of gravity in a falling apple; and Morse to see a suggestion of the telegraph in the words, "Their line is gone out through all the earth."

Furthermore, we are so constituted that reactions tend to repeat themselves, so that a response

to an exciting stimulus from without somehow adds such an element to our ideas of that object, and so distinguishes it from other things about it, that we react with less effort a second time to such stimulation, till finally reaction is without effort—at least conscious effort. Not only so, but objects become distinguished, classified and named in consequence of the reactions of the self upon the outer world, till they are grouped by the law of association; and the presence of one object of the group causes the whole class to spring up before the mind, indicating the sensitiveness of the mind to even a suggestion of the thing, which it has been accustomed to respond to as an excitative. Obviously the greater the knowledge of the environment and the more advanced the sensory powers, the more extensive will be the series which, as groups, will be aroused when one of the series is presented to the senses, and the greater the probability that one object so presented will arouse the whole series.

Our reactions, it will be seen, thus develop our powers to react. On the principle that the unused becomes the atrophied, conscious or unconscious lack of response to stimulation eventuates in practical inability to respond. A man's activities are determined by those ideas for which reactions have been provided. Where the powers to react are well developed and no stimulus is given, we have the "felt need" that becomes so interesting an element in providing for the wants of people—in religious

and social life. He who removes from men that which they have been accustomed to rely upon to stimulate their activities—those powers having been highly developed—and provides no substitute, may expect disastrous results; at least some outbreak of activity which will be abnormal. It is said that John Wesley owed much of his success in his Church work to his discerning this principle in dealing with the common folk of England, whose bent towards certain activities which the Church had been forced to forbid, left the people without stimulation, yet with fully developed motor activities that long years of indulgence had made second-nature. He met that demand in his social meetings, and many convivial Church gatherings, which gave an outlet to expression, in word and deed, and thus saved men and women to the Church who might have sought sordid things in their almost irresistible desire to relieve pent-up powers.

We see here more than a hint as to the source of community and national ideas. We obviously inherit from our ancestors our powers to react against certain stimuli. Otherwise we could not rationally explain the exquisite taste and skill of the Greek in dealing with marble; the Italian in dealing with pigments; the German in music; and the Hebrew in the interpretation of the things of God.

The objects which stimulate our senses remain the same; but the power to react and the disposition to react, vary in individuals and races due to heredity and activity. Motor activities developed

through years are transmitted potentially to children—and what we call “tendencies” are so marked that they soon become, under stimulation, established forces. These motor powers which constitute such an important element in what we call character, and distinguish what we ordinarily denominate race characteristics, must date from the remote past. The English doubtless owe more of their national characteristics to the lands from which their ancestors came, than to their now native land. The characteristics of men whose ancestors came to America from Germany, France and Scotland, have probably been less affected by the change of country and by years of absence than by intermarriage with other nationalities. Abraham lived a secluded, almost isolated life, during the time he was being impressed by such exceptional revelations from God. As a consequence he stamped his whole posterity with certain race characteristics which that race bears to this day. Years of residence in foreign countries, and life under the most varied conditions, have not yet obliterated these characteristics, nor have they greatly modified the race ideas. If accurate Chinese history could be secured, no doubt the peculiar race characteristics and ideas of that people would be to a considerable extent explained—at least so far as the theory here advocated can explain them.

With this bare outline suggestive of the origin of ideas, the matter of the persistence of the same,

the feature of the subject with which I would especially deal, forces itself upon our attention. This subject was first brought to my attention by noting how, in keeping a journal of suggestions and plans for future work, and for recreations of a literary sort,—the purposes and ideas of the past would persist after having been practically abandoned and even forgotten. Their presence in some instances I took for their first appearance to the mind; but found on investigation, these were in many instances but suggestions or plans long since considered, but again forcing themselves on my attention somewhat more fully developed. The natural question arose: Whence these ideas, and why do they persist?

Goethe had implanted in his mind the "Faust" idea early in life, and it teased him till he died in old age. Warren Hastings early conceived the idea of regaining his ancestral home, Daylesford, and the purpose to obtain it never forsook him during all his career in India. Dante and Milton early in life decided each to write a great poem, and they did not so much possess the idea as the idea possessed them, till they had accomplished their tasks.

The history of inventions and discoveries is usually connected with some such persistence of ideas. A Newton works on his theory of gravitation, lays it aside, practically abandons it, finally takes it again in hand and demonstrates that the inspiration he first received was not a mere vagary.

Philosophers have been pursued by certain suggestions, and have interpreted as best they could their visions to the world, till finally the idea, struggling through ages to express itself, came forth in its symmetry and self-convincing power, to become a precious heritage for coming generations, and to take its place among the things we call certain and valuable.

It may be asserted that nothing which is true is altogether new. Few exercises yield richer returns than that of tracing ideas to their supposed sources—to mere suggestions or guesses in the remote past, which suggestions, if we could press our investigations further, would be found, in turn, to have owed their utterance to hints still more remote. But no less interesting than the genesis of an idea is its persistence—the manner in which it passes from mind to mind, and from generation to generation. In this persistence *ideas proceed from the obscure to the well-defined; from hints and suggestions to established convictions.*

The entire field of literature is ready to contribute illustrations of this principle. The records of the different sciences are, in this particular, equally fruitful and must be, one and all introduced, in our day, by “historical sketches,” telling how present day opinions bear upon opinions held, and it may be formulated, years ago. I shall confine myself more particularly to philosophic thought, however, and even here but a few of the many illustrations are cited—examples indicating

how the more remote past is connected with the ideas of our day.

The Pythagoreans forestalled the ripest conclusions of modern science when they made *number* play a final and decisive part in all things. Pythagoras is credited with having given utterance to the saying, "The wisest of all things is *number*, and next to this is the *name-giver*." At the boundary line of the chemist's numerical descriptions he begins the use of words to describe his problems. What shall we say of the genius which could, ages ago see in the harmonies of music that which forms a basis for nearly all of our science of to-day, viz., the principle that elements mingle in certain proportions; calculations on squares of distances or the like, yielding such results as Newton obtained; vibrations at definite and different rates, giving us in turn music, light, electricity, X-rays, and we know not what more? And what of the insight which saw the potency and magic of a "name," that which should register for the time what could not be calculated or might never be, yet would enable men thereafter to stand on solid footing while they made further investigations? We build up towering structures on "atoms"—things which exist, so far as actual experience goes, but in name.

It is asserted that but for the influence of Aristotle, which for fifteen centuries held the world from the truth, what is now known as the Copernican theory of our planetary system would have perhaps been given to mankind in the days before

Christ; for Pythagoras had discerned here the truth as it was afterwards seen.

The Eleatic philosophers anticipated our latest problems if not conclusions in philosophy. They saw the opposition between perception and thought, and contended that the former must be corrected by the latter; that what was perceived was merely phenomena, and was vacillating and deceptive, while the thing discerned by reason was the unchangeable. "Being and Thought are one and the same," said Parmenides in 500 B. C. "Thought and thing are one and the same," said Hegel in 1800 A. D.

When we contemplate Heraclitus in the light of an appreciative and complete characterization of him, we are inclined to think the statement of a modern writer in philosophy concerning him not an exaggeration: "The influence of this powerful thinker," says Ludwig Noiré, "was the more considerable because all subsequent systems had either to attach themselves to his doctrine or to deal with it in the way of development or correction." Heraclitus, in opposition to the Eleatics, saw incessant "flux" in all we perceive. In connection with this constant onflowing he developed the idea of an unfolding which has in it the germ of modern evolution. His theory that all things proceed from fire and return finally to fire, sounds very modern indeed, when science tells us that the final form which energy takes is heat, and that we can follow it no further. What Heraclitus really means by

"fire" was what we would denominate "warmth," or warm air. If he had suggested the term "fire-mist" to begin with, in addition to what he said of heat as the final form of energy, he might have written an up-to-date book on the origin of the universe from the view-point of some of our most advanced scholars of the extreme evolutionary type. This from a man in A. D. 503!

He furthermore said that the soul attains to rational thought by receiving into itself the divine Logos, which presides over the outer world. Here is our doctrine of the Divine Immanence, or Universal Reason,—vaguely conceived, but enunciated nevertheless. When Heraclitus says that in sleep the soul loses connection with the outer world and is united again on waking, because brought into connection with the world by means of the senses—we have the germ of the "two-soul" theory, announced by a recent writer on psychic phenomena.

Empedocles anticipated the theology of the afterdays in his suggestion that the inner side of things in this world is controlled by Love and Hate. In our last analysis we say, "God is Love"; on the other hand we cannot describe the spirit of evil in one word that indicates better what we mean than by saying "The devil is personified Hate." We may differ as to the nature of the contention of the two principles, and yet we assume that there is such contention, and that the same comes of desire to gain supremacy in the realm of spirit.

How far is Empedocles from Darwinism

when he says, "that cases of adaptation abound because in the nature of things it happens that what serves its purpose is preserved, and what fails to do so perishes at once?" If this is not the doctrine of the "survival of the fittest" in unmistakable terms, what is it? It is well known that Democritus launched the theory of Atoms, and while his theory was in some respects crude, nevertheless it was the same in substance that is now held as the basis of our physical sciences. When Bacon began his tireless experiments at the beginning of the modern age of scientific investigation, he could not do better than to call the attention of the world to the long-neglected name and work of Democritus.

When we come to Plato we turn our attention from naturalism to mind, and deal with pure thought. We cannot forget, though, that in dealing with Plato we study a double personality, for Socrates and Plato are inseparably united: the pupil is the embodiment of the spirit of his great teacher. The world knows what Socrates was and what he taught mainly through the Platonic Dialogues.

Plato was the creator of a theory of knowledge; the founder of Idealism; the inspirer of the sciences of psychology, moral philosophy and logic; the clear enunciator of the soul's immortality; the suggestor of the many ideal republics and states from the times of Aristotle to Edward Bellamy. His philosophy combined so naturally and easily with

what is known as New Testament revelation as to occasion little discord in the early Church. Of the many secrets this wonderful man discovered, not the least to be mentioned his philosophy of right living. He was both in his teaching and in his private life for a long time a standing puzzle to Christians who held the theory, now happily discarded, that nothing good could come out of Paganism.

When we reach the name and works of that other marvel of the ancients, Aristotle, we seem to have discovered thought's complement, if we take him in connection with Plato. These two men have been called the electric poles which gave direction to the current of thought for two thousand years. While these men, as we shall see later, represent types of thinkers, we find in Aristotle one of the finest instances of what was more common in after days, viz., a sifter and elaborator of opinions expressed by predecessors. Not that Aristotle was wanting in originality; but his love for the truth did not allow him to ignore what others before him had discovered and perhaps but partially formulated. He has thus done justice to his predecessors while he has made all men of thought after him his debtors, by the comprehensive sweep of his genius. He has contributed more than any one man to scientific education of the world. He wrote on practically everything, and the singular fact to observe is that he may still be said to deserve the description Dante has given him, "the master of those

that know." His logic remains as he gave it to the world. His "politics" may still be studied with profit by men who would discern the philosophy of government. His "Rhetoric" is a marvel of insight and practical knowledge. In "Ethics" he satisfied the most pious of men in the days of the Schoolmen. While in "Physics" he often says absurd things, his anticipations of things afterwards found to be true must not be forgotten. Assuming the earth to be round, it was not a bad guess, considering all things, when Aristotle said it was 38,000 miles in circumference. He said further that, "we must not treat with incredulity the opinion of those who say that the regions near the Pillars of Hercules join onto India, and that the ocean to the east of India and that to the west of Europe are one and the same." Here Columbus got his clue.

Aristotle wrote the first "History of Philosophy," and in his "Metaphysics" gives us the terms "form" and "matter" which play so important a part in the philosophy of the afterdays, especially in the works of Kant and those inspired by him.

Aristotle was the great word-coiner of the ancient philosophers. In this particular, as in others, what he did was to originate, to be later developed more fully, such words as "maxim," "matter," "form," "category," "motive," "energy," "mean," "extreme," "faculty," and a host of other terms which we should not know how to do without.

Perhaps the best evidence of the power of Aristotle to dominate the mind of mankind is seen in the fact that when in the 12th century of our era, his works, after having been practically lost to the world, were again brought to the attention of the thinkers of Europe through the Arabs, his influence became a kind of dynasty of Aristotlean ideas, continuing till about the middle of the 16th century. Thomas Aquinas, the great theologian, regarded Aristotle as his master no less than did Dante the poet. The theologians of that time regarded him as one of their own, and Aquinas classes Aristotle's logic, physics and ethics, in his great "summary," with Christian divinity; Dante utilizes Aristotle's theory of the universes in some of the most critical passages of the "Divine Comedy." Beatrice standing on the ninth heaven discourses in Aristotlean terms concerning the "unmoved Mover of all things." In fact, till the time when Idealism dominated Modern Philosophy, Aristotle was regarded as one inspired in much the same sense we now think of the ancient prophets—one of those few very choice spirits to whom God communicates what He does at rare intervals to rarest men.

I shall dwell no longer on the particular point that I have used ancient philosophers to illustrate, viz., that thought proceeds from obscure hints or happy conjectures to established convictions. After the death of Aristotle ancient philosophy de-

teriorated. Nothing else prophetic or anticipatory, worthy of special note, was uttered till in a much later age. But it would take a vast volume to do anything like justice to the debt the world owes to those intellects from Thales to Aristotle, Theirs was the period in the world's history which might well be compared to the season of the year when the pollen flies, carried by the winds, to fertilize the plant-world.

It is noteworthy that in their persistence, *ideas seem to proceed through Typical Thinkers*. If the figure of the piston rod of the engine be used as an illustration, then we might say that thought moves because of the propulsion given at the two extremes. But rather let these typical men be thought of as the complementary rails of the same railway track—opposite but not necessarily antagonistic; essential to each other. If what is here said seems to imply that the types are but two, this is what is meant.

When Coleridge says that "every man is born either a Platonist or an Aristotelean," he but discerned and put in convenient phaseology what the painter Raphael had long before expressed in his famous fresco in the Vatican, when he represented the two philosophers, Plato and Aristotle, standing side by side, the first pointing with his finger to the heavens, while the latter, listening coldly, points his finger towards the earth.

This line of cleavage is not fanciful, nor is the two-fold division merely arbitrary. When it is

said that the early disciples and apostles were sent forth two by two, and when we find the sort of men that were coupled together, we see a recognition, by the Divine Author of Christianity, of the fact which we find bound up in our very nature. Peter and John; Paul and Barnabas;—a mystic in each instance joined with a practical man of affairs. A Luther has his Melancthon, and a Wesley his Whitefield. It is not at all remarkable to discover that such men, while complementing each other, had their sharp disagreements. Differences were almost inevitable. Plato and Aristotle had theirs, and their contentions have been exaggerated into malicious opposition. But as the gospel was spread through typical men working in couples side by side, so Thought has ever progressed, and will progress.

Plato stands for that type of mind which sympathizes readily with Parmenides, Heraclitus, Pythagoras. He has his disciples in Hegel, Emerson and Browning. He finds his counterpart in the poets, the prophets, and men who trust their intuitions. Aristotle sympathizes naturally with Democritus, and becomes the fountain-head of such thinkers as Leibniz, Bacon, Locke, Darwin. The men of Platonic type are impatient of the investigation of individual things, and stress *a priori* thought. They are the great theorizers of the world. They are caught by the "Zeit-geist" which they believe to be Universal Reason in its manifestation to a certain age, and they dare to predict

or anticipate what does not as yet appear. They speak in parables, often, and have enriched the world by suggestions which the ages afterward acted upon and made thereby wonderful discoveries. They have been the first to see the sun on the mountain-tops and have declared to mankind the approach of a new day. These men have been Idealists, Spiritualists, Mentalists or Personalists, as we may choose to call them.

The Aristotlelian type of men have patiently investigated; have reasoned from individuals to generals; have stressed reason and logic; have despised prophesying; have disliked mysticism; in their extreme form have become Positivists, but nearly always have been on the border-land of some form of Materialism. They emphasize the senses; are anxious to be known as practical; in their zeal they have often done violence to instinct and intuition, just as men of the other type have often done violence to reason and despised patient investigation of nature.

Whole epochs have been dominated by one or the other of these types; and when this is so, we have on the one hand a poetical and prophetic age; and on the other, a matter-of-fact, scientific age, with materialism at our very doors. If we might press this matter further and note its bearing on national temperament, the statement could be made as a general one, that the English mind is Aristotleian, while the German mind is Platonic. This may not seem just in the light of the patience of

the German student: but the Platonic tendencies to some form of Idealism, and to a love for theorizing, are undoubtedly characteristic of the German. Materialism has ever flourished in England, while idealism, mysticism, and the like readily grow on German soil.

Men in every age have consciously or unconsciously leaned to one or the other of these types of thinkers. Whether declared monists or dualists, they find they cannot serve two masters: for if dualists, they either subordinate matter to spirit and become spiritualists; or subordinate spirit to matter and become materialists. If monists, one substance must absorb the other—matter absorb spirit or spirit matter—and again the necessity appears to “take sides.” If a “Double-faced Somewhat” is back of everything, then again the question asserts itself whether the “Somewhat” is essentially Spirit or Matter.

If, however, ideas in their persistence, must needs persist through their mediumship of mind, the world has need of the two types of men referred to. If these men of complementary natures know themselves and each other, there follows thankful recognition of what each can do for the other.

This matter becomes very practical when we see a Walter Scott, as Lockhart describes him, with head erect, a smile of triumph on his face, because conscious of power and vocation, driving his pen over paper at an almost incredible speed, when writing his matchless works of fiction; but when

writing his "Life of Napoleon," his head was bowed over his books, a pained expression was on his face, his manner hesitating and doubtful—because he was out of his element. The world to-day cares little for Scott's "Napoleon," but it will continue to the end of time to rejoice in his novels. What was true of Scott is true of men in all the vocations of life—they should seek to recognize their own powers and those of others, and *respect the gifts of God*. By failing to recognize worth in men from whom they differed, such men as Lucretius, Spinoza and Francis Bacon produced works that wholly reject the theory of design, simply because these authors were prejudiced against theology and supposed "teleology" was inseparably connected with theology. Had they been broad-minded enough to see what even theologians have done for the world, they might have saved themselves from much error and added an important element to their systems of thought.

It is noteworthy that ideas persist *in the face of apparently annihilating arguments and in spite of constituted authority*.

This has been seen particularly in the realms of religion and philosophy. We see something in man rising up and protesting against what appears to be invincible logic. There is no apparent flaw in the argument, but instinct or intuition says, "It cannot be true." This sort of persistence calls for explanation, and is not an unimportant phase of the general trend of thought.

Take, in philosophy, the system of Kant. No one will contend Kant is perfectly consistent; but it may be asserted that the grasp of the man is so powerful, and his comprehension of mental phenomena so complete, that most writers who undertake to refute him seem like pygmies. Yet, without having read what the strongest opponents of Kantianism have said, the intelligent and independent reader of Kant will usually after some days of reflection come to some such conclusion as this: "I cannot make a reply to this which would be satisfactory either to myself or to others, still I am not convinced of Kant's correctness—nay, I even believe he is in error, in spite of much that is true in his system." And this very disposition to regulate, correct, modify,—by some standard the nature of which we do not fully understand,—is one of the curious things to be met with in the persistence of ideas as related to the general trend of thought.

Take the arguments for materialism, or agnosticism—they have been strong, and some might say, unanswerable; still, not wholly because of our religious training, I aver, but because of something within us which we have not fully comprehended, thinking men have been impelled persistently to reject the conclusions of the materialist and agnostic. Their systems abide for the time, and yet not because always replied to satisfactorily, but because at war with the higher instincts of men, the systems are rejected even before some one

appears who satisfactorily refutes the same. Hume had been rejected long before Kant showed how very far the astute Scotchman was from the truth. Granted the fact that those who attempted a reply to Hume did not use temperate language and did not meet the issues fairly: still they felt he was wrong, and felt that they were right, even though their arguments were in some cases flimsy.

It might be added here that whole systems of theology have been logically consistent, and indeed practically unanswerable, from the standpoint of mere logic, and those who have attempted to refute them have been involved in contradictions, if not worse—but the human heart has ever been, in the long run, wiser than the human head. Where God has been misrepresented or caricatured by a system of doctrine, the heart of humanity has eventually rejected the harsher phases of doctrine—and the result has justified the position for which the instincts of man contended. This does not mean that the voice of the populace of a given age is more reliable than the voice of trained and special workers: but where the instincts of man have persistently from age to age resisted what scholars have urged the world to accept, the result has almost always justified the position taken by human intuition.

There has been as much resistance to the doctrine of conscious eternal punishment as to any doctrine we have heard proclaimed from the pulpit. This opposition is not peculiar to to-day; it

has been either expressed or has struggled for expression through all the ages of the Church's existence. And we cannot ignore the instincts of intelligent and spiritual men and women, who have lifted up heart if not head in protest against the bald, literal, seemingly unsympathetic way in which the whole subject is often presented. Their natures cry out against the mistake that exists somewhere, though they may not be able to say where, nor be able to give a theory that will satisfy what they think revelation really promulgates or that will satisfy the demands of transgression against God. But it is certainly worth while to deal with that force, call it Reason, Spirit, Instinct,—whatever we will, which enables us to postulate or affirm what we cannot formulate. This disposition to affirm what pure reason would exclude, was illustrated in Kant, who, finding himself forced into practical agnosticism by his own arguments, acknowledged the truth of the things his system held could not be proved, and came to affirm that a higher reason, the "practical," enabled him to rise above the theoretical. Kant said that in the higher realms he found the "categorical imperative."

The persistence of ideas is but the more emphasized by the fact that in that persistence we note, often, *deviations and irregularities which call for some explanation*. The trend of thought is something like the course of a river, whose main direction is unmistakable, but whose windings, due to

obstructions, present to the eye considerable irregularity. The persistence of the stream in a given direction despite the irregularities in its flow is strongly indicative of a cause why the river should flow in one direction rather than in another. So, in case of the direction thought takes, and in the persistence of it despite obstructions and irregularities, we have more than a hint as to the reason for its particular trend.

This irregularity in the progress of an idea has been called "pendulation," because of the tendency to oscillate within certain limits. We note a tendency in men to abandon a course of thinking which has for ages held the world, and take a position, seemingly antagonistic, only, however, after the lapse of years to again assume the position that had years before been abandoned. This sort of "history repeating itself," in thought as well as act, so that what once was again appears, gives a deeper meaning to the biblical moralist's words: "There is nothing new under the sun."

The course of thought has been so regular in its very irregularity that its direction in a future age has been pretty well anticipated by those who were familiar with the drift, and who knew the forces that were at work when making their predictions. No doubt the observation of this interesting fact led to the writing of books on the "Philosophy of History," and in the case of a man like Hegel, who was apt to be borne to extremes by a theory, this sort of writing was carried to the border of

the fanciful. Yet, though men have gone to extremes in emphasizing the limitations and what they called the necessary direction of thought, still much truth is here—too much to ignore it because enthusiasts have gone to extremes in dealing with it.

Let a few instances suffice to illustrate what I mean by this pendulation in thought. The early Greek philosophers, as we have seen, were crudely scientific and extreme in their naturalism. This course was suddenly abandoned for the study of mind to such an extent that Socrates cared no more for a scene in nature than did Madam de Stael. We might call Socrates' philosophy anthropological rather than strictly mental, for he was interested in *man*, and in mind as the most important thing in man: but Plato swung to the other extreme in concerning himself with MIND,—Ideas—almost to the total disregard of *individual man*.

But a reaction came in the days of Aristotle. Raphael's fresco does not exaggerate the situation: the Stagarite seemed impatient of sky-study and he pointed earthward. While not abandoning the study of mind, he, with a true empiricist's instinct, took the lower forms of life as stepping-stones to an appreciation of the higher. From individuals to generals; from the plant to the man; with his foot on earth, his upward reach was considerable, but uncertain. Plato began with what was in the heavenlies, and was uncertain as he descended.

After these two men had done their work—there came an age of skepticism. Leaping over the centuries for the time, and taking no account of the introduction of Christianity into the world as an entirely new element to deal with—we see in what may be called modern philosophy pendulation on the same curves. We see modern philosophy just after the Renaissance first cosmological, then anthropological, as it traversed Holland, Germany and France, then on reaching England it developed a theory of knowledge, where it finally became skeptical. But just as the skepticism of the Sophists inspired the Socratic reform, so the skepticism of Hume aroused Kant from his “dogmatic” slumber,” and German Idealism dominated the world.

To take another view-point: Just as the study of nature in the early days led to the study of mind, and the study of mind led to skepticism—so in the later days, when nature was unduly stressed, mind cried out for a hearing; then, in great measure due to the Renaissance and Reformation together, Reason ascended the throne and was almost deified. But the heart at last spoke, in what is known as the movement of Romanticism,—Lessing, Rousseau, Goethe and Schiller leading. Kant was much influenced by this movement in the composition of his “Critique of Pure Reason.” Thought pendulated from Reason’s domination to a disposition to subordinate reason to something higher, just as when Christianity entered the world and men’s in-

tuitions rather than their reason were trusted, under the name of faith, reason in the meanwhile was relegated to a much more limited sphere than men had formerly granted it.

The history of the writings of one man is, in concrete, an illustration of this oscillation of thought. I refer to the estimate the world in various ages has placed upon the works of Aristotle. Soon after the death of the great philosopher there was reaction against his ideas, and for some centuries Stoicism and Epicureanism ruled in educated circles, giving place later to Neo-Platonism. The pendulum swung to the extreme in the tenth century, when Aristotle became practically unknown to the Christian world, though greatly revered about this time by the Arabs. Through translations from Arabian literature European scholars became in the eleventh century acquainted with Aristotle, from which date he again got a hold on the thinking world, such as perhaps he had never before had. For four centuries he held unmistakable dominion—being authority, almost on a par with inspiration, for the theologians of that day, and, as expounded by Aquinas, becoming the poet Dante's guide in cosmology and indeed everything not strictly pertaining to dogma.

Later, in the sixteenth century, a reaction against Aristotle set in, and a fate similar to Hegel's in 1835, was experienced by the Stagarite. The theory of the heavens propounded by Copernicus, struck at the heart of confidence in

Aristotle. Men were not considerate enough to see that the great philosopher, living in the remote past, could not know everything, even to the true center of the solar system; the pendulum, in consequence, swung to an opposite extreme, and what was before came again, in a measure—for Aristotle, while not lost sight of, was no longer an authority.

With the rise of the strictly scientific age, the influence of which we still feel, Aristotle again became popular, his works were again sought, and the truths in them emphasized. Probably the present tendency to Idealism in philosophy means once more the relegation of Aristotle to a subordinate position. But not however without the world's recognizing its debt to him for truths and rich suggestions.

We may now appear to go to the borderland of the fanciful in suggesting that there is something like *periodicity* in thoughts' deviations or irregularities. Ideas are not only like the famous Lost River, disappearing only to emerge again, but ideas are remarkable for the regularity of their recurrence.

As has been before suggested, persons who have kept diaries and journals through years have been compelled to note how the mind, without any reason that can be assigned, comes back at stated times to think thoughts long before dwelt upon, and all unconscious that in so doing the mind is but moving in something like an

orbit—passing the same way it has formerly passed, yet, with no necessity compelling it, as we think. This periodicity in individual thinking can be explained to a degree by the presence of like conditions or environment at stated seasons. But this does not appear to explain wholly the phenomenon. Those who have studied the individual mind closely have seen in the peculiarities of its workings the world of thought in miniature. Great religious revivals come periodically. Commercial disasters and commercial prosperity seem to follow the same law. What secret or hidden forces are at work, the discovery of which would make all this plain?

The periodicity of an idea in its persistence finds illustration in the regularity with which some persons have dreams of the same character. In one of Hawthorne's "English Note-Books" is to be found for example the following entry: "For a long while I have occasionally been visited by a singular dream. It is that I am still at college and there is a sense that I have been there unconscionably long, and have failed to make such progress as my contemporaries have done. This dream, recurring all through twenty or thirty years, must be one of the effects of that heavy seclusion in which I shut myself up for twelve years after leaving college, when everybody moved onward and left me behind."

This dream of Hawthorne's has its counterpart in many an experience, which I mention as some-

thing difficult to explain or to be brought under known laws. They recur at stated intervals, and either follow or are followed by the same physical disability.

Believers in human progress would *expect to find in the persistence of ideas that there is a decided tendency to purification of thought as the ages move on.*

Conceding lapses from high and true thinking, and singular instances of deterioration, where one age of enlightenment has been followed by one of stupid indifference; and granting that thought has moved apparently in circles and that at times the "progress of the race" has been simply a marking time—still, despite this and more which might be said, the movement of thought, as it is identified with truth, is much like the double motion of the incoming tide—progress in spite of fluctuations and recedings.

George H. Lewes wrote a brilliant and readable "History of Philosophy," with intent to prove that men have been moving in a circle during the whole of their supposed philosophic progress: but in the face of the fact that Mr. Lewes' position is not endorsed by any considerable number of thoughtful people, though his book was published over fifty years ago, and that he wrote in the interests of and in defence of Positivism, we need not be particularly concerned with his opinion. That there has been progress and that we are nearer the goal now than men were who years ago labored to formu-

late a philosophy of nature and life, can scarcely be seriously doubted by fair-minded people.

Still the question asserts itself, How do we correct the errors of men of the past who, when they promulgated their theories, were in possession of the same facts now at our disposal, and who, in many instances, were men of such insight and rare mental power as to be classed among the world's great teachers? We can see how the invention of the telescope and the discovery of the law of gravitation would enable us to correct past theories concerning heavenly bodies, and make such accurate calculations as men of old could not make. But when we deal with mind, we have now only what others who first philosophized possessed. We understand the human body as they did not, and especially the human brain. We know more concerning psychic phenomena than they did; but unless we are content to rest in materialism, this sort of knowledge no more explains the puzzling things which are associated with the working of the human mind, or its mysterious instincts, than evolution explains how life began on this planet. As evolution completes its task when it tells us of process, so materialism accounts for none of the higher problems of the soul, when it shows a certain dependence of mind on body.

Granting the beauty and utility of the theory of evolution and gladly accepting it for the most part for what it brings and gives, still where it is bound up with materialism, and, in its extreme

form, professes to account for the origin of the soul, and indeed all else, upon the basis of the potency of matter—we may confidently assert that men have mistaken an account of a *process* for an explanation of the vital truths back of the process. The account may be correct, but to explain the apparent distance of the sun from us in winter, and its vertical rays in the summer; its eclipses and its relations to the planets—by mechanical causes, is not to account for the establishment of such an order as we see, kept up through the ages, and adjusted so nicely to the wants and needs of men. It is, therefore, not enough for one to say that the theory of evolution or development will explain how we correct the errors of the past with so much assurance, especially in matters that are purely philosophical.

Take instances already given: Socrates caught from Anaxagoras the suggestion that “reason” ruled the world. With this suggestion as a kind of germ for development, he stressed “concepts,” assumed the spirit of man to be immortal, to be rewarded and punished as it was virtuous or vicious; made virtue equivalent to knowledge, and finally laid the foundations for a theory of knowledge. Plato took the wealth of suggestions and theories his master left, added to them the riches of the philosophers of the past and of his day; assorted, combined, added to, and finally presented to the world what may be known as the Platonic system of truth—not systematized, but in great

part formulated in his famous Dialogues. Plato hesitated not to differ from Socrates, to correct and add to what he had said. Aristotle as the next link in the chain, did for Plato much what Plato did for Socrates. The thing worthy of note in all this is the assurance or complacency of each man when he made an innovation upon the theories of his predecessor.

Then came a lull—a lapse; but when men began to philosophize again in what is known as the Modern period, they just as boldly corrected the ancient philosophers as they gladly accepted much they had said. The age from Kant to Hegel was the golden age of German philosophical thinking, but today we as mercilessly dissect Kant or Hegel as they did those before them, and do it with as much complacency as if we supposed wisdom would die with us. The men who were regarded as having spoken the last word on the subject of philosophy are respected for their mental power and insight, but are forced to take their places in that ever lengthening line of plodders, as men, it may be, of unusual or even epochal insight, but men who “knew but in part”; in the meantime the problems which consumed these men have become the problems of our day, and if we have not yet seen the truth in its entirety, we at least see where these men were not wholly possessed of it.

Whether we accept or not the truth of such a thing as a divine revelation, whose highest expression is found in the New Testament, it might

be asked why we find so little disposition to correct what Jesus or Paul have said? How is it we assume nothing will be developed in thought antagonistic to their teachings?

While not attempting to correct what they said, we do seek to expand the principles which they enunciated and apply them to everyday life. Why this difference in the treatment of the assumed truths of speculative philosophy and the assumed truths of the New Testament? Is it due to the fact that no one has questioned the authenticity and authority of the latter? Have they not been the point of attack for two thousand years?

Those who accept the New Testament as the most complete form of revelation of God to men see in what is known as "Pentecost" the beginning of a new condition, which starts the race upon a new course. This event, and the experience it brought with it, has elevated the race to where it has insight such as was not possible before. It is not fanciful to say that from that event on, the spiritual in man took a decided upward turn, began a peculiar course in development such as marks the close of one great cycle in the life of man and begins another. Being possessed of a Spirit that before was not his in the sense it now is, man now, in union with the Spirit of Christ—which is one with the Spirit of Truth—is as truly developing his spiritual nature as he was for ages developing his physical. And the intuitions of man are now being cultivated, where men are obedient to

the truth, as never before; consequently, though reason in man is as reason has ever been, intuition or spiritual instinct will come to the aid of reason as it did not in the days of the ancient philosophers. Our hope that we shall reach philosophical truth, as well as what might be called higher truth, is based on the fact that the same Spirit that leads the race on will so purify us from prejudice and from the dross of worldliness as to enable us intuitively to detect error and just as intuitively feel the force of truth. Not more development then, but development under an unerring Guide, is our guarantee that thought will attain to Truth.

The whole movement of thought may be illustrated by the track of a spiral railway in crossing the Alps. The train winds round the mountain, plunges into a tunnel, and seems to traverse again the same track it passed over a short while before. The confused traveler looks out of the car window to see ahead of him what he has formerly seen, and thinks the train has lost its way in its own windings. But each circle round the mountain has carried him higher; the track he is passing over and the tunnel he is passing through, while on the same curve, are not the same. In the meantime the strongest evidence that he is making progress is his ability, ever and anon, to get a glimpse of a new outlook. A snow-capped crown appears that was not hitherto visible; a beautiful valley for the first time is spread

at his feet. At length the summit is reached, where the panorama of the Alps is spread out before the beholder!

So with the progress of thought. We have already advanced far enough to feel assured we are not merely circling the mountain of Knowledge, for we have glimpses of truths, now and then, which truths, though lost to view for a time, reappear more fully and to abide. Shall we ever reach the mountain-top? Never in this life; but who can doubt the race is being carried onward towards that point where "we shall know as we are known"? Who can doubt there is

"One far-off divine intent,
To which the whole creation moves?"

What I have hitherto said has been somewhat general in its character, bearing upon the persistence of ideas as a principle without specifying any which stand out as though race-wide.

The poet Goethe enunciated the doctrine, since accepted universally by botanists, that all parts of a plant are but variations of one type, viz., that of the leaf. Later, the same poet-philosopher saw in a section of the skull of a sheep the suggestion that every single bone of an animal's skeleton is some variation of the vertebra. Goethe's insight led to a discovery of such unity in nature as had not been more than dreamed of hitherto. The fact that the doctrine of the metamorphosis of plants had its parallel in the animal kingdom should not

have occasioned much surprise, though it established a much more extensive unity than men had before supposed existed. Now philosophers and scientists go further and say boldly that man is a miniature world—a microcosm—and they include his mind in the generalization. If we object to such an assumption, the reply is, What more natural than that this should be so? In a higher sense than the English poet supposed, we say “the proper study of mankind is man”—individual man. Just as the medical student at the dissecting table, when studying anatomy, knows that he has before him, subject to his scalpel, typical man—so he who studies mind, has in the individual mind, the general outlines of the mind of man as a whole. Persistence of ideas, therefore, in the individual man leads naturally to the thought of persistence of ideas as seen in community life, in the province, the nation, the various races, and finally the human race as a whole.

As we ascend we expect to find fewer ideas common to the class. Human instincts are the same—though peculiar conditions may produce what seem to be wide differences and varieties. The wind sighing in the pine forest, or roaring in the oak woodland, is the same air in motion; the sound varies because produced by different mediums. Human nature is capable of almost infinite varieties as we descend to minute details, but there are certain great fundamentals upon which the world of mankind is practically at one. Only within the

last few years has this truth dawned upon the more progressive races of mankind, as the result of the close connection nation has had with nation by means of commerce, by world congresses, but particularly through the labors and investigations of the tireless Christian missionaries. The Great Book of the most enlightened nations has found a response in the hearts of even the most degraded of our kind. The Book thereby proves its divinity on the one hand, and the unity of the human race on the other. It also proves that in great and fundamental matters the world is one.

Perhaps what we call "provincialisms" in the realm of community ideas find a parallel in what is known as national or race peculiarities. The same forces are at work everywhere, but because of some variety in the medium, differences appear which are not so pronounced as they at first seem to be. We sometimes wonder at the persistence of an error, such as the doctrine of the Transmigration of Souls, the horrible customs connected with the Sacrifice of Human Life for supposed sin, as seen in pagan countries. But a close study of causes and aims often reveals more to be pitied than blamed.

Take as an illustration of the persistence of an error a doctrine which has always fascinated a certain type of men, even to this good day, viz., the doctrine of Ideas as enunciated by Plato. At first we are astonished at the suggestion that a man of Plato's mental astuteness and saneness, could

have believed that only the Ideal Man existed, and that men, as seen in the world, were but as shadows, reflecting however, each in his degree something of the Eternal Typical Man. Plato taught that man as seen on earth, partakes of the nature, or enters into the nature, of the Ideal Man in various degrees. Take this theory however, and compare it with Christian revelation, especially as it is worked out in Paul's epistles, and note the parallel. Christ called Himself emphatically "The Son of Man"—the typical Man, as well as the point of union for the race. He is the Eternal Man, who becomes the source of life eternal to all who partake of His life, and to all who become one with Him so far as to reflect Him. Revelation has no place for eternal life as set over against "death," aside from union with Christ. The Christian scheme preserves our identity and thereby meets the instincts of the human soul: but there is more than a suggestive parallel between the theory of the Greek Philosopher and the mystical doctrine of our union with Christ as now preached and understood.

We conclude therefore that the secret of the persistence of much that is erroneous in the world, especially where men are sincere, is in the element of truth which the error contains.

The Doctrine of Transmigration of Souls is but another form of the doctrine of Purgatory—seeking to explain and satisfy man's sense of unfitness for the life he feels he is destined to enjoy here-

after if he lives up to his privileges here. The horrible sacrifice of human life on the part of pagan peoples, especially at the death of some celebrity, finds its cause in a desire to make some sort of an atonement for calamity which the gods are supposed to have brought upon a people, and to appease those spirits which, human or divine, might do great harm if atonement is not made for the wrongs they are supposed to have suffered.

There are at least two ideas which all nations and races seem to have in common, and which are bound up with our very being. These two ideas persist in the human race, as a whole, much as certain other ideas persist for a time in community or natural life. The Idea of God and the Idea of the Soul's Indestructibility,—at least of its Life after Death,—are the two ideas which may be termed fundamental, and which have always been present in some form in the minds of men, and amidst much misconception and positive error, have persisted, and we are sure will persist, while man exists on this planet.

As to the Idea of God, no extended argument and no extensive quotations from a varied and rich literature on the subject, would seem necessary, since the final conclusions to which the most thoughtful of men have come may be summed up in the words, "The being of God is a necessary and ultimate principle of reason, involved in the constitution of man as rational." In the discussion of the persistence of the idea of God we may with

but a brief review of the expressions of discriminating thinkers on this subject, pass on to the consideration of the kindred idea, of the Soul's Immortality, and then to the more interesting work of seeking the cause for this persistence in both instances.

The Idea of God is one that will not down. While God may be called Power, Absolute, World-Ground, Something-not-ourselves which makes for Righteousness, Force, Cause, Unknown, and many other terms, the same Being is meant, and like Paul, we take our stand and preach the God of revelation to those who have erected altars to Unknown Gods.

Herbert Spencer has said: "The persistence of the universe is the persistence of that Unknown Cause, Power or Force which is manifested to us through all phenomena." Feuerbach says: "It is a general truth that we feel a blank, a void, a want in ourselves and consequently are unhappy and unsatisfied, so long as we have not come to the last degree of a power, to that, than which nothing greater can be thought." Zeller says: "The spirit of man cannot be satisfied till it finds in every force the manifestation of an original force, and in all beings the product of an original Being; till the checkered manifoldness of particular laws is brought back to highest unity." Sir William Hamilton says: "From Xenophanes to Leibnitz, the infinite, the absolute, the unconditioned, formed the highest principle of speculation." Agnostics,

Pantheists, Materialists, Deists,—all agree with Theists in this: Absolute Being exists as the first principle of reason. Even Comte was forced to “make a God” after he had found no place for one in his system. If Kant, in his “Critique of Pure Reason” shut out God, on the ground that we are incompetent to deal by means of reason with such a subject, he showed the persistence of the idea of God the more pointedly in his subsequent “Critique of the Practical Reason,” where he tells us the practical reason affirms what the pure reason dare not. Kant found it positively necessary to postulate God, not “to please his old servant Lampe,” as Heine sarcastically says, but because Kant had a sane mind and saw too clearly the presence of certain fundamental ideas of the race to ignore this greatest of them all.

Perhaps the persistence of the Idea of God has not been more satisfactorily or pertinently expressed than in Dr. Samuel Harris’ “Self-revelation of God”: “(This idea) persists,” he says, “in the implicit consciousness, regulating thought, even when theoretically disclaimed. It is evident without the assumption, explicit or implicit, that the absolute Being exists, the reason of man can not solve its necessary problems, nor rest satisfied with any intellectual attainment, nor hold steadfastly to the reality of knowledge, nor know the continuity, the unity and the reality of the universe. The necessary conclusion is that the principle that the absolute Being exists is a primitive

and necessary law of thought, a constituent of reason, and a necessary postulate in all thinking about being."

The idea of Immortality is bound up with the Idea of God. There was deep philosophy in the saying: "Because I live ye shall live also." Yet just as we find no attempt to prove the existence of God in the Old Testament, but find it everywhere assumed; so we find only intimations and assumptions of immortality in the Bible till "life and immortality are brought to light" in the revelation made by Christ.

From a philosophical stand-point we see in the *nous* of Anaxagoras, the hint which Socrates received as an inspiration, and which he developed into what became, from his time on, a more or less clearly defined doctrine of a future life. It is usually assumed by biblical expositors that by the 8th century, B. C., the Old Testament prophets had formulated for the Hebrews a tolerably well-defined doctrine of a future life. The growth of this doctrine in the Old Testament, from vague and nebulous beginnings, but makes the parallel between the growth of the idea of immortality in the pagan world and the growth of it in the Jewish world, the more interesting. When we come later to speak of causes back of these fundamental ideas, this parallel will receive some attention.

When once the idea of immortality took hold of man, it so fully fell in with his higher instincts—was so much like a complicated key fitting a com-

plicated lock—that, despite arguments to the contrary—some of them cogent and, for the time, apparently unanswerable—the idea of an existence for man which extended into the unknown beyond, has persisted to this day. “Plato, thou reasonest well,” has been extorted from every fair-minded man; while the majority of enlightened mankind has quietly assumed a doctrine to be true which is intertwined with the very existence and spirituality of God. God, the absolute spirit, Man His creature, made in “His image,” and having a strong instinct for immortality, because he was made to live with God—this prevails as against all forms of atheism, materialism, and skepticism.

In the course of reasoning on the subject of the persistence of ideas, and especially of certain fundamental ones which belong to the race as a whole, we must sooner or later meet the question: What is back of this persistence? To that part of the subject I now turn. Why do fundamental ideas persist in the race?

The first reason I give is the one which grows out of the physical nature of man—his hereditary tendencies. Some would tell us this is the only cause for persistence of ideas. And, though we reject this wholesale assumption, no harm can come to truth by facing facts as we have them presented to us, even though those facts have been interpreted by others differently from what, as it may appear to us, they should have been. We can not, for example, deny much that is true in evolu-

tion, or in radical biblical criticism, even though we cannot go to the lengths some do in drawing inferences from the facts as they are supposed to be given. So in the matter of hereditary tendencies.

Those who have studied closely savage and civilized life, or the development of a people from virtual savagery to civilization, are struck with the changes which take place in the practical disappearance of certain powers once utilized, and the development of others not before possessed to any considerable degree. A people who live on roots and simple grains, who dwell in huts or shelter themselves under even more temporary lodges, who fight with spears and arrows and hunt game or raise a few cattle for meat—must develop their motor powers rather than cultivate the fine sensory distinctions which belong to more civilized life. The keen sensory powers of the savage, placing him almost on a level with the highly developed senses of the lower animals, and associated wholly with motor reactions, are not utilized for any end in themselves. Hence, by the law that the used becomes the developed, we find tendencies and keenness of sensory perception in purely practical affairs, and quickness of motor reactions in self-defence, in contest for food,—all transmitted in considerable degree from father to son.

On the other hand, a more general environment, where food, clothing and shelter come from a great variety of sources, and men meet men not to fight but to trade; where the avoidance of pain and the

search for pleasure give color to all of man's efforts, we naturally expect to find keenly developed sensory powers in relation to many things which the savage, or the same people once in savagery, had little ability to discern; furthermore, certain motor reactions, because there is no call for their use, almost disappear. As in the first instance, where the sensory keenness in regard to the few things, and the quick and sure motor reactions as regard the essentials of life, were transmitted to children; so we have a like transmission in the case of more advanced civilization.

This then is the basis of certain ideas purely from the standpoint of environment and heredity, or from what might be called the physical side of our nature. The ideas thus developed have reference more particularly to physical needs. But they serve to give us a hint as to how ideas of a more spiritual character are developed.

Add other elements to the one just given. Change the nation and give it other environment; transplant it and develop in it new powers because of new demands. Take Israel from his tents, his simple life in the wilderness, his isolation, and give him a land of corn and wine, spacious houses to dwell in, and enemies to fight, and there has been added what must sooner or later develop new powers; while powers which served well in the wilderness will now have become extinct for want of use.

Or go still further: Place people where there will be general intermarriage with other nation-

alities; let German, Celt, and perchance Semite mingle their blood in offspring, and let the inherited tendencies of different nations and even races combine in children, and we have the possibility of hitherto unthought-of tendencies, both temporal, and shall we not add, spiritual?

When we come to ideas concerning religion, the philosophy that is boldly evolutionary, or sordidly materialistic, seeks their origin in the first place in *fear*. This was the theory of Lucretius, afterwards espoused by Hume. Man, being timid and superstitious, projects his own life into all objects, and either creates a man-god, which is simply a giant man, capable of protecting him, or lets his superstition lead him to create a monstrosity which he seeks to appease by every form of sacrifice.

Others tell us that religious ideas come of *dreams, trances*, and the like. Men have imagined themselves, while asleep, in communication with spirits which they could not approach while awake. From this as a hint, it is an easy transition, some think, to people the air with spirits, and even guardian spirits.

Others would say that religion came of *reflective thought*—as the result of philosophizing on life. The best reply to this is that men indicate their religious tendencies long before they become philosophical. Perhaps it were better to say that men become philosophers because they have a religious nature.

Now, while the above theories are rejected, it is but justice to what is perhaps true to say that the influence of fear, and even of dreams, on the savage cannot be ignored. What has been taken by some to be the origin of religious ideas, a saner philosophy and theory will take to be the origin of error in religion. By means of fear and superstition and because of dreams ignorantly interpreted, men have sadly deflected the rays of truth, which might otherwise have indicated the source whence those rays came.

Turning again to the ideas men get from their practical contact with things about them, we find that where there are no dormant powers there will be no development. We know nothing of a keenly developed eye-sight or hearing where there was no organ and nerve, to begin with. As life comes of life, so highly developed senses come of less highly developed, or, it may be, very rudimentary ones.

So it is with our ideas concerning religion. Fear, dreams, and other causes may be given as explanations of the development of such ideas, but even granting that they have a part in that development, still we must see that without the presence of such ideas in embryo, there would be no development. Furthermore, the after development of these ideas,—their purification and the ultimate reach they attain,—all go to show that, though affected by certain causes in primitive man, these ideas finally find their rest in God, their element, and prove thereby that they were originally inspired by Him.

I have noted above that what is enduring in national or race character comes of motor reactions inherited from past generations. The development of the sensory powers to such an extent that certain ideas stand out vividly, forms the basis of motor activity, and motor activity gives a basis to persistence of race ideas. Language aids as a kind of footing, but nothing can take the place of the response of the man himself. The tiny quail, just hatched from the shell, will hide in the grass upon seeing the face of man. The domestic fowl, though originally wild, and just as ready in its wild state to flee from man, shows now no fear. This is an illustration of heredity in the lower forms of life indicative of something in its higher forms. The principle is the same. Motor reactions, inherited from the generations persist when vivid sensory excitement arouses the brain to action.

We can make no exception of religious ideas when we take a perfectly fair view of the whole situation. Perhaps I had better say we must include in the part which heredity plays much of the susceptibility of individuals and nations to ideas concerning religion based on the response which ancestors have given to what might be termed the true and the false in religion. The horror the Jew has, to this day, of idolatry in any form, even to a mere painting which is supposed to represent heavenly things, is to a great degree an inheritance, intensified of course by early train-

ing. And where the Jew is approached with an appreciation of his past history, he is found even now to have a spiritual susceptibility and discernment in matters which concern revealed religion that indicate only too clearly the result of generations of development in things of the spirit. Some of our best Christian commentators have been men of the Jewish race.

The trouble with non-theistic theorizers has been that they have supposed they explained the origin of religion when they indicated some of the elements which had to do with its development, albeit those very elements, left to themselves, taking hold on man's instincts for God, would have landed the race in gross error. We must look for a Spirit of Truth in the world, if we would find the true key to unlock the difficulty which this phase of the subject presents to us.

To sum up then: We find in the much talked-of law of heredity, but another form of the biblical promise that blessings will follow the children of the good to the third and fourth generation, and that spiritual unsusceptibility in children will be one of the results of ignoring the claims of God upon the soul of man. The question as to the origin of, or the capacity for, religion is not even touched by the law of heredity. To develop any power in man we must first have that power in germinal form to begin with. Man is a religious being, because God so made him. It is part of man's very constitution. If that tendency or faculty in him is

awakened or developed by error, man will be swayed by superstition, all forms of idolatry, and be plunged into misery by the very powers which are the highest he possesses. To prevent this the God who gave him a religious nature has given him a revelation of Himself in what we call the Bible. Not only so, when man has once caught sight of the truth, nature falls in with the whole scheme of revelation as seen in the Bible, and over all the Spirit of Truth is seen to preside, "enlightening every man that cometh into the world." God and Immortality, as two fundamental ideas, are two inseparable ones. They persist in the race because they belong to man's very nature.

Turning from heredity and other purely physical causes to something of a purely mental character, I think we cannot ignore the fact that ideas persist because Reason in its very nature must seek rest for itself. We see this tendency in young children taking the form of questions.

"The Reason Why" impels men, and in proportion as they have power to appreciate the truth. Probably if we but saw the world as God intended we should, not a star twinkles, nor a flower nods in the breeze, not a voice is heard in nature, nor a calamity overtakes man, but is designed to make us ask questions and get thereby such knowledge as will be for the betterment of the race.

At the first of their philosophizing men found rest for Reason in the idea that everything in the world could be explained by water, fire, or air.

When the suggestion of a *nous* or intellect was made by Anaxagoras, mind became the subject-matter of philosophy and everything else a puzzle. Then the question arose, What must be done with everything that is not mind? Again, How can mind have any sort of dealing or communication with matter?

To find rest for his reason, Plato in part laid hold of, and in part created, the famous doctrine of Reminiscence, which in the light of our present knowledge of what heredity does for us, has in it an element of truth. But Plato went the whole length of believing that, as one has put it, "the cat which played in his backyard was the same cat that played there four thousand years before." The type alone abides and is real: everything we perceive is merely individual and not only perishes but never had an existence save as a mere shadow. The shadow, however, may serve to awaken in the mind of man the recollection of what he saw in his previous and larger life, ere he was limited to this region of adumbrations. A man of earth may serve to arouse in us the recollection of the ideal man we knew in a former state, and thus with everything we see.

This doctrine which Plato seemed to take seriously gave rest to his mind, and he lived and died in the faith. Aristotle rejected much that was to Plato part of his life; but Aristotle in turn rested in much that sounds to us strange and curious, as, for instance, when he says: "there is a limit to

space." Yet all serious philosophers, such as Leibnitz, Kant, Spinoza, Fichte, Hegel, Locke—no matter how curious, to us, their theories, or how far from the truth we now think they were—clung tenaciously to their philosophy of the world, the soul, and God, as essential to their living real lives and doing real work in the world. In fact, man must have a philosophy, and the more serious the man, the more the necessity that reason find rest in what a man can live by and die by. If faith becomes our support, even faith must not antagonize reason.

There have been men who disregarded this impelling motive to seek rest for the mind, and professed to be of those who have sought in vain to find it and have given up to be skeptics, either by the name of agnostics or some other. Hume was such a man. Whatever he really at length believed, he appears in the history of thought's progress as one who gave up the problem of finding intellectual or spiritual rest, and left strong arguments in defense of his course.

It is said that in the early life of Prof. A. B. Bruce he read Strauss' "Life of Jesus," and the book loosed him from his moorings, so far as belief in the actual man Jesus was concerned. About the same time the young "George Eliot" read the same book, and with the same result. Their after actions were quite different however. George Eliot remained a skeptic all her life. Bruce resolved to find rest for his mind and soul if pos-

sible, and quietly but with infinite pains, examined all the facts as he had access to them, became satisfied that the position of Strauss was untenable, and at length became the leading Apologist of his country, and one of the first of his day among all such writers. What Bruce did in this particular of satisfying himself concerning the life of Jesus is what reason urges us to do as to a philosophy of life.

The puzzle, however, is why men have been permitted to rest so long and so complacently in gross error. Some claim that we of to-day are no more certain that what we regard as true is really so than what Plato or Aristotle taught.

I freely grant the gravity of the question thus confronting us. Yet we are not obliged to retreat before it. In the first place it does not matter so much whether we believe in the Copernican or Ptolemaic theory of the heavens; whether we are Atomists or believers in "four elements"; whether we think space limited or limitless; whether we are evolutionists or believers in the most literal theory of direct creation. It does matter, however, whether we have been honest in our search for the truth; whether we have loved it more than ease, fame or money. One who knew much philosophy and of strictly spiritual things said, that at best "we know but in part." But he, and even the pagan Socrates, would shame us if we sought to take advantage of our limited and limiting conditions, to give over the attempt

to discover truth concerning nature and mind, and especially where that truth bears directly on conduct. Why the human mind in the past has rested so complacently in error in its philosophy of nature, and why reason has had its demands so completely satisfied in what was afterwards found to have in it little of truth, we cannot fully understand. It would seem that some higher instinct or intuition would have broken in upon this sleep of ignorance, but we cannot forget that where knowledge was vitally connected with conduct a Something higher than reason has ever urged man to seek to know the truth, concerning the true, the beautiful and the good.

Modern biblical scholarship has done us rare service here where the timid and ultra-conservative saw only destruction. There is not more vagueness to be found among the best of the ancient philosophers in matters they gave their lives to fathom than is to be found in the Old Testament Writers concerning the great truths of which they are supposed to have been the special custodians. Why were these Old Testament men so imperfect and unsatisfactory in their notions of the soul's immortality, a future life, God's Fatherhood, and the attitude of God to the world outside the Jewish nation? I am aware that to present another difficulty is not to answer the first. We are, however, accustomed to see nothing remarkable in the colossal ignorance of the ancient Hebrews concerning the processes of nature; neither are we shocked to

find that while they are regarded as the people through whom God made special revelations to the world, their knowledge was mixed with much that was dross. In some very essential matters they rested complacently in what was very far from the truth.

But did they not aspire after mental or soul rest and find it? Read the "Book of Psalms," that volume which gives the heart-throbs of the nation, and see if the cry of the soul was not "for God, the living God." Note how the psalmist panted as the hart for the water brooks, after knowledge that was essential to conduct. Note, too, the beautiful lives those men were able to live, in spite of their partial and very imperfect knowledge. In all this we have at least the suggestion of an answer why the mind can rest in what is practical error: It may do so if the few essential truths that make for character have been discovered.

We see then, that while it is the nature of truth to seek those who will accept it and give expression to it in language—there are a few fundamental truths or ideas that have persisted and will constantly persist, during the existence of the race—because they are the few ideas which are bound up with true living, so that to do violence to them means to do violence to life itself. And whether that man's name be Confucius, Buddha, Socrates or Paul—he who discovers these truths has come to be, in a measure at least, "in tune with the Infinite."

This leads naturally to the last reason I shall give for the persistence of certain ideas, viz., the presence and power of intuitions. When a correspondent of the poet Browning thanked the author of "La Saisaiz" for invigorating her faith by means of the suggestions the poem contained, the poet replied that he had been aware of the communication of something more subtle than a ratiocinative process when the convictions of "genius" thrilled his soul to its depths. Hegel asks: "Who is not acute enough to see a great deal in his surroundings which is really far from being what it ought to be?" But what of this "ought-to-be" that persists in the best of the race? Socrates has made us familiar with the idea of a "demon" or "divine voice" such as that which guided the great Grecian teacher,—exercising now its restraining influence, and at times manifesting itself so unmistakably that Socrates would not disobey it even to save his life.

That men read with appreciation of such an experience on the part of the ancient philosopher proves the universal character of the experience which this good man in the earlier days felt so keenly. When Matthew Arnold speaks of a "Something-not-ourselves which makes for righteousness," which he discovered to be playing upon the soul of man, he was but echoing in other terms the experience of Socrates. When Immanuel Kant, coldly philosophical and hating mysticism, had closed up the mind against God so far as reason was con-

cerned, he found a "categorical imperative"—the postulate of the "practical reason"—which provided a foothold for faith. Kant in this but put in other terms what Socrates, Browning, Arnold and others have expressed, each in his own way, while referring to the same "spirit in man."

In speaking of the persistence of ideas we have encountered something in "intuitions," as I have called them, which is more than an "idea." Intuitions help us to understand why ideas of a certain sort persist, but we must now use the term "ideal" rather than idea, and remember that a principle rather than a process is being dealt with when we grapple with the mysterious "something" which so many men, and especially so many good and highly gifted men, have experienced and have called by names so various.

We are driven at once to see that an ideal or principle which has had such influence upon the teachers of the human race is not itself a mere whim or empty notion, but must have, if we may so express it, objective validity—at least there must be a "pattern on the mount" somewhere if we elevate this variously interpreted and named "sense of things" into a criterion.

This criterion that we thus are forced to make more real than the ideas which we test by reference to it, is especially prominent in the region of morals. Henry Jones, in his volume on "Browning as a Philosophical and Religious Teacher," says suggestively: "The consciousness that the ideal

is the real explains the fact of contrition. To become morally awakened is to become conscious of the vanity and nothingness of the past life, as confronted with the new ideal implied in it. The past life is something to be cast aside as a false show, just because the self which experienced it was not realized in it. Thus man's true life lies in the realization of his ideal, and his advancement towards it is his coming to himself. It is a power that irks, till it finds expression in moral habits that accord with its nature, i.e., till the spirit has, out of its environment, created a body adequate for itself."

To say that such a criterion is in the very constitution of man but inevitably leads us to ask: How did it get there? We have seen that heredity (and to this may be added all that is involved in early training) explains in part the peculiar development of certain ideas, even in the realm of religion. Heredity also, as has been seen, with the associated power of environment, is a prolific source of error. The latent and universal tendencies or ideas which fear, dreams, etc., can arouse and develop, in no way explains the presence of these ideas in their possibility. And when the principle or criterion, which corrects the false in religion, even where the creeds or theories remain mixed with much dross, and which elevates good men far above their creeds and times, is to be explained, heredity and training are altogether inadequate. We are forced to postulate a Power, a

Person, a Spirit, back of such intuitions or guiding principle. The idea of God and the idea of the soul's immateriality and immortality are thus inseparably bound up with the presence and power of "a Spirit in man," which Spirit belongs to him by right of his origin. This is particularly satisfactory as a key to life if we accept biblical revelation, especially now that, since Pentecost, this Spirit has become in a sense not before experienced, the "Spirit of Christ"—given to lead those who obey Him "into all truth."

That which puzzled Socrates and which remains a puzzle to all those who reject the doctrine of the "inspiration of the prophets" of old, is intelligible to the man who sees in Socrates, and, in fact, in every good and wise man, ideals which are higher than he or his people; we see the "light which lighteth every man which cometh into the world," especially manifesting its illuminating power where men are willing to be guided by its beams. When we read that Confucius, the Socrates of China, taught men to "live as Heaven commands," we are not told whether he meant by "heaven" a mechanical power, or a personal God; but one who has made a special study of this subject, himself a gifted scholar from the Chinese nation, says Confucius meant a personal God. If so, he but saw dimly what we in more favorable conditions have seen with more clearness—the presence of God guiding the race, and especially those who would submit themselves to His guidance. Socrates and

all good men of pagandom differed not so much in kind as in degree from the prophets of old, who, as God's chosen mediums to the world, were, in a measure, far above their fellows, endowed with spiritual insight and wisdom. These very men in their prophecies spoke of a day when the spirit of prophecy would be far more universal; when a man would not say to his neighbor, "know the Lord," but when the law should be written in human hearts instead of on tablets of stone. This had reference to a day when the few especially and highly inspired should give place to something like universal inspiration, though perhaps with none so pre-eminently gifted in this particular as those "holy men of old" who "spoke as they were moved by the Holy Ghost."

Accepting as I do most thankfully and heartily the doctrine of the presence in the world of a Spirit, which Spirit is God in His fulness,—the persistence of certain ideas becomes to me the most natural thing which could happen. If a Spirit of Trust exists, and is immament in men, the question of a criterion is at once fixed and explained. The yearnings, longings, the glimpses of truth, and other inexplicable intuitions of the race—all become plain and even necessary. Such a Spirit could not brood over human hearts and not find here and there a response, so that men stirred to the depths of their natures, and realizing an ideal of the beautiful, the pure and good struggling within them for utterance, must of necessity speak

wiser than they know and give forth truth in the form of hint or parable which the ages after would understand better than the men who originally gave forth those utterances.

Accepting this Spirit in the world, I can understand how truth begins in obscure hints and progresses to clearness and sharply defined outline. I can see how truth under such a Spirit's leading will be more and more purified, till practically all the dross will be gone. Ideas under the Spirit's guidance, struggling with, and even against, man's prejudices and actual resistance, will naturally take what seems to those who study the trend of thought in after ages, a zig-zag course. This could hardly be otherwise. Men cling to their intellectual moorings long after they have been convinced of the error of their beliefs, and hesitating concerning their course, they are finally moved as the pendulum swings; so we have "pendulation" in thought.

The Spirit's presence in the world and in man makes clear the struggle to make actual in life the ideals which the Spirit inspires. The Spirit became personal in Christ. The presence in the world of an Ideal Man both fulfilled a longing of the human heart to know that such a man had existed, and made it clear that all men must labor to realize in their lives, if led by this same Spirit, that "perfection" which the Father in heaven possesses, and which He bids us possess each in our measure. Hence all real progress in this life in the Spirit begins with contrition, which is the soul rejecting

former ideals, or realizing at length the claim of the ideal which all along was struggling to assert its rights, but which was hitherto resisted.

Finally the presence of the Spirit in the man makes clear why the fundamental ideas which are inseparably connected with the actuality and presence of this Spirit in man—such as God, Immortality, and Right Living—will not down, but, though ignored, or suppressed in one age, or by certain of the race, break forth in some form of expression in another—sometimes much colored by the imperfect character of the mediums of expression, but still quite discernible as the fundamental ideas which belong to the race because the race had its origin in God, and God has stamped Himself on every member of it. These ideas will persist as long as man lives on this planet, and their significance will be fully seen when “man shall know as he is known.”

VI.

ROBERT BROWNING: THE SUBTLE ASSERTOR OF THE SOUL

Harriet Martineau once said to Robert Browning: "There is no need for you to study German metaphysics, you are German enough already." In spite of striking differences, Browning must suggest to the discriminating reader, Immanuel Kant. The first was of Scottish-German descent; the second German-Scottish. The great metaphysician gave himself almost wholly to the study of Mind; the poet, to the study of Soul. They were both in a sense agnostics. Kant insisted like Browning on the limitations of human reason, but assumed that there was what he called the "practical reason" which enabled man to postulate with assurance what mere reason could not affirm; so that the existence of the soul and God were by it guaranteed. Browning took much the same stand, but used different terms. From the standpoint of mere intellect the poet would have been a rank agnostic, but he found within man what he elected to call "heart," but which might be more exactly called "intuition": this the poet thought affirmed with emphasis what the mere "head" was not competent to assert, namely, the reality of God and the immortality of the soul.

Thus both Browning and Kant, the latter by prosaic metaphysics, and the former through the

medium of poetry and a poetic temperament, reached beyond agnosticism to positive belief; and while both have been misunderstood and misinterpreted, they have become to men of thought bulwarks to faith in God and the Soul.

Browning was, by preëminence, the poet of the human soul. In his own comments on the character of "Sordello," he tells us that the poem is "a study of the development of a soul," and then adds: "Nothing else is of any consequence." Other poets have at times given their strength to soul-analysis, and have produced results which may rank with Browning's best in this particular; but no poet has ever given himself so exclusively to such analysis. Writing for fifty years, and producing work of the most varied character, and from every conceivable view-point, Browning seems to have had no pleasure in any subject in which he could not discover the workings of passion, the processes of casuistry, the daring assertions of the soul's intuitions, and the all-conquering power of love. If he describes natural scenery, which he rarely does, he subordinates such description to his main theme, namely, the mysterious workings of the spirit of man. This fact is the more remarkable in view of what Browning could do when he made the attempt. He was susceptible to the beauties of nature, as indeed to every form of beauty, and could revel in mere description, as a sample selection will illustrate. No man could have written the following lines

who failed to take delight in expressing—if for nothing else than for mere expression's sake—his impressions of natural scenery:

Above, birds fly in merry flocks, the lark
Soars up and up, shivery for joy;
Afar the ocean sleeps; white fishing gulls
Flit where the strand is purple with its tribe
Of nestled limpets; savage creatures seek
Their loves in wood and plain—and God renews
His ancient rapture. Thus He dwells in all,
From life's minute beginnings, up at last
To man—the consummation of this scheme
Of being, the completion of this sphere of life.

This selection from "Paracelsus" reminds the reader of Shelley, Wordsworth, and our own Bryant. Wordsworth would hardly have said, in speaking of the lark, that it "shivered" for joy, but Shelley might have so described it. Shelley would not, on the other hand, have given the turn to the close of this extract that Browning has, but Wordsworth would, to the extent of his ability. Browning, it seems, could have written of nature in a way that might have rivaled the poets who have been looked upon as nature's very high priests: we find him, however, as seen in the quotation just given, being drawn as by irresistible attraction to the polestar of his thought—Man.

Comparing Browning with Shelley and Wordsworth, we can say with a discriminating writer: "Shelley turned from man; Wordsworth paid him rare visits; Browning dwelt with him." Shelley,

susceptible to every form of beauty, but especially to beauty in nature, was at the same time overwhelmed by the presence and problem of evil. Wordsworth lived amidst mountains, rivulets, dells—brooding, moralizing, composing lines addressed mainly to nature or descriptive of nature, and incidentally about men and women. Browning saw in the soul of man, despite its muddy vesture, that which fascinated him: he would have reversed the Byronic line and said: "I love not nature less, but man the more." Browning's very manner in social life indicated his genuine interest in men. Longfellow, who has been much praised for his democracy in this respect, received visitors with an air of resignation; Browning, with a cordiality that spoke his living interest in everybody.

There are at least three names which are suggested when we assert that Browning is preëminent among those who stress the soul in song. Those names are Dante, Shakespeare, and Goethe. Can Browning's claim be made good against these?

Dante stands apart. In some particulars he is easily supreme; but not as poet of the soul,—if by that is meant one capable of laying bare the inner man. Dante teaches in picture. He has peopled for us the spirit world,—hell, purgatory, and heaven—with characters that instruct by their place rather than by their self-revealing words. His devil is not a talking one like that of Milton or Goethe; but his situation and surroundings suggest that place may speak as loud as words. Only

now and then do Dante's characters speak, but even then they do not reveal their characters so much by their words as by their looks, acts, or situations. We judge more by the smile of Beatrice what she is and feels than by her philosophizing. Dante is an allegorizer, and as such is simply unapproachable. When he has located men and women in some section of hell or some circle in purgatory, or placed them in some one of his numerous heavens, he means that a description of the locality and its general significance must suffice for the reader, who is left to particularize as he pleases. Dante thus gives food and suggestion to other poets who delight in making the Italian poet's characters tell what they know. Dante's "Sordello" of few words becomes the basis of Browning's most exclusive soul-study.

In making a comparison of Browning and Shakespeare in the matter of emphasizing Soul in poetry, I think it is much a question of degree rather than kind. Such characters as Macbeth, Othello, Hamlet, King Lear, and others that one ordinarily familiar with the great English dramatist will at once think of, represent the passions of the human soul, as given in the main in drama, in such a way as to gain for Shakespeare the verdict of "prince" among men who have essayed to portray the human heart. The process and progress of temptation have never been better given in prose or poetry than in Macbeth. The inception and development of jealousy is portrayed by a

master-hand in Othello. The evils of irresolution and the destruction of the man as a consequence are seen at their best in Hamlet. The gnawings of grief in consequence of filial ingratitude reach their supreme presentation in King Lear. What more, it may be asked, could Shakespeare have done to gain the place of the poet, by preëminence, of the human soul? The answer is not so difficult as it would seem to be.

Shakespeare dealt in soul-analysis as a feature of his work; Browning gave his force to it. What Shakespeare could have done, had he taken Browning's course instead of the one he did take, cannot be definitely stated. But as matters stand the creation of character rather than the analysis of character was the work of Shakespeare. His supremacy here is shown by the way he has disassociated himself from the characters which he has created. No one else has succeeded in this as he has. Characters seem to come full-fledged from his brain, with their definite traits, and yet with so little of the poet's personality about them as to astound us even to this day.

When we come nearer to the Shakespearean characters we find that his men and women talk oftener to one another than to themselves. People who talk to others, unless under very rare circumstances, hide rather than reveal their inner thoughts and nature. Now when Shakespeare gives us soliloquy or monologue, we have his characters revealing themselves to the extent of the poet's power of

expression, or so far as such revelation serves the poet's purpose. When the King in *Hamlet* says,

O, my offense is rank and smells to heaven,
It has the primal eldest curse upon't,
A brother's murder;

or when Richard III. says,

With God, her conscience, and these bars against me,
And I no friends to back my suit withal,
But the plain devil and dissembling looks,
And yet *win her* —

we have men speaking for the moment their innermost thoughts, and thus portraying their wickedness and wretchedness: but all this is done in Shakespeare as it were incidentally, and in short speeches. He gives us glimpses now and then of the inner chambers of the hearts of his characters, but this is exceptional. The brief soliloquy, to suit dramatical purposes, is indulged in, and the characters are again plunged into life to dissemble as before.

How is it in Browning's characteristic poems? The dramatic is *incidental* and the monologue is *supreme*. His characters are created to tell *all they know of themselves*. They are *talking* rather than *acting* characters. It is noteworthy that while we have in some instances the poet's men and women talking to others rather than to themselves, yet their very auditors illustrate the fact I am contending for, namely, that Browning means that his characters shall tell *the truth and the*

whole truth as they feel it or know it. In no instance has he more definitely determined that a creation of his should reveal herself completely than in case of Pompilia. But Pompilia, while not depicted as speaking to herself as does the Pope, is on her deathbed, and with but a few hours to live. That very fact gives her the chance to open her soul to the world. Caponsacchi tells his story to the Court; but he is so thoroughly carried out of himself by his love for Pompilia that we at once have no fear but that he will tell the whole truth concerning her and himself. His story to the Court has all the characteristics of a monologue. When Louis Napoleon is represented as speaking the truth of his life, he has a congenial young lady as his sole auditor, but she becomes an auditor only to give him the opportunity to pour forth all he thinks of himself both good and bad. Thus it is all through Browning's poetry. If his characters speak to others rather than to themselves, they speak to auditors who have become inspirations to them to tell the truth, rather than hindrances to it. The auditors are those to whom the Browning characters *confess* rather than *talk*, as in the case of the wife of Andrea del Sarto, or Bishop Blougram's dinner companion.

Shakespeare, then, creates that his characters may play their part on the stage, and reveal so much of their real selves as suits his purpose. Browning either brings in upon the stage a character already known, or one he has created, that

he may have the man reveal himself with reference to that single thing which the poet regarded as the only end worth while in the study of man—the development or dwarfing of the soul. Shakespeare as best suited to tragedy gives oftenest men and women going to the bad: Browning delights in the soul's aspirations, and seldom fails to connect even his weaker creations with the immanent God. It is SOUL in his characters, not characters as such, that Browning stresses.

In the matter of stressing the soul, Goethe is perhaps the poet who makes a nearer approach to Browning than any other. The most casual reader of "Paracelsus" must think of "Faust," and "Paracelsus" is representative of as much Browningism as any of the poet's productions, with perhaps, the exception of "The Ring and the Book." We find our minds turning to Goethe's "Iphigenia" when we strike Browning's "Balaustion." We think of Goethe's lyrics when we read Browning's, and note how both poets made Love their principal theme, and possess the power of leaving a definite and living idea with the reader by means of a short poem. Both poets are principally concerned with men and women, subordinating to character-study everything else.

The similarity that I have indicated between these two writers is due in part to the age in which they lived. They were heirs of the same psychology. They were alike idealists in philosophy. Goethe was a follower of Romanticism with which

Kant sympathized so much. Browning was just as firm a believer in "heart" as against "head." There was a pantheism, of an allowable kind, that was common to both.

But I believe something more than the age in which these men lived, and the philosophers with whom they sympathized, combined to make their poetry similar. They temperamentally sympathized with much the same things. While far apart in some respects, they are near enough together constantly to remind the reader the one of the other.

And yet, with all Goethe's greatness,—such as to gain for him the name of being one among the three greatest poets that have ever lived,—the contention is still good, I think, that Browning surpasses him as a poet of the soul.

Coming at once to the masterpieces of both, compare "Faust" with "The Ring and the Book." They agree in that the soul plays the most important part in the two poems. They agree in making evil serve as a kind of handmaid of good. The bold ground is taken in "Faust" that the Devil may so far overreach himself as to convert a man who becomes disgusted with evil, even where the man has made a compact with evil. The Margaret of "Faust" calls forth quite as much sympathy as the Pompilia of "The Ring and the Book,"—but what a difference in the two women! Both are uneducated—at least unlettered—and both women of keen intuitions: but Pompilia is a

spirit, while Margaret is a beautiful, pious, loving, but erring girl, who lays all on the altar of human love. I hesitate not to affirm that Goethe was not capable of creating such a character as Pompilia—so free from a sense of the earthly. It is probable that Mrs. Browning sat for the picture in all that is highest and best in Pompilia; but no matter, here is Browning at his best in the production of woman as the embodiment of a great soul—and nothing in Goethe's poetry can equal the creation.

In the character of Goethe's hero we have the one human being that the poet follows through two poems—the first and second parts of "Faust." He is to these books what Job is to the Old Testament drama of that name. Everything is made subordinate to the one man. Here is soul-study and soul-analysis to the ability of the great German poet to give the same. It is no secret that Goethe later in life decided to "save" Faust rather than let the traditional story of Dr. Faustus be his guide. It must be evident to a discriminating reader that the writer of "Faust" is embarrassed at times in regard to the course he had best pursue with his hero. Finally he shows him as having so far changed from being entirely selfish and self-seeking as to have a scheme for the betterment of the poor of the land, where they may have homes and lands. Faust has so far seen what it is to live—to live for others and not for self—as to take a joy in it beyond what he ever felt in the ways of sin: at that moment he dies, and, while claimed by

the Devil according to the compact, is saved so as by fire on the general principle of "fitness."

How much of the inner man do we see in Goethe's hero? A glimpse here and there, and then a plunge into all sorts of fantastic revels and weird carnivals. A soliloquy now and then, representing a sad, aspiring, but disappointed man: then the world with its hubbub, and Faust taking part in it all. It is soul-development, of a sort, but we cannot fail to see that Goethe is taking strange interest in scenes which have little in them to recommend them save that the poet likes to follow his fancies. The suggestion is strong that, while showing the development of a soul amidst all sorts of worldliness, the poet is taking quite as much interest in the worldliness as in the soul.

"Faust" is nothing like as earnest as "The Ring and the Book." Goethe has given us a devil, Mephistopheles, who is so good-natured, withal, as to suggest that he never meant to do great harm to Faust. If evil is what serious men think it is, then Mephistopheles is a mock devil—a mere creation, in something of an apologetic mood for so much slandering of the Devil, who is represented by Goethe as after all not so bad as he has been made out to be. "The Ring and the Book" on the other hand, is in dead earnest. Guido, while a man, is a devil,—suggestive of the Spirit of Evil as revelation represents him. Singular indeed that a representation of the devil incarnate in Goethe should be far outmatched by the *man*, Guido, who

has simply been diabolized by sin. As a soul-study, Guido far exceeds Mephistopheles—if for no other reason than that the world feels Browning's creation to be both a true and an earnest one.

What in *Faust* can compare with the priest, Caponsacchi? Here, too, is soul-awakening and soul-development; but, as in the case of *Pompilia*, the spirit in the man becomes at the last so prominent as to make the reader forget all else. We are studying a soul, not a man.

I know it may be said that Goethe's characters in "*Faust*" have no such opportunity to reveal themselves as have those in "*The Ring and the Book*," as all in the latter poem are either on the witness stand or seen in the secret chambers of their homes, and have the secrets of their souls revealed because the conditions of the poem require this to be done. This is notably so in the case of the Pope, who reveals as much of Browning's real philosophy, as even Rabbi Ben Ezra. But, the choice of a theme, as well as the treatment of it, indicates the trend of a poet's mind. When Goethe would give us a soul-study he takes a man of the world, plunges him into the revels of the world, and incidentally shows him deteriorating or spiritually improving under it all. Goethe wanted as much of the "world" in his poem as he could get, for he loved to study man as he saw him, not necessarily deeply, but as a passing force. "*Faust*" is thus full of suggestive touches, but has few careful analyses.

Browning indicates his trend by seizing on the idea of an old murder case in Italy to make a study of character, under such conditions as will best serve to bring to light the innermost plans and purposes of men and women. We have the souls laid bare—because Browning wanted a theme that would admit of such treatment. When we lay aside "The Ring and the Book" after reading it carefully, we feel that we have had insight into souls—we feel we know the men and women who have acted their parts in the play. We think little of the world, and little of mere externals: we have been concerned almost exclusively with men and women shut in from earth and in such extremes of life as to show us what human hearts are capable of under these extremes.

It is hardly necessary to add that Goethe in his treatment of love is much more concerned with the conventional and merely human passion, based on "elective affinities," than Browning. Hermann and Dorothea are happily married just as a modern novel might marry them, and this seems to be all Goethe had in view in the writing of this beautiful poem. Browning might not have made the course of love run so smoothly, but he would out of the loves of the two interesting people have brought forth a passion which had far less of earth about it. Browning's Norbert in "In a Balcony" says, when about to face death with his loved Constance,

Men have died
Trying to find this place, which we have found.

Browning's people in love more often miss than find their prize; but only to find something in human love higher than the mere earthly possession of it. It is usually connected with that eternal principle of love that makes this life seem unsatisfactory. Witness this well-known passage, which probably gives Browning's own idea of what love ought to be in its higher manifestations. The dying Pompilia, in her testimony, turns to the man, in her thought, whom she loves with all her soul, and says:

Marriage on earth seems such a counterfeit,
Mere imitation of the inimitable:
In heaven we have the real and true and sure.
'Tis there they neither marry nor are given
In marriage, but are as the angels: right,
Oh, how right that is, how like Jesus Christ
To say that!

Speaking of Caponsacchi's soul, and her attitude to it, she says:

He is still here, not outside with the world;
Here, here, I have him in his rightful place!

And doubtless Browning intended this to be read under the supposition that Pompilia pointed to her heart.

Perhaps nothing by way of quotation would better reveal the attitude of Goethe to love, the earth, and experience, than his introduction to *Faust*, where, as a man advanced in years, he calls on the "dim forms" that pressed about him, when

a young man, to resume their reign, and, as they do, the poet says:

Shades fondly loved appear, their train attending,
And visions fair of many a blissful day;
First-love and friendship their fond accents blending,
Like to some ancient, half-expiring lay:
Sorrow revives, her wail of accent sending
Back o'er life's devious, labyrinthine way,
The dear ones naming who, in life's fair morn,
By Fate beguiled, from my embrace were torn.

Taking into consideration that this is but a translation, which cannot adequately produce the original, still the thought is there, and reveals the cry of the man over lost youth, lost power, lost friends, and unfriendly "Fate." There is little more in this than making capital of a man's bitter experiences. This is the conventional way of treating such a theme as that which Goethe is handling.

In Browning's "La Saisiaz," written under the shadow of a great sorrow and calling to mind a greater one, the poet asserts his "belief in Soul" and is "very sure of God," while his personal sorrows, which the German poet would bring to the front, are repressed, and the soul of Browning, chastened by them, is seen in its faith:

I have lived all o'er again
That last pregnant hour: I saved it, just as I could
save a root,
Disinterred for reinterment when the time best helps
to shoot.
Life is stocked with germs of torpid life; but may I
never wake

Those of mine whose resurrection could not be without earthquake.

Rest such, unraised forever! Be this, sad yet sweet,
the sole

Memory evoked from slumber!

After this brief and superficial survey of the three poets, who, while suggesting Browning in some things, yet are not, though as great as the greatest, his equal in the one particular of which we are writing—it may be a more direct way of dealing with the matter to take up some of Browning's more prominent poems, and instead of making elaborate quotations, which would extend over pages, show the ruling ideas of these poems.

Browning's earliest production, "Pauline," is in the form of a confession, and tells of the soul's awakening—a revelation of high ideals and low aims. His next poem, "Paracelsus," is a study of a soul whose passion was the acquisition of knowledge—this poem being almost exclusively a study of soul-development, though in the face of the baffling effect of the mind's limitations. When we come to "Sordello" we hit upon a poem that is by preëminence a study of the soul—known and asserted to be such. The study, however, is soul-development as against baffling environment. In "Pippa Passes" we have much beside soul-study, but we have the unmistakable Browning idea—a pure, ingenuous spirit affecting others for good, and that unconsciously. In "Christmas Eve," "Easter Day," and "La Saisiaz," to

which might be added such poems as "A Pillar at Sebzevar" and "A Bean Stripe," Browning is wrestling with questions that concern the soul's immortality and also the problem of evil. "In an Album," "Fifine at the Fair," "Red Cotton Night-cap Country," deal with kindred themes—all bearing on the soul as especially affected by the evil of unchastity. These are soul-studies as truly as anything Browning wrote. "Saul" and "A Death in the Desert" are two poems which are perhaps the best known to the general public, and both are so obviously connected with the spirit of man—the first in its prophetic power, and the second in its intuitional—that all we need do is to call attention to the fact. "Rabbi Ben Ezra" is soul-philosophy. "The Ring and the Book" simply marks the climax in soul-study—for *all* centers there. It is noteworthy that after reading Browning we are little concerned with the mere intellect of his characters. Some discriminating writer has said of Christ that he is so portrayed in the New Testament that we never think of His mere thought-power—for the moral is so overpoweringly ascendant. This is in its measure true of Browning's best characters. Goethe's Mephistopheles is *smart*, and Faust is *learned*; but Guido is *bad*, and Caponsacchi is *good*.

When we come to some of the shorter poems of Browning, such as "Andrea del Sarto," "Abt Vogler," "Francis Furini"—we see soullessness, soulfulness, and the relation between body and

soul; and they are all powerfully depicted. In "James Lee's Wife," "Bad Dreams," "Any Wife to Any Husband," and a number of such, we see soul-studies under the shadow of alienation between man and wife. In the poems which might be termed Poems of Casuistry, such as "Bishop Blougram," "Mr. Sludge," "Aristophanes' Apology," "Prince Hohensteil-Schwangau," "Fine at the Fair," and a host of such, we see the moral man made prominent. We have apparent failure claiming success as God sees success; or success as men see it acknowledged to be failure and the man excusing himself; or downright failure, as that of a cheat, known to men and acknowledged by the person himself, yet the person permitted to say the best for himself that can be said.

It may be surely affirmed that no poet but Browning has written so much, and for so many years, and yet by means of the single thread, "SOUL," has enabled us to *string* together all he wrote.

Although I have given myself but little room to speak of Browning's subtlety, this is the feature of his soul-analysis which is the most interesting. He is like a photographer whose genius lies in posing his subjects. The great Camberwell poet loves a striking "situation," and having caught one, he seems to say to his character: "Stand here till I take you as you are." No poet furnishes such stories as does Browning. Even young people in school enjoy and understand "Stories from

Browning." The reason for this lies in the fact that Browning—in spite of his obscure style, his interminable digressions, his almost maddening assumption that you know everything he knows—always has a good story to tell. The best feature of the story usually is that he leaves his readers to guess what the poet does not utter. He is constantly delighting the sympathetic reader by leading him to think he has seen more in Browning than the poet himself saw in what he wrote,—and herein is one feature of his subtlety. The obscure and enigmatical "Childe Roland to the Dark Tower Came" has been interpreted in all conceivable ways. One who for the first time carefully studies it, and who has some imagination, will join the great procession and confidently offer a "solution"—only to find out usually that he has been already anticipated. It is said that an enthusiastic reader of Browning once asked the poet whether Childe Roland was not meant to teach a lesson on "Aspiration," such as "Excelsior" taught: the reply was, "O yes, something of that sort." This is about all the curious questioner could learn from the only man who could say what was meant.

In "Pippa Passes" subtlety runs through the whole poem. The touch of the innocent girl, by means of song, enforced by the Spirit of God, plays upon conscience at critical moments so as to turn men and women from criminal purposes to courageous action,—yet the singer is all uncon-

scious of what she is doing. She, like the Baptist, is but a "voice" in the wilderness of sinful conspiracies and self-indulgence. Some of the touches in this poem are simply inimitable.

Of the great religious poems of Browning, "Saul" and "A Death in the Desert" are best known. We feel the thrill almost of prophecy itself as we glide with David in his song from mere descriptions of natural scenes to deeds of heroic men, then on to love, and to the beauty and significance of sacrifice as illustrated in the priestly functions of the former days—till finally the songs selected by the singer have done their work, and the king has come to himself; but a spirit David himself did not anticipate has caught him, and his voice and harp are no longer his own, but utter the hitherto unuttered and tell in a prophetic outburst of the incarnation of Christ.

In "A Death in the Desert," where a rude Bactrian makes pretense to graze a goat, yet is really keeping watch at the cave's mouth to give the alarm in case of surprise, we find at the close of the poem these words, which, taking in their connection, have sent cold chills over me as though from a shower bath—all from sheer delight at the poet's subtlety. Speaking of those who were present when the author of the Fourth Gospel died (as the situation portrays), Browning says:

Valens is lost, I know not of his trace;
The Bactrian was but a wild childish man,
And could not write nor speak, but only loved.

If the reader who follows the story to this point does not perceive the master-touch in the last line of the above quotation, his case is hopeless, so far as any appreciation of Browning goes.

In "Christmas Eve," "Easter Day," and "La Saisiaz," the thought is as subtle as it is high and purely religious. No mere quotations can do justice to these poems.

In such short but significant poems as "My Last Duchess" and "The Last Ride Together," we see depths which remind one of looking into the bosom of a Swiss lake—so deep yet so clear. When in the former poem the nobleman tells one, who is looking with him at his dead wife's portrait, that because the Duchess was wont to smile on everybody who did her a kindness, he (the Duke) "gave commands," and "then *all* smile ceased"—Browning does not say that the woman died of a broken heart, but leaves the sympathetic reader to fill that out.

In "The Last Ride Together" the humorous and pathetic combine, yet an impression is left that is most pleasing. A rejected lover is riding for the last time with the lady who prefers another, but has granted to the unfortunate one this favor. Instead of brooding over his fate, the rejected man revels in the thought of his present bliss, even to the suggestion that the world might come to an end before the ride is over and he will be found with the woman of his heart.

In "Abt Vogler" and "Andrea del Sarto,"

Browning touches the pathetic in human experience, as it has rarely been touched. In the first poem, where the organist has, while extemporizing on his instrument, been caught up into the "third heaven," he wonders if what he has produced can ever be repeated, the moralizing thereon is as thrilling as it is subtle:

All we have willed or hoped or dreamed of good shall exist;

Not its semblance, but itself; no beauty, nor good,
nor power

Whose voice has gone forth, but each survives for
the melodist,

When eternity affirms the conception of the hour.

The high that proved too high, the heroic for earth
too hard,

The passion that left the ground to lose itself in
the sky,

Are music sent up to God by the lover and the bard;

*Enough that He heard it once; we shall hear it
by and by.*

Andrea del Sarto is a powerful presentation of a highly gifted man, an artist, deteriorating under the influence of a woman who is not worthy of his love, and whom he loves unworthily. His paintings are lacking in "soul," and he knows it and bemoans it, yet hints that had he loved as he should have loved, and had his wife been what she might have been, Raphael himself would not have been the now "soulless" painter's match.

I close with some mention of the masterpiece

of the poet, "The Ring and the Book." Here nothing less than the whole story of the murder, the scenes painted so vividly, and the characters brought out so sympathetically, could do justice to the poem. But a scene or two at certain critical points in the great poem must suffice.

A priest, Caponsacchi, has been induced to do the unusual and unheard-of thing—namely, to steal away from a town in Italy the ill-treated wife of a certain nobleman, Guido, and carry her for safety to Rome, in a closed carriage. The two are overtaken on the way, and the infuriated husband thinks murder too good for the guilty parties. The whole story hangs on the testimony given by the parties concerned, in the court. The priest, evidently as honest as he is pure, belongs to that class so often selected as Browning's heroes and heroines—the uncalculating people. He has simply acted, out of a good heart, where a case of pressing need came to his attention. But, in carrying out the plan, he has had revelations of human nature such as he never dreamed of: he has experienced the soul's awakening. In telling his experience to the court, whose incredulity can be felt, so vivid is the scene portrayed—his honesty and his love for the woman, Pompilia, are not more plain than the priest's awkward attempt to hide the love he feels. He thinks the delight he had while sitting by her side in the carriage, as they rode all through the night together, must have been similar to what two saints might experience

who side by side, as martyrs, await the signal for the first resurrection. Perhaps something in the looks of the men before him led the priest to add:

You know this is not love, Sirs — it is faith
The feeling that there's God, he reigns and rules
Out of this low world: that is all; no harm!

Then with unapproachable pathos and humor combined (humor excited at the ill-concealed feelings of the priest), the brave fellow is made to say:

At times she drew a soft sigh—music seemed
Always to hover just above her lips,
Nor settle, — break a silence music too.

The man had a bad "case," as all know who have experienced the symptoms. In fact, the entire story of Caponsacchi is entrancing, in its hints, half-confessions, glimpses into depths of character, unconscious unveiling of innermost thoughts—till the reader is led to ask if ever the human heart were so dissected.

If Caponsacchi's testimony to the court is fascinating, the confession of the dying Pompilia is thrilling. She does not hesitate to acknowledge that in a pure and unearthly sense she loves Caponsacchi. Her account of the memorable ride to Rome has the unmistakable woman's touch about it, and Browning has thrown into Pompilia's story all that his great genius and his knowledge of a woman's way of looking at things gave him ability to put into language. If what I am writing inter-

ests at all the reader who has not read "The Ring and the Book," he will take up Pompilia's story and see for himself its significance: for those who have read the whole sympathetically, there is no need that I give more than one quotation:

Oh, to have Caponsacchi for my guide!
 Ever the face upturned to mine, the hand
 Holding my hand across the world, — a sense
 That reads, as only such can read, the mark
 God sets on woman, signifying so
 She should — shall peradventure — be divine;

Yet 'ware, the while, how weakness mars the print
 And makes confusion, leaves the thing men see —
 Not this man sees — who from his soul rewrites
 The obliterated charter, — love and strength
Mending what's marred.

Here an unlettered girl, with keenest intuitions, born of a pure soul, and those intuitions aroused to their highest by their possessor being on the border land of the spirit-world, pours forth words that partake of philosophy and prophecy, and voice the yearnings of many an aspiring soul, that would give some expression to the difference between what we are and what we would be. Here, too, we see the joy such souls take in those choice spirits who like Christ see in "Simon, son of Jonas," the Peter (Rock) of the future. Pompilia delights in the rare insight that can see "the mark God sets on woman"; but Caponsacchi does more—he "rewrites the obliterated," and sees the perfect in the now imperfect. Doubtless Elizabeth Bar-

rett is here depicted; no matter—not in this one extract only, but in Pompilia's whole story, we find such turns in thought, such unexpected and thrilling touches as to lead us to affirm that no man has yet ever excelled Browning in the subtlety and power which he asserted the claims and the reality of the human soul.

